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An abstract of the thesis of Michael Edward Petersen for a Master of Arts ill International 
Relations, University of Cape Town, May 2008 
Tide: The Impact of the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks on Cnited States' Security Assistance to 
Southern Africa: A Quantitative Analysis 
Rack!:,tfound: 
Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States government deemed Southern Africa to be 
of no strategic value. An impoverished region with a wealth of problems, Southern Africa 
mattered litde to the United States government who approached regional security cooperation 
with a primarily minimalist approach. During the pre-9/11 years the Cnited States did provide 
Southern African governments with some security sector assistance, primarily in direct military 
training and law enforcement programmes. Other areas such as peace support operations 
assistance, border and transportation security, and counter-proliferation training were marginal, 
as were arms authorisations. Everything changed on September 11 th, 2001. Ibe result of the 
attacks was a massive security and foreign policy shift for America. Tn response, the Cnited 
States launched a Global War on Terror, which truly affected its relations with regions in every 
part of the globe, Southern Africa included. 
Research: 
This thesis examines pre and post-9/11 security assistance from the Cnited States government 
to the nations of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, l\hlawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in the time periods 1998-2001 and 2002-2005. Chapter Two 
focuses on pre-9/11 security cooperation and Chapter 'lbree on post-9/11 security cooperation. 
Each chapter quantifies bilateral treaties and agreements, joint military exercises, military 
training, peace support operations training, arms authorisations and grants, nuclear security 
training, law enforcement training, and border and transportation security training and overall 
training expenditure. Chapter Four then pools the data together and prm-ides a pre vs. post-











9/11 levels. Training and arms per soldier ratios are calculated based on the data to produce 
regional rankings of Cnited States' assistance. Chapter Five offers conclusive observations and 
recommendations. 
Results: 
Data analysis of the time periods clearly demonstrates post-9/11 increases in security assistance 
to the region including large increases in law enforcement, border and transportation security, 
nuclear security, military HIV / AIDS assistance, and peace support operations. There was, 
disconcertingly, a significant reduction in military training which dropped due to several nations 
refusing to sign Bilateral Immunity Agreements with the Cnited States government, which 
protect American military personnel from being sent to the International Criminal Court. 
Additionally, there was an almost doubling of training expenditure and a tripling of arms 
authorisations and grants to the region. The post-9/11 years also show a shift in assistance 
priority, as South Africa falls far down the overall ranking and Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, and 
Mozambique become the region's greatest benefactors of the increase in United States' 
attention. Ultimately, the data demonstrates that the Cnited States is approaching the Global 
War on Terror and post-9/11 security relations in Southern Africa with a law enforcement 
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'Together with ollr alliej' and jhendj~ we mtl.ft help Jtrengthen /~/ri(a 'J fragile .ftateJ~· help bllild indigenotfJ 
(tlpelbill!J to JWtre porom' borden', lind help build liP the law e,!/orcement and i!ltellz~ence i,!/TtHtmdtlre to de'!y 
havemjor terroriJtJ. An ever more lethal environment exiJtJ in /~/ri(a aJ lowl dzJil wan jpread b~yond borden to 
inate regional wilr ~onel'. Formin,g caalitiofIJ' q/ the willi/~g and (oOperatille JM/ri!)' ammgementJ are k~y to 
ca,!/ro!ltif~~ thel'e emergif~~ tremJl1e1tional threatl'. " 
PreJident George If: BttJh 
jlt!y 111". 2003 
The September 11 t\ 2001 terrorist attacks on the L~nited States resulted in a profound change in 
l::SG security and foreign policies. Since that infamous day, the George W. Bush Administration 
has been committed to global security cooperation, with a strong focus on 'coalitions' and 
'partnerships' with other nations and regions, as a means of dealing with threats of terrorism, 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and non-democratic regimes. 
With world focus on the Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa, the nature of security 
cooperation between the LJSG and Southern Africa has remained largely unpublicised and 
analysed. It is not clear how the L~.S. has sought greater influence in the Southern Africa security 
sector as a result of the global nature of the 'War on Terror.' 
An empirical question can thus be asked: What has been the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
on how the CSG approaches Southern African security? 
We can assume that 9/11 wal' a catalyst for significantly increased interdependence between the 
C.S. and Southern African nations. ImTstigation of this hypothesis requires precise study of the 
pre and post-9/11 security relationship. Therefore this thesis will be a theory-generating case 
study consisting of two parts. The first identifies a lot of facts about the data and the second 
draws implications about the existing factual interpretations of the case and on future research. 
This is done by examining security sector assistance at the quantitative level, primarily through 
international training data and arms transfer figures. These will collectively demonstrate how the 
world's superpower has penetrated and is shaping the regional security complex of Southern 










region and how through security cooperation programmes, it is working to enhance its own 
regional influence on African policy. 
DEFINITIONS 
This thesis defInes Southern Africa as conS1Stlng of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. This is not a study of 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
'Security cooperation' refers to the following areas: bilateral security treaties or agreements; 
military training and assistance (MIL); military HIV / AIDS assistance; joint military exercises, 
peace support operations training and assistance (PSO); anus authorisations and grants; nuclear 
security training and assistance (NS); law enforcement training and aSSJistance (LE); and border 
and transportation security training and assistance (BTS). 
The terms 'pre-9/11' and 'post-9/11' refer to specifIc periods of time, with 'pre-9/11' referring 
to Fiscal Years 1998 - 2001. 'Post-9/11' refers to Fiscal Years 2002 - 2005. The tiscal rear 
begins on October 1 st of each year. For example, f<'Y1998 began on October 1 st, 1997. The four-
year blocks of time provide consistency for data analysis. 
When reference is made to the size of police forces in tables or within the chapters, the numbers 
are inclusive of all non-military law enforcement offIcials unless otherwise stated. For example, 
counter-narcotics agents may be included under the tenu 'police forces' despite not bt:ing 
labelled a 'police force'. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The main objective of this thesis is to answer the following questions: 












[Fere the 9/11 telTOri.rt attackJ on the United State.r a cattl!y-vt for qynamic [hanJ'l in the Jectlri[y relatiomhip 
between the United StaIN lind Southern Africll? Do the qUlIn/ita/ille meamre.r Jhow a change or not? 
[Fhal are the implicationJ f!f the chllngeJ, ~l a'!Y, in the Jecuriry reilltion.rhip between the United StC/teJ and 
SOllthern /~lricil? 
HvIPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC 
A study of pre vs. post-9/11 security cooperation between the C:SG and Southern Africa is 
important for many reasons. The first is simply due to the general lack of research available on 
the topic, as well as the growing importance of African security affairs. Academic attention may 
be largely focused elsewhere when it comes to post-9/11 U.S. security studies, but that docs not 
mean that regions beyond the Middle East are not changing security relationships with the U.S. 
in significant ways. There have been no academic works comparing and contrasting pre vs. post-
9/11 arms sales, bilateral security treaties and agreements, law enforcement training programs, 
border and transportation security training programs, nuclear security programs, or HIV / AIDS 
assistance for security forces. These areas need to be examined to assess any change. 
This topic will provide valuable information to academics studying African security, C:SG 
officials involved with security assistance, and Southern l\frican officials who arc recipients of 
security aid in the hope of showing the growing U.S. influence in Southern Africa while offering 
solid recommendations for future relations. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research is a triangulation of method through a nuxture of qualitative and quantitative 
methods. The complementary strengths of each method are necessary to provide the best 
picture of the security relationship. Given that the subject area has not been extensively studied 
in prior academic work, qualitative methods based on secondary research are used to build the 











As the thesis question aims to establish the substance of the security relationship between the 
U.S. and the Southern African states, much of the text-based data is in the fonn of documentary 
evidence collected from USG documents. The qualitative method of choice will be based on 
four primary components: Pre-9/11 security cooperation between the LSG and Southern Africa 
as a region and on an individual state basis; Post-9/11 security cooperation between the USG 
and Southern Africa as a region and on an individual state basis; Pre vs. Post-9/11 security 
cooperation analysis; and implications of the data results. Qualitative data analysis is used in the 
chapters to extract themes, identify patterns and make generalisations. 
To complement the qualitative data, the thesis includes the quantitative research tool of 
numerical historic data to help establish levels of security cooperation between the U.S. and 
individual countries. This data is used to determine trends, security cooperation programme 
priorities, and establish favoured nations within the region. 
The ftrst stage of the research analyses the level and quantity of secUtllty cooperation between 
the U.S. and ten Southern African countries from FY1998-FY2001. Several types of data were 
collected. The ftrst was an estimated size of military forces and police forces. Then international 
training data was gathered from all U.S. federal agencies that operate international trainmg 
programmes in security-related sectors, separated into individual years. The training sectors 
were broken down into military, peace support operations, law enforcement, nuclear security, 
and border and transportation security sectors. With the identifted number of personnel trained 
per program per year, came an estimated USG monetary expenditure on military and law 
enforcement programs for each year. Next, anns authorisations and grants from the USG to 
individual nations were collected for each year in the period from both the U.S. commercial and 
government-to-government anns industries. All data is organised into tables for imprm-ed 
representation. In addition to the statistical data, bilateral security treati(:s and agreements; joint 
military exercises; and military HIV / AIDS assistance programs through the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) HIV / AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) are summarised. 
The second stage of the research is identical to the ftrst stage in that it also analyses the level and 
quantity of security cooperation between the U.S. and the same ten Southern African countries 











'The third stage of the research is an analysis of the data in stages one and two. It brings the two 
time periods together at both the regional and country-levels, which lead to a comparison of the 
pre and post -9/11 statistics, to determine conclusions about the research question. Results are 
based on taking the training numbers, arms authorisations, and training expenditure, and putting 
together data tables which show the percent change in a particularly area, comparing pre and 
post-9/l1. 
In addition to the data tables, 'training ratios' were calculated to show how training allocation 
has changed after 9/11 in relation to military and police force sizes. This calculation was 
completed by taking the average size of the military and police forces in the pre and post-9/l1 
years, multiplied by four to represent each year of the period, and then divided by the total 
number of persons trained in either the military or law enforcement sectors. For purposes of the 
training ratio, training figures from the peace support operations and nuclear security training are 
not included in calculations. However, border and transportation security numbers are added to 
law enforcement training numbers to determine a law enforcement ratio. 'Ibis is quite fair due to 
the overlap in law enforcement and border and transportation security. 
Given that the l~ .S. is a superpower, how and if the increases in C .S. assistance have affected 
regional security in Southern Africa is explained. Rased on data provided in the previous three 
stages, this shows how post-9/l1 security assistance has changed the dynamic of power relations 
in Southern Africa as shifts in C.S. attention prop up nations that previously were not identified 
or treated as important partners. 
LL\HTATIONS 
The study of security is wide-ranging and subject to much debate. This thesis will not focus on 
each and every academic perspective of security studies, but rather security relations in terms of 
the realist definition- the use and application of military and law enforcement-related security. 
Traditional elements of security studies fall under military, intelligence, law enforcement, and the 
legal realm. The discipline has expanded in recent years to include extra-traditional concepts 











of 'human security.' This thesis will not delve into the concept of 'human security' and all that 
goes with it. Only the more traditional sectors of defence and law enforcement will be studied. 
Due to the lack of information on specific terrorist threats in Southern Africa, this study will not 
seek to study specific terrorist networks or activities within the region. It will focus more on 
possibility, response, and capabilities that involve U.S. interests. 
When exatnl11111g security architecture, this thesis is not gomg to focus on conflict areas 
involving Southern African states. Iberefore, there will be very little to no discussion on the 
impact of Southern African state involvement in conflict areas such as the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Lesotho, or civil wars and their overlap in Angola and Mozambique. This thesIs is 
not a study of regional conflict. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO RESEARCH 
This thesis opens up information on the scope and types of security programmes the CSG 
operates in Southern Africa and even around the globe. Many of the programmes on which data 
has been collected are not in mainstream focus, particularly in non-lmilitary sectors. In each 
sector discussed, the information analysed and provided should open up a door to orher 
researchers for more detailed exploration of the programmes and how they impact securit:r. It 
will serve as a model for security assessment in other regions of the globe, which may also have 
been overlooked since the beginning of the U.S Global War on Terrorism. This thesis will also 
provide African security experts and researchers with ample data to pursue greater 
understanding of expanding USG security interests on the continent, particularly with the advent 












PRE-9/1! SECliN: 1TY ASSISTANCE 
FYI998-2001 
In thc bt~ 19')0, Southcrn Afnca had a ttS'onai 
population of appro:um~tcly 110500,(0) and a 
regIOnal miht. ty ;12e of 29f1,2lX). Pohc~ and 
PRE_9/11 REGIONAL SEI:I ' RITY SECTOR 
2211,OOO_ The r~glon heed poor ",framuclUre. 
10'" perfonrung mSUlU UUfl< , rlSlng Crlllle, 
epldenuc HIV /AIDS, and fra!1;11e eCon"nUe$ 
, tratCglc c"nccm W thc USG, A L.S 
Deparunent of Defense (D"D) report declared 
cxpllc1l1) how lUt le Southern Afnc~ mattcred 111 
81r .. teg1<: tcnn, to the US go\'ccntncm, 
"Amcnca's sec-urity lnterc"" In Afnc. ~rc very 
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Ta b le I 
combat f",-cc.; and wc hotncpott n" ,hlp._ Wc do dC81cc a<;<;c", 10 F"c,hnc. ~nd tnatcnal, ,,·h tch 
have been and nngh t he e'peclaUy important III the evem of cormngenCle, or "".cuaUons_ But 
ultimately We Sec very hIde tr.ditional strategic interest ill Afoc.,'" Southern Afoc. ".,,, clearly 
not a pnonty, 
nnety of ,ecurJlr programmes mcludmg training for 9,392 mibml}' and ,erunty per<onnd at ~ 
eo,t of n1<"e th~n S27 ,flQ),ooo. 'Ibi, mcluded traming f"r 5,0.\0 unifonned milit.ry personnel in 
genet.1 military traimng prograllUllcs; 1,491 ~blawllln .nd South Afncan milihry perronnel m 
peace support operatio", progr.mmes; 25 South Afncans ill nuclear securitv programme,; 2,24 1 
L I In,led State< Department orDck",e_ Ollicc or Inlcmat<onai Seeurit), AI1"",_ I! S .'>e,'urit)' .\'Irategy ji~ SuI>-
Saharan Ajhca. W,,-,h ingt<>n: omc. "I' Intcm~tional SCCUflt)' AlTai~, {) I Augu,! I 'i95_ "-, round OIl 











via "'Ih Ia,,' .'nfoTcctn<'nl pTOgrdrntn<"; and ]75 offiCial, border and tn.mport.tlon security 
or£ictal, (see Table I). Tm.> muning was complemented by regiunal arms ~l1thoti .. tions and 
grant' exceewng $2.l0,551,()()() (",,~ ' j 'able 2), 
TIu, ch.ptn do,ciy .'xamln<', count'y-bv-
country tr~l1ling staustics, detailed monetary 
alllhO<;'atio", and gt"~nt' for ann,. and ovctall 
trnmingprogcaIII Cxp<'",Jltur<'_ 
Stan.tical data collected fn)m mulurle CSG 
govnnrncm ~gcncl<:' IS u,cd to 'd~nl1fy and 
sutnman,c thc kTci of ,ccurity a''''hln~c_ 
Information for each connt,.. .. IS broken do"n 
lilto <~v~r~l ,~Cl1ong compri'ed of, bilateral 
'C~l.tn ty ITe~I1~, and agrcern~nt" rnil!tatv 
tr.urung and a,"l't~nce. rnll11~'Y I IIV/ AIDS 













P~ E-')/ ll REGIO;"[AL ARMS 
AlTlIORiSATlO:-;;S .00 {;RA~nS 
(Oo:llk on -.S_ d " II . .. ) 
I'lI-IS-A HII' UCS_A UC,,-T , , 
'" w" 
2l(18 1197 2n.l') 14:1<11 , , 
" 1469 ~ ,, 
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Y '(, " IWJ 
, 
6-'4 ,~ l OOIill 73"" 
" " 
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, \0.1 2.ill 
.~ , PSg 
5·'j.l\ m' ,rn~ ,~, 
op<-ration, lraimng ~nd a""tan~~. ann,< authorL'~uo",< and grant,. nudur secll11ty 
traimng and a,,;M.ncC. ~nd botdct and !tan'pottaUon >iC~utity ltol.1nmg and ~"i,t~nc~, 
ANGOLA 
The LTrulcd Stall'" rc~ ~/11 
secutlty rel.riomhip Wlth Angola 
foeu",d pnrn~ril: on th~ poliucal 
wo,kings of cncung th~ clVil wor, 
A, one of lht~e "bsen'u 'lanon. 




















P<'"c<' whIle ()"~rs~~mg ,he i.l."oka Protocol.' I-bslerung cff"Jn to ",h~ th~ ~n<i, l~y in p:u-t to 
. \ngola', 'Ig1llficam strateglc Importance 10 th" l -.S. A ppto:wnardy 70 10 of C .S. oil Import. came 
from Angok which also ,erved a, tI,e United St.t",' .ccond I~tgc,;t illve,Uncnt site and the third 
1'[1$"" traJmg p~tmer ill ,ub-Saha",,, AfrIca,' TI,e USC recognised ,hal a ,;uhl~ and pt-",ceful 
rumo" wet,!d heller "on-c ,.!,,,,,,rican inlere,r~. DllC to tI,e cinl w.r, minimal military anJ 10.'" 
enforcement lramUlg "'-", prmided for ,.I,ngob,ll ()ffi~l:U'; in Ihat there were no lOin! mIlitary 
c~cr"bc", no P'''l.~'' <l1ppor{ "p" .... t101,,; traIning. no \VMD "r cnuntcr-prohferaulJn u,unmg, and 
no border or tt:ln'p"rtation ,e~unty truling and ass,"lance of any kmd. 
In thiS period {h" USG only llim.d 16 Angolan tnlli\a'~\' ~mllaw ellf()r~emt:nr offiCIal, Yla th"", 
progrntnmc", al ,evcr~l l{"-",,onal Cenle" for Seeunty Smdie, (RCSS), th,' U.S. llcpattinL~u of 
J",nc~ (Dol) O",cr,ea, PH>S"L-ulori~l llndopmcnt, A"i.stanc~, and Traming (Ol'IlA'I) ~nJ th~ 
llTUg Fnforcetru:nt Agenq~' Int~matIonal Tr'llmng Progratn (DEA-l'll') (see Tabl~ 3). B'Tond 
traming dato., Ihe re,! of Ih~ ""eurity cooperat"'n catne III the form of arms sale, (,ee Tabk 4) 
Bihleral Secumy neaP", ~OJ ,'\;:!,\'ctncnh 
In what ,,-a, ,he rno", ,igrufIeant "gn of imp'ovltlg rch""on" 111 FY99 the C.S, and Angol~n 
governm"n" laun~hed Ihe u.S.-Angohn BLl.nul Con,ult.livc Commission. ,dueh aim",! 10 
enculrragc dIalogue .11<1 coordina!" ptof1"rnme, and need, Th,. cornn"",on mchld~d 
comm1l.tee, lll\'olving den,nce anJ law L1,fotcetnent co-operation. I'ormcr A"i,lanl Se~retary' "f 
St~!e for 1\fnean A ffmr', H~nnan Cohen, de,cnhcJ ,h" "grufIeance of the comrni,,1(l1l. ~, "'I he 
Bilateral Con,ultatw" Conuni"ion " a d~,-ic<, thai i, u,eJ hr Ihe U,S. goYCrnlTI<'nt to 
demo"'tr"t~ that thL,- "'lint 10 ha,e major ""provements in their rd"lion,h,p ,,~th p<trticuhr 
countrie,. This j, what was done ,,'th Sou,h A[nca, In dfect 11 ,a)" to th,· olher natlon- rou are 
a pnvilegeJ parlner for u,.'" 
, Kon,leir",r. Wall'" H. III . AITic.' . W"k StOles; U.s. Poli cy Option' if] A"gob.-' T <slImony Bot",e Ih< 
&n"~ Comm;llee On Fore,!?" Relalions "ubcommirtee on A ti-ie~n A IT~i"" \\,'",hington D,C " 16 December 
2002. 
J Umktl Stale> Depaltmelll ofStm. Bureau of Poiltical·Militllrv AfTa;". Congre.<siomJ f're,ematwn JOt-
F""OIl'n ()p~l'a/i(),,-,: I'i,,,",,j J'e~r NQ7, """""ing'''''': COPO, November 1'1')6. p. 1 77 
, Herman Conen Imet'Vi<-w, by John Ro'enberl:> in "1 ma!?illln!? Angola" by Internali"",al "-peei"1 R.rmrh a\ 











nOf1,eXlste11t as th~ !mernotiO<1al -"filit"r}" 
F Jw:auun and Traimng rrowamm~ (IMF1) 
pru!:tam wa, su'pe11ded 10 r;Y98 due to 
continued ho,ohlles between the Angolan 
gf)\"ermnL'flt and rebel force.s, 'Ilus left only the 
ness progrAm th~, sm, six Angolan dcf~n~~ 
officials at a cost "f $24,0110 to "{{end defet1ce 
PKt 'J. U ~I , I KIn' '''Il'! K, I Jt 'l<O 
pK,)(,K ""Il ,,\I'! "I'tll Rl ll' I \. 
'''VII , 
I"" ,,,' I ' ']',n ",' 
seminars at the USG', AfrICa Center for StrategIC nCS'L ... 
S,",k, (ACSS) (,ee Tahle 4). The SemIna", 
focused on ciVlI,truhtarr u l",ion, and humon 
nghts, L,S. officials felt An~laf1 offiCIals heoefited from the l\CSS ,emInars becaus.e, 
!Ot O 
"it w~.s important m allowing them to hear di'parate VlewS and break out of an "dated mentality 
born~ of }'~a",< of ""at,'" 
U ,5. HI V ! l\\DS aSSl'tanc~ to the Angolan ,\rmed forces (Fl\.A) via the Dep~runet1t of Defense 
lilY! All)S PtL"\'emion PtoW',m (DHAPP) rro..,-am began in FYO] wlu:fl an lflillal need, 
."c"mem "'., condu~led," 
$2..'ill9 ,(00 m attn,' aluhorisauon.s wa, grant~d to Angola through the U.S, commercial defence 
mdustry (,e~ Table 4). Most of the approved arms export lKen,c. "'L't~ fot tnt.scellaneous <par~ 
patt, for aircraft mill!tenance, but totals .Is" Included $42,00/ fOT expk.slR'S and $2,() 1Il,IKXJ 
, St(ICkhoim International Pc,",c R"c.rth I,,'lilulo at hnp:/ifirsuipri.org/tlOll_ fi"!lmjle~.php 
• Um",d Sl"l.' iJep"rlmcn l "I' Defen,c. tJcpartr"om of tf\<: Navy. N a,'Y 1 !oalth Rosearch Center. The Fir<l Four 
r,ar.<: Synop.ri< of/he Global /:lfarl. San Dio~o, CA JUliO I,OO~, p. ~ 
'Uniled Stales Dtparttlktlt of Sial<. omc. ofDekn,e and Tratk C,,,,\rols, Dir<"' Comm<rcial Sal« 
4uli1oci,allom Ii" Fisc,,' Yeor 20(1(). Wo,hinglon GPO. 2000, p. 4 











fOT mUn1110n'-Td.,cd C~port"' Th" " not,,""onhy hcnu,c the c()um'} "'~, techmcally ,till m 0 
clvli war and sull a fIre control system was authrmscd for ,ale to the govemmc!lt. 
Law EnfQrcement Inurung and AwoI.orr 
Law enforcement assISlance for Angola was not. priori£)' for the L'SG beyond payments to the 
UN Iru'Sion. Only N;o law enforcement-tra1ning programmes were acove, both ill FY')')-OO. 
These induded rl,,, DE. \-ITI', wmch trnJneJ ",ght CotUlter-narcoOcs Angolan offiCIals, and the 
( lPD,'. T program ,,",lCh Imincd N'o Angolan 1a,,')'~'IS ;n wln'na] pro,ceuna'" The L'SG did not 
vlew l\ngob as a major concern for narcotics cr1mc affecting the U.S. OT as" centre of money 
latuldenng, although in FYOl Angola was added to a Suo!e Department Bureau of International 
t-:aru)uc' and I ... "" Enforcement (IN!.) list of u)Ul1tncs ,,> watch for pOlenual mcreases in drug 
and finanClal cnmc.' 'Ibis conccrn led to the U!:iG's first "fkr of umm]k funded .nl1~T1"'~ and 
counter-narcotic, uaJrung dunng FYOI. TI,C , a",e )'co.r a low enforcement necd, a"e,"lUent 
'illye)' team was sent {o {he counuy wah plans to !!,tow coopcranon .nd (mming.") 
BOTSWANA 
In the pre-9/ll Y~"'"" Bo{swa na enjoyed a 
' trong bilateral rclanon,h{p with {he { T,S. It 
was described as a "reglOna] player" and 
ha,'mg "one of Ihe r~).,~on\ most profe<SlOnal 
and re'ponslhlc ""ht,')' estabiJ,h<n<:nts and 
offen a model for ci,·ilian-m..Wtary relations for 
[he teH of d,C contmcnt"lI l'h~ ""lot 
• United S",,., 0"P..-tm<nt of St~1<. OtT",e ofOef<"," ..,d T ,,,,Ie C<>ntroi •. Direct Commercial Sale" 
Awhori.<u,u",.,jiJr F'.,eal Year 2IXII. Wa,hing(on. 2()()i. Part II., p I. 
(hup-!!" ww .pmddlC· .. ,"'lo govirpt~5.\ inlro.hlmj ~""""ed 2.l Novcmoc, 2(01) 
, lJH;!ed Slale' Ikparlmen[ of Slalo. Bureau of Inkm",;"nal Narml;,,' and Law b,[orc."",m AfToj". 
inlemOlion,1i Haremi.', Om",,1 S""'eKY Reporl 2(101. Wa>.hitlgtC>lt: LiPO. March 2W2 
(http://www.slale.gov/p/iHI/rb..-tl.t.p!/j atc~"ed 24 No,,~mocr lOO6 
" Unikd Stale, Departmenl of Slale. Hu,~au of JnlemaiionaJ Nar"",-i", and Law Enfi,,-remenl AlTai" 
imcm,uiooai Narwlic. Comrot SlrmeKY R,,!,orl 21)1)1 I"ash,ngwll: GPO. Morch 2002 
(http:,·iwww,state,go_"-piinl'rls"-llrcrpl.-) 
I J Unned States llepanmom of State, 1>",""" of Polittc~I-Mllj{my AlmlfS. ('onff~"f/Jnai fludK~' Juwjica""" 











meluded helping 1I0(,w.rta b"ild rq~1(Jnal power, Irnpwving secunty te>ourc~ ,lIocanon ,nd 
" I' I' " LWI -tnlurary '" aUon •. 
Th~ U.S. tn\l!K.u 4SR Bots,,'ana military and secunty officIal, at a cost of $2.259,400 with th" ,'a,t 
malority (433) trainIng in mlhtar), p:rogratntnc, (,~c Tahl~< 5 and 6). AdJil1nnai f, ,rm, of sccun,y 
assistance carne in the form of artn ... le authori,atlons, military fmaIlcing grant', and the 
<:<tabhgrunen! of an international Law Eniorccment 1\cademr in GabowTlc (ILEA-C) 
Bor,wana dtd n,,! acrivdy reeeJ"e or particIpate 111 am· CSG-sponsored peflce <u ppon 
operanoru;, bordn or traIl'P<-'ttal1on security, and nuclear <cclIrIty tmining ptogt"rnrnc< 
In JuJy 2()()() the L;.S. and Botswana goyerrunems 
mrctcd I1lto an agreement c,t<thlt,h111g an 
im,-m,uonai l.aw I ':n ['>tc~tn~nt ;\c"d~tny to, 
prnnd~ tnming for middle m,nagers ii-om cliglbk 
'" " II 'If I Rll\ "'>vPI"\II"" ~" . ... k '\\'11 I '"VI ~'111 aI I>\!' 
1m I ,'" ",' 
" ... , ,{I .. .lui, ~'l 
IlEFE~r.E ~URCEMENI 
,,~ : " " AI .... , , " IMET ,~o 201 r~ 62·1 





fund,'o hy Ih,- lISC;, bUl i, ,taffed by both L;.S. and 
Jl.otswan, na"on,l. wl1h ttairnng conduc ted by 
federal l-.S. agencle,_ 1-101>""",,, w," cho,,-n "' a 
sil,- due 1<> "long ''''-ndmg and clo,e coopemuon in 
law enforcemenl .no mum.1 mlncst m combaung ,jl~ ~3~ I~: ~:~ n" 
[JCS- l·t2\JI 
'I " " I'd d" h trans-rultlon" crune, I Is '-"gn,- la, ,,:h'C t. e rA 
I'MI' , " , IS97 1,')0 101ct~Sl" of :ill particlpanng SADC n.tions in I'M""- \ 12 W -11') '''" ". 
,evcr,1 way" by c"abh<hmg and e,'<panding the , , , , 
long-term hal",n among law 
enfotc"m~'1l1 offiL~al, ,hal arc L-ririe.l 10 combating Inlernational crime; by 'upp<>tt:ing 
" United Siaie, Departments of St"te Bure"" of Pol iTical_Milil.,), hllllin;_ For€lf7I ~fllllury l;-~jnjng "m! 
A_'-",<lance and DoD Engagemenl ACIMli2J of In<ereSI: Jaim R"f'O"t to Conl'7~u fi,,- Fucal Ye,"- }OOI January 
'00 ' 
" lnwTTlallOnal Lu" Enfor<emem Academy Gai>or()l]e Weh,il._ 











ocmocracy and strcssillg the rule of law ill Ifltemaoo<ul and dome'tlc pahe<; opcrauom; anJ by 
"i'lng the profc",JOn~!J, m of office," lm-oked In the fight "gam.! cnm,,"", 
The U.S. fTa;ncJ ·n.> of the 4Sllllo(Swanan offiCials vIa foUl: rrulita,y programmes; IMET, Jom! 
Comlnncd Exchange and T'aJll1og aCEl), ltCSS, and the A"tauon J...,aJchrup I'wW' .. m (ALl'). 
IMET lrllncJ the mo't ",(h 244 over ,he fOllt )'C.'" at a cost of $1,BH,OIXI. A tm"l of $_n_"IX~ 
was spent on tri>U1ing 174 Botswana Defence Force (BDF) commandos in unspeClflCd sublect 
arc •• through JCET (sec Tabb 5 anJ 6). 
The numbers trained indud, 14 flDF officer, ,em to smmI leadership ,,,(run"IS at thO' George 
Co .\\arshall EuropblO Center for Secunty Sn,Jie, (GCMECSS) in Germany and the 1\fucon 
Center for Srrat"f\lc Sn,,:iJcs (. \CS.'SJ. Bot,w .... 'a "'''" one of only tv,n countrIes In the '''gU}fl (the 
other bemg South Afnc.) fundn.! to ,end" pilot w t""rung through ,h" VX A" Force'" 
AVlaoun L~.dership l'rogrnm (lli.l'). TIns occurred ill I'Y98, after which th~ pros",m Wa, 
suspended llntil FYOz. 
;'1111",0' r!lv IAiPs ASS/'tance 
The DH A l'P progrlm was "'ttla,,,d In 1I0"",oll, m FYO I wh~n offici"ls conducted .n '" Cl>umr) 
need, .",e"ment in order to begm combaung HIV I AIDS in the BDF. The tnlual a"e"m~nt 
led to a Botswana fingadler G eneral belllg assigned as the BDI' 1-IlV!AIDS Policy Director and 
lllctc",ed f,UlltC pwgnunmc dCSlgn coll"borl(1on betwccn ,he DIlA"?"? Center for Dt",",,, 
Connol, ,he BOP." 
Ann! Authoo'm:ion5 and Grants 
RcgiuMlIy. and unly '~COflJ to ~uth Afne"> in the ptc_')!11 y~a"', But<w"na h~ncfiteJ from the 
rughest a"thon,"oo1l< uf defence/arms sale' via the FMS-A, F:\fF, "nd DCS-A progra'nm~' 
wh'~h cullectwdy to",lI~d $41,115,000. The $2,122,000 in 8fS arms agreements wa, pri,narijy 
"Ste""e" Schrage, "Ded;';m,on of ILLA Gaborone." r~mrt, m JeJication CC'Ctll<"'Y. Gal>orone. llC>!swona. IS 
Maroh 2003 a' http://wwwstmcgowpiinlirl,irm.'203 I ~,h1tn o<"c"ed 2 fd)fUm)' 2007 
" \In,,ed S",,", Department otTJeten, •. Department or the N,V)', ?-l,vy Health Research Cemer. The FirS! Four 











for ammunit1<'" tdat"d items"" wdl '" a ,eric, "f 'mall b" ,us, wruch were hkely 10 help ill river 
patrols along the oorders. The $37.410,000 I!l aurhori,auon< wuh the DeS programme was 
prnnartly for nulilat} electrolllCs, computer<, comml1n , ~,,,ion and radar equipment, aircraft 
plll"cha.'''. and sl~~ttS for tank. plan"" and annOUTe,] "eh,d" matn'enam:c (sec Table 6). 
La,,' Enforcement Mauling and .:\ssistance 
Beyond Ihe remarkable bila!e",1 agreement eMabh,hing Bot.wana as the ho"! of the 1l£A. very 
link three! Lt",· enforcement traimng or """,stance WaS ""t'"ted in the pre-9/11 yeats. Just 2S 
Hol,wana o[{idal, part1C1p"tL...J III 11ltem~t1o",,1 Lt,,· enfornment traimn!, ;L,,,,,,nS with FS. 
federal agen~1"". Th" induckd two Bots,,"'ana le" .. 1 profe,",onol, through OPD .. '"!' a, well a, 2., 
others with ..arlO\.!, .';kohol, Toba~-.;o. and l'ireanns Agency Imcmati"[lal Training (ATI'), 
DHA-l'll'. and FedL11l1 Bl11"eau of Investigation (FBI) sponsored law enforcement programmes 
(,ee Table 5) 
LESOTHO 
Although the LS, amI I"",otho nUlnta'ned 
go"d "tate-to-M~le relatio"s in the pre-9/11 
ycar., Ihe mtern,,1 1n,1 ahilit}' w1thin ] .<:sotho due 
to poor military and robee mstitutions bc<:anlC 
Ihe mam seruriry issue bem'een the two naUOn1;, 
Th" LS, d,d 11<~ ",·am further mternalll1Stability 
to conmhu.e to ,,,gional d"st:.lh,h_,~t1on so l -,S, 
efforts focused encour.gtng 
development of an apohuca\, democno tk. "nd human nghrs a"'ar" mll nmy force. Table 7 
' lberefore Amerl~an ""cu,it)" ~oopenouon "'os only in th" nulitat} Sector through the IMET and 
RCSS prognmmes and with bw cnfm<:ement ,-i" OPDA'f, Th" ptogr=es prm,idcd tmirung 
for 221> Roy~l Le'otho Defence Force (RLDI') memhcr. at " <:' ''t of $.,]9,000 ("'-'" Tahle. 7 ~nd 
8). No nuclear security, border or tt"nspmtanon ,,,,urit}', pcac" mprOtl operntiolls, tnilitar;' 











M!.!!!1!."') "[miDlng: amI '\sSL'twce 
M,h,ary pW"""nune, were focuseJ on civil-milimrr 
,dation, and re'pLx;1 for hllman right, with 
aJdioonal uruning area, odd<:d 111 I'YOI fot J,,~sler 
management ~nd peacekeepIng opero"O!lS TIl[" 
PHI '1I''''~11l ' ''''PI~'JI'''''' 
I'H''",HI'I'III\PI .... llrrl.(I iJq, 
II '0111" 
" • • ,_ ., L _.r u,,,, 
DEtI<NCF~"nd J.~~ ENrORCFMJo.!>; J , , 
.]. . 
I'!lm",} me~ns of tranung was ,'j" the J!l.U'T 
ptogromme """h 221 pcreonnel partlclpatlon 111 ti,e 
four-year period. L;pon e'mht; 'hmen',:",::r;':h;','::':';:S':':' ,\;~~~~~~~~2~~2~=~:':'! 
111 I'Yoo, ,eVL1l ""mor RLDF officials 
T~b!e ~ 
Law EnfOKement T"'I!l"'~ "D.d /hs;,tal)ce 
Two Le",tho police offic;<:ts participateJ in ~ t.:~G-funded SADC regiDnal c""nret narcotic, 
traitung programme 1n FY~8. Le,otho ofCicj"b "leo p:Jrticlpat"J ",-jth U.~. CustOJrn and Bonier 
P~uol (C1W) onJ DEA agent' in inten;cpnng and mvc.,llg.1rjn" controll"d ,lehvelles of narcoUC, 
from Colombl~, "'" I"'SOthll, to South Afrk<l; wd from Pakistan to !\:;coragua (,.j" l .... "'rho and 
.\hami)." DUring 1"'1'00 l.eSothll SL11t fmrr partiClpants to ti,e U,S",p0!lS,,"cd ReK'Dnal l.aw 
Enforcement T rairung l'eeJ, A"ce.,ment Fotlltn helJ Galx>ronc.!" 
MALAWI 
Prto-9/11 ):ears uw th~ U.S. amI Mob",; as haYIng, "dme rdatlun,; M"I~,," g"n~r:ill) _,upports 
C.S. po,jtion, llIllntL111:Jtronal 1SSU"S."" The Inrun security objectlH I"()r thc esc; 1Il M"I'WI .... as 
to build up "pohI1L-..1 dt:fLllC~ forL..,' III order to help strengthen fragile m,tltution, ~nd p:Jv~ the 
wa), for a smbk Jemoct"trc ."Xld}'. Rd"ti,·~ to it< SIZ" . .\hlmn enlo,~d excellent "",uri!) 
,-danon. with the C.S. TIlls "' ... , likely influenced by it belllg rhe ",Ie ~ourh"m Afric~n natron to 
" United Stak, Dcpartmrnt orStale Uu"."U of IntenJat;onol Noremic, and L.w F.nf<>r"e",enl AlTarrs. 
In/ermlllonal Nal'co,i", Control Simleg)' Rcpo)'1 IW'}. March 2000 Al 
hllp :llwww.stme.goy .. p .. inllrlslnrcrplil999 •. 926.htm 
L1 Un;tod Slates OePOnlmnt of '>talc. Uureau of ImemOHOn"1 Norco!i"' III\d I .• w Enforce",enl AlTa,rs. 
Inlerntltional Nwwli", Conl)'o/ Siraleg)' Reporl 2000. March 200 I Al 
h IIp:l! \\,IW ... <tate. gOY Ip/m IlrI s.'nrcrpli1000i89 3 . him 
'" United Stale, Department of Sia! •. F!ureAO of Polilical·MlIitarv AlTair.'. Congre.»ionai f'reseruatlOn jOr 











partlClpatc III the l\mencan peace support 
Afnea, ,h~ 
(ACRl). 
A '''tal "f 1,~-,1 :>OlD!' ant! :>01alawian law 
=forc~m~nt rec~ivetl mUlling 
aSSistance from the USC at a cost of 
S.\116J)()(), ,h~ malority ofwiach wa, 'hrough 
ACRI, winch tramet! 1,476 MDF perwnnel 111 pea"" suppurt l>p~mti"n, (See Tabl~s ~ Tabk 9 
and 10). Second to ACRT wa, m,litar}, training. which .,upponeJ 447 ).101' pcr"->nnd (S..., Table 
9). Law enforcement !nuning occurred, but for only eight ).1ala"mn officials. There was no 
military HI V / A I DS a,sista11C~, ioint tn1~l:lr;, nerclScs, ~'1fO /count~r-prohf",,~uon !nunmf\, or 
bordcr anu trampottamn "'-'cum}' naming anti a""tancc. 
Military Trajrunr and Asslstance 
The u.s. spon"ored 447 MDI' and MuD pers(lnnd in Military. Ttruning anu A"",sta11<;~ ptogt:ltnS 
in the pre-9/11 yea,",. IMET trained 324 pets(lnn~1 at a wlal co,t of$I,101,1)()O In a yaJ"1~ty of 
ar~",. including [man"",, management, and medlcal care, :>1alawi abl> had regular Int~ucti()n with 
Atn<:nean Sp.:c,al Forces trainers VIa the JCET progrum. JCET training by L; ,S. Spec,al Forc~' 
anti civil affaIrS grouP' o<;curred annually betw~~n FY')')-OI for 111 )'IDI' personnel focu,~tI "n 
light mfantry tactic,. n"., wa" at a cost uf S317,()()(). The mihtar,' wa" also a pilrticipant '" RCSS 
progr:unmes wllh 11 senior It'fldets alt~ntling 'emina" (,~~ Table, ~ and 10) 
r~ac~ Support Oprrntions Training ~d A~nt4.'l.li 
Mala", was the only country in Southern ,Afnca tu parl:t.cip01c in the L;SG's f1agshtp peace 
support operations traullllg progratnme, the .ACRL TM mlhtary re"L~"eu cotntnl1llications and 
other non-Icthal "'-jwPlll<"llt ,,·ith 1,476 troops trainetl at cxpemhtu(~, of $1.6 75,1XX) ('L'C 











1II.1a"" ren,,,ed $2.372,41)() 11l anns ).,'r.lnts and 
aulhon,allom uf wh,ch all but $>.4IJO wer~ 
through uM-orne Furelgn Mtlit~ry l'inaoc"'B 
(FMF) granl, and gm-emnlcnt-to-!,:o'-Cnlmtllt 
tOte'8" I;hbtar), Sales-Agreements (1' :>.iS-A) 11l 
FY9R ('ee Tahle HI)_ The F:>.iS .t1n, expum wert· 
pnmanl:- fur w""pun 'y'tem co~Hructlun dC'ign 
and =crafth -dtidc related ma111tenantt .nd 
'part'" ' 
Law Enfurcement Trainmg and A55ist~nce 
:'I.lal",,·,', potOU' l)()td~ts and prnximltr to Ea,1 
Afn~an lerron" acllVltr WeT~ pnmat' ... cun""",, uf 
the CSG. Despite that, there was vetr little 
, 
""' ,),,1<1 "Ill '''"1'1 ",Jill' PRIH.R""" '\1'1 ",," H' I", , 
'1\1 W' 
. .... " ' .l "" • 
OEFE~CE ~RCEME~r 
[:~~ ,: t1 ~ 1:: ",; 11~~ 
jeE'! , "0 21.1 ,,1 117 
, 
~~\ 
, , ; : ~ m , 
F'd.;:'_A l-I('? , , , H(,? 
, , 
interaclion '" the rr~-9/11 p,ats h.etv.een :>'biaw'an bw enforcement offi~'al, and Table 10 
~olUlterpart ag'Ofl~'~s 1n the L-.S. 1'(0 1;1al",,'an, ""ere 1nnJIYed in hotdeT OT ~0",,~1 
""eun!~' prugnmtne._ Onlr eight :\-bla,,';an bw enfurcement pcf'unnc1 rcccil'ed tta,"tng ftum 
tit<- CSG l1lcludtng N;o ,en;ur drug ufficlal, "',th the DEA-ITI' who att<·nded a DEA-spun'OIed 
two-week se1111nar on drug control 111 <-apc Town. South Afn~a; a. ,,'ell a, four w!th the A"l'F-
IT!'. and tv. 0 P""''''UfOTS with OPDAT (sec 'hble 9)_ 
M OZAMBIQUE 
\J ,S,-Moz.mb'L'ft1l ",~un(y rdalJons 111 the pte 9/11 ytlIS were not p.tt1~ulaTl)' do,e, bu' rlue to 
the fragile , tare of the Mozambi~an g'" ~mmenr and 11l'lilulions. a, well a' an mahtlity to patrol 
,ts coast and horder. the USG pmvided def~nce, law enfoT~ement. .nd ~oastal 'e~unrl' assi,ranL'C 











tntq.~ratc<l ooo_poh tio;:al, p,ofc'''"oal IlTtJbtary] 
force, maintruned at a l",d consi,{ent with 
To work toward. l ;,S. security go~ls, 614 
mlli{ary and other &<onm{y penlonnd We'" 
proYl<kd !,",l1ung at a wst of $H, 1 52,1~~J (.ee 
Tabk, 11 and (2). Th,- majority wa, in thc 
d~fence scctor ,,~th 454 personnel, prImarily 
through IMET ~nd Mme ASSl"anec ptogratnm,-, ("tA). In lhc law cnf"",em'-nt ,,-cto, 
II I "lo~~mb' 'lll(- la"':TN; and <C<:UTl'Y ag<,ot' ".,-FC ;n"ol",-d ill v,noll.' p togr,mm". 
Tabk 1t 
Whll~ 49 Mozambi'llK l"avy personnel wen- tnun,-d 1n t:ni{~d S{~tc. Coast Gu~rd (FSCG) 
proyamm,,, (,n' Table I I). 
11K b'ggc>! amount of ,e~urity ~' '')p''Fa{1on ~ame 
ill t!}(' form of '-qUlPPlfl" and rrnining Armed 
For~es "f "I ozatnbiclu~ (FAD:-'f) dc-trurung 
P~I··}/U't'IRII' '<'<lPII\IU' .... 
rHo '<,I 1"'11 r :\". "'Ill II k. (J, I ~ 
""I\\IBII,1II 
,_ • I , ",.(1,,'1 
[)FJ' EN CF. . Dd I.A IV fi N I O J< CF.\IF.NT 
TRAINING ban~1ion, and in building up ~ Mozatnbl~an de-
mln mg QUick Rca~tl<>n D '--Intnmg F,,,~,,, 
op~",nng un der u.s. DoS c"nuoL In ""' priJ 21JIJ I, 
the U.S. DoS estabhshecl the world', ftrst and on], 
A,uv,ty ~~ FY9'I I'YOO I·YOI T OTA L 
HCSS , , ,,, , ,,, 
TME T 1 ,~ I ,~ 17R '"' (",; INCLE , '''' Uo.) 1 ,(. -IJ(' ~ "ru' ~ 17'X; 21~n 71;)0 
i'UTAL "nB -'-IB 2\"" !S,l2 BllO (fJRDF). Th~ QRDF i, abk w rapidly d '-ploy 
worldwIde, when d,~ Office of \X',-apom Rcm,,,--al 
and Abatetnffit III the ES. Sm{~ Departtn~nt" 
ARMS AUfI[{)RISATTONS AND GRIlI'US 
[)CS-A 
F~IS-A 
., , " , ,U , ,. , ,I, l , 
Bureau "f P"h [!~"j-.Militarv Affairs requcst, It, ~,~o~,~,~,:, ==~,,=::;~,,==,~,~. ==j==2'2,j 
",r,,'~e,. \\'hen Oot d'1'j",-t:d, the t~RD F keep' it, skills sharpened b" hdpm" to dc-mille 
'\j oz~tnb'que a{ the rey"",t of Mozambique', Namnal De-mining ingn1Ut<- (INO)" " 
" United Stnte, Depallment of ~mte. Bureau of Politi<al -Mili'ary' 1\ fh ,,,. Conll,re",\·iotI<1IP"",ntafion Jor 
FureJgn Opera/ian, Fi",,~1 Yea,. 1998. Wa.<ilingto,r GPO, Ma} 19<17. p. 312. 
~, United Stme, DepJllment of Stmc. Bure>ll of Pol i(I,",1 Mil it'0- AIt",Th. Ollie" "f Humanlla""" De-mining 
rr"~ram' 'To Walk Ihe F.W"lh In Safety," W.,hmgt()n: (;PO April 2006, 











The goal is for the QRDF to receIve tasks from the IND and deploy within ten days to 
anywhere in the world that the u.s. DoS, in coordination with Cnited Nations Mine Action 
Service (CN~L\S) directs them.21 
Military Training and Assistance 
Support of the ;'vIozambican defence sector came primarily through the IMET, MA, and RCSS 
programmes. IMET trained 193 FADM personnel in courses focusing on civil-military relations, 
human rights, and budget management at costs of $656,000 (see Tables 11 and 12). 
The majority of C.S. expenditure was on enhancing Mozambique's indigenous de-mining 
capabilities. To achieve this $7,030,000 was spent on helping FADM de-mining battalions and 
developing a Quick Reaction De-mining Force. To train the de-miners, FS. Special Forces and 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel trained and equipped 216 FADM personnel 
from the 1st Battalion of the FADM army22 at a cost of $1,150,000. In FYOO the USG provided 
the commercial de-mining company RONCO with $450,000 to provide FADM with dogs for 
de-mining.2) This was followed in f<YOl when the U.S. continued operational de-mining training 
of FADM at a cost of $2,180,000 (see Tables 11 and 12).24 
Beyond these two major assistance programmes, RCSS was active with five senior FADM and 
~vIoD officials participating in leadership seminars with the ACSS at a cost of $14,000 (see Table 
12). 
21 International Campaign to Ban Landmines. Landmine Monitor Report 2001. at 
http://www.icbI.org/lm/200 1/mozambique/#Heading2641 accessed 25 April 2007 
~2 United States Department of State. Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Office of Humanitarian De-mining 
Programs. "To Walk the Earth in Safety," Washington: GPO April 1999, p. 12 
23 International Campaign to Ban Landmines. Landmine Monitor Report 2000. at 
http://wv.w . icbl.org/lm/2000/mozambique#Heading 1663 
24 United States Department of State. Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Office of Humanitarian De-mining 












Joint Military Exercises 
Service members from the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, and U.S. Special Operations Command 
participated in MEDFLAG 01-2, held in Nampula and Maputo, Mozambique. MEDFLAG was 
a medical training and civic assistance exercise conducted by the U.S. European command 
(EUCOM). It provided mobility training and operational experience for U.S. medical units. 
Collateral benefits included interchange of medical information and techniques with 
Mozambique medical personnel and enhanced telemedicine. 
Law Enforcement Training and Assistance 
In FY98 the USG provided funds for the National Assembly to conduct a semmar on 
developing money laundering and asset forfeiture legislation. According to the USG, the course 
"was extremely well attended by members of the Assembly, personnel from the ministries of 
Justice, Interior and Foreign Affairs, and received very favourable press coverage.,,25 Between 
I-<Y1999-2000 the USG offered $260,000 in law enforcement assistanoe for, "law enforcement 
safety and survival; police science; assessment of the justice system (legislation and enabling 
regulations), and investigating and prosecuting public corruption.,,26 In I-<YOl INL funding of 
$170,000 was provided to Mozambique for support of a new Police Services Academy, 
particularly with curriculum development.27 As far as international exchange and training are 
concerned, OPDAT and FBI-ITP were the most active as 57 Mozambican judges and lawyers 
get prosecutorial training and 50 Mozambican law enforcement officers trained with the FBI. 
Two Mozambican personnel worked with the DEA in counter-narcotics (see Tables 11 and 12). 
25 United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1998. February 1999 at 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1998_narcJeport/afrme98.html 
26 United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999. March 2000 at 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/1999/926.htm 
27 United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 











USG C()nCenl ~bout ~ozamb"lu,,'" limited abiliry '" patrol it. c()astline led [0 ~ {"'lin of Crllted 
Sta'~. C()ast (;w>.t<l (l:SCG) "iliCl'I. b"m~ senl to wurl: ",-jth til .. \tin,wy of [)efuilce (IIi<>D) ()n 
• Coast (iw.tll De\'d"pmt:1l' plan :md ~n Ulloal ):lIT<!" ,.l,'''e.'_'nwnr JUr1llg FY99,'" 
Muzamblque's c()nnnued tC'lll",<t fot as",stanc" led t() ~ SlX-tn.n eSCG mubile trruning team 
being sent to trnin ·11 memher,; of the l1edghng :>'l()nmb''lue Navy 111 marltlme S""Ul1~·. 
J\Jilluonall}, ~lghl Mo>>mbi",n N~vy o(ficiuls tnw .. Uro to the U S vl~ the C:SC( ;', InlL .... ,aUon.l 
Vl.,itm Ptogn.m (l;SC(;-!VP) [<, lnL"tOt, ml"met WJth. and learn from l :SCG k.d""h,p 
NA.\UBL\ 
])unng Ih~ pno-9/11 year. l1ll\,amibia the U.S focllsed on ohjec'Ne' WTliht to ,ho,e wDrhJ on 
ill other Suuthern AfT1~-an n~t1()n.'. 'lh" mdu<kJ s.ustflln~d civil-military [ei.DO"', the bu,ldmg of 
d~mocro.nc v:olue', enh.ncoo m,lltaT,), resJ><'c' for htun~n rl~ht" and general lI!Jhm,!' 
ptofe"iOnalIsm, Drumg the,e )'ea", Ih .. USG ,"w "J.m,I",,', gt~,{"S{ strt:n~tll as ~ de-mirung 
SllCCess "tory and felr H sen-oed a' " greaT <A.mpl~ to orhet regional s{ak, suffering from 
landmm" problems. The USC; w~nted to s~e "Jamibia tak .... 'uonwr p',,;tmn m region"l affairs 
through ,t>; r~gronal ianJmin" exprtlise and Ul lanJnnne op .. r.OOns in Intem't1on,,] 
peacekeeplng. ' Iberefure, lh~ L1SC; ",,,e,,eJ Ile,vil} in <k---muung trairung and a""'anee 
Collecffi-ciy, 240 "Jam,I",n m'htary ~nd oth"r security officials partK1P"I~d '" tr~"ung 
prugrammes CU,t1t1g $l,('2IJ.I~X) (see Tables 13 and 14). 'Illi, included milita,!', ]a,,- enfo,e<>tn<'1u, 
and eoastal security u'Jrung. Nam,bi, ,ud not parlie'pate Ul any peace support opt"rat1t"" 
trA,ning,loint military exerClses, or nuclear S<"curity trainIng. 
,~ U";tod SWes Dep""mollt of S"'-lc. Bureau "j'J"lctnalional Narcotic, .nu Law Enfoo;omont Mfu;", 
fnlfrnalionai Nar,OI1{:,' ('nnlral Strale!{)' Rep"r! I Y!IY. March 2000 oJ 











the I.\IET,jC.E'f, Il.C.SS, ~n(I.\IA p",wuDlme, 
,,~th " 1"",1 of 226 p':r5onnd train~d, wl1h the 
v~,t majority in th,' :\L\ prol'Pm (.e~ 'hbl~ 
13). ' l1Jese year< <aw focused Ita,n ' ''g for th~ 
N"",!llla /)ef~n~e I'()t<.~, (NDI') .nd Numibl~n 
Nat;()nal Pol;n' (NNP) m dc-nll1ung, ' lhe :\IA 
progrnm had d,e gre~tesl funding .nd ,m~nt;()n 
wld, mOre than $1,000,000 ,penl' on t.catnJng 
and ~y<upr111g 136 l'<DJ' ,nd NNP nune 
experts (>«' T"bl~ 13). In FY98, L.S, nutilar), personnel compkt~d dl~ train-the-tralllCr Tabl~ 1.l 
pco8ruDlme foy the 1\'DF and P()Ii~~, in"IUcnng 114 militar;- ffiginttn and police in 
de-nlining operations"". Thai nllmix..- mclmkd 20 police de-mm~r" a< well a, 20 m~dlc.l 
per>Ol1nc!." Adcliuon:ll dc-nurung tra1mng fm 20 Namiblml wklic" t()talled $472,000 in 
FYl999." rh~ $4flS,0(lO '" FY()I .k-rruning li.mdmg p"m'Jded te~hnkal ~"P<'tti,e, dlYOUgh ~ 
l;.S. <:on",,<:«>r, to th,' NDf' to enable il 10 COmmlle dcanng rh,' c~m'!fJing b,'rm, mrrounwng 
electric pow~r pylon, 111 northern N~mibl', \2 
The LS(i u"~d J\IET and ACSS progmmmes to pro\-ide profess",n,,1 tr"'ntng on (wil mliJrnr;-
relation, U' wdl U' fOf pyofesslOnal de,'elopmem proJ-,<rdmmc"S at LS. mihrn'y con~gcs, Second 
to th~ de-nlining programme" J:\-IET Wa' th~ brgt:<! rruhtaty programnw .nd through j( 47 
NDF personnel Were p"" ,ded p"ofe'",Ollal It.",;ng ... \ lacgc IX'rtioll of the $484,[)()J in IMET 
funds was spent (~l scndmg Namibian offi~~n\ anJ , en'Of Non -Comm",kll",d Ofiicen 
::> U"i,,'<l S"'leS D<.'P~rtTOCnI of S",,~. Rure .. , 00'0 Iil;';31 Mili{o!)' >\ ffair ', Omce of Hun",,,i,,,,,,,,, Dc-lhinmg 
P"'l!r.um. 'To W~lk (he Eorth in Safe{y," W"hinglon: GPO Seplemher 2002 al 
h{{p:/ /WWv. . sIal". gov /I/pm/ rI~irJll"walh"'rthil 002 i I 486Q, hIm 
'" Daviu Hart le)', "to.' a",ibia." LanJmi"". in Ali-i< •. h,"" 6.2 IIngu't 2002 Mme Action Information Cenler at 
http://m.x-imu.cci"/joun,al/6.2/porur.les/prur.ko, ,alllibia.illlll 
" U"i{cu S{ak' lkpartlllcm, of S{~Ic. lh .-cau of Polillcai·Militarv A ttl .. ". Forei;:n MJ/irary Traimng atld 
,~'·.,i-"'mc" and DoD Ion!!.GKcmcnl Adi-.';lIe. of {men": .Ioiot Report to Congre,s fOl' Fiscal r,,,,'s f9W ,,,'" 
]1}()(). March 2000. Sect .... , IV ~I http://WWW.''.\c.gov/w,,"w/global/,.rnwfm'ram/<'o of .2i"m,html 
" linLleJ State, lleparlment uf Sta'c. IlLlITaU ofPohtical '-1 iii I"')' An" i". Office of Humanitarian De-mmwg 
PrograllK "To Walk lbe Earth in Safe"!},," Wa,hiuglon: (iPO Noyembor 200 I 31 










(KeO) 10 Engh,h languag:~ lIainlng at defenc~ 
longuage school, ill the L' ,S," SIX l"D1' and .\\o[) 
official, partlClpated In . \CSS sernor leadership 
SetIllll~rs In FYOO-Ol at a cost of $23,000 (""e 
Tahl~ 14) 
l'>:OF =g \\'lth U.S. SpeCJllI Forces occurred 
only dunng: FY99 VlO JCE"!" when AmerICan 
coun[Gpart~ trained _W NDI' Sr~c,~l Force' III 
lJj<ht I"funt,)" tacnc, (M-e Tabk 13):~_ 
MiliNty HI\' /';UDS ,\ss,istance 
l'HI ./ II _I" HII \ "HlPl ~"I'" 
PR'",HI\11\I'1'"II'RIIlIII 
'''"HI\ 
'''.~ t 1 ' d II"., 
DEFE!';CIo ond LA~' EN FU KCloloiENI' 
H IS_A 
Tabk-14 
Mil;'~IT H!V / AIDS 1''''t:lnc~ !:>egon in FYIl1 "'hen 'he USC fund.d • Na!TI.1blll.n 
militarv HIV / AIDS program prOf'O,al written by Population Service, Intemanonal'\ an KGO 
focu",d on health issues llllow-illcome countnes, 
Arm,; . \ulhnu,;alJon. and Cilllnrh 
N.llll l"" "."s ~mhorJSed both Dircct Commercllll Sales (DeS) and FMS agreement' dunn!'; 1he 
pre-9!ll yeat_', lot~lhng: $1,39l),mO m DCS·A and $%6,000 ill F.\IS-A (see Tahle 14). Ahnost 
ll~)'>!" of the cotnmerc,.1 ddence ar11d~; licen'e; under DeS-A 1!1 the pre-9/11 )'e"'rs "'cre for 
small anns (pIStol" rifles) and ammunltlon fot the small armS_ 
La",' Enf()rcement Itaimn!, and ASSIStance 
l.~". enf"rc~TIlenl ~"i'lance "',,, m1mmal with just 17 l'<am1bian r~''-'onnd teCe1ving: tr • .i1ling. 
One tecd, cd crunulal iu,tic~ and prosecu[()riai trnlIllll~ via 01'OA'I' and the Do] sent a U.s. 
------
" United SLlies UepartmenlS of State_ Bureau of Polltic.I-Mililary Allalf', Foreign Mliilary Traml,,!; and 
.~.,.i'la"':e and V.,V E~g~geme<ll _~c/i\'ilie, of l<IIereSl· Joml Reporlto CMgrefJ. March 2002. Seohoo TV, pg', 
22 -23 at Imp:/'/"",,,, >late gO"/<iocument,/org."izarioni109!i4. pdf 
" liniled States DepartmenIS of SLlIe Bureau of Political-Militory Allmrs. Foreign Mli,lurv Traming ami 
A,,;,,ance and Do}) Engagement Ac111'im, of Intere" Jomt Rer()n 10 CongrefJ for FIScal reO/" 199.9 and 1000 











attorney to "Jamibla a, pan of the International Crnlll11al Inve,ug.>uon 'I Tainmg and .. \ .. iwUlce 
Pro!,pm (lCITAP) to pro"ide trwl!ng m cnnunal mve,tlgauon.<. AddmonaUl', 10 N=bmn law 
enforcement p",wnnd ttamed l11 DIIA and ATI;-In'" the malonty of whIch ocnu-rt,d ;n r'Y01 
(.<~" rabk 13). 
As far a' sperii!c bw enforcement fundmg;, ooncen1t.'d, thc VS. am'mpled to pro~;de $30,000 
worth of a«1<tance to Namibia', Dn>g I.aw Enforc<'ment Unit (DLEU) at the end of F'rTIO. 
111duding dol". drog fe,t kit" and computef'. Ilowever, NamibIa's Mirustry of Justice wa' 
unabk to approve the reqtU:r .. d I.etter of Agreement hefore the end of the fj<eal l'eaT and the 
offer had 10 be wuhdrawll," r-.;:muma dJd nut lccept ally U.S. law enfotc~1'nCtlt fund, lfl I'Y01 
(,~" Table H) 
'Ihe only border securiry' assIS tance Namih'a TCcdved was dllting FY01 when a USCG offtc'al 
u"Ol",'lkd to Nlmibia to conduct a "Jantime Law Enforcem,'nt l're-Tra111ing Sun-.. y 10 helr 
design furore U:llillng progralnme" for the t\ ami!'!"" ),javy and Cusloms St.'n-ices," 
SOUTH Ar:RIC~ 
South Africa received the moH ,ecurity a"btance of any Southern Afnea n state ill d,e pre-9/11 
years and wa" viewed by the USG as!ts greatest parUler ill the reglOn, 'n"s W,,", d"" ill brgc part 
hccau.<c South Africa h:u1 the largest populauon, mo<t strongly e<llbli,hcd 111<uttltlon,. largt."t 
economy, and .<t:ronge." mihta'y. It made ,,'n,c fot thc L;S to culm'ate l ,tI(lng Tclation.hip. 
The liSe fdt South ;\fnca'.< 'mportanc,' could not IX" wHln,tated a" "it" kcy to ,cgional 
stablhry· m Soud,eMl Afnca."" 
'" LJmted State, D.p.rtmen1 of State. Burc~u or JnU-"f11ali(Hlai N",cotic.< ,,"d J"w lC~ ro,ccm.nl AI1;'i". 
Itllem~li()tlal Nar('()"". ("()fllmi Stra7"KY Rq~m 20flO. March 2{X) I , at 
hnp; / /'''''' .state ~ov /r/ i n Ii, i , . '",,'rpli2000iX9.1 . h! m 
." United Stale, Department of Stale Bu,eau or Inlem.li(Hla l Na,cotic, and Law lCnj(>rcc"'enl AITa;"'. 
itllem~li()tlal Narc()"". ("""rml SlraloK)' R~Il()rt 200<1. March 2tX) I , at 
h1!p;//"'ww. 'tile gov/r/inl . ',i,intC'p</2{X)()iX9.1.htm and Inll.,-,agCllC)' W""ling Gmlip (>11 L'SG Sp<,""",~d 
1I1ll"TJlallO",,1 bchonge< "",I Tralllmg (JA W{h rr2(Jl)j In,'enlol)' u/l'mgmm, W.,hmgtC>Ol: GPU, 1', 86, 
" Umlcu Sht!c< IJepart"'.n[ of St.t., Ilur~au of PC>lincal-Milimry Affairs, Cvng'e,·,;vnal/'resenlation lor 











The USG', _'ccuriry object"T' w~rc pntnarih 
m eMabhshing ~ strong defencc rebnon'hip 
h~lw~~n me rw" naHons thrO<lgh medIUm' 
such a, th~ nL'W 1:.S. S. ,\. Bl-Nariono! 
ComllllsslOn, and hdptng the 'mllla'y and 
law ~nfurc~rnem agenCles contlnue to 
(TatNtil!1l m the posr-ap~tth",d ern, South 
Afnca wa' s~~n as m~ reglOrud leader and 
mented thc most attenttm'. 
Th~rcf()rc, dl~ L'SG L'1IdL-U up lrnilling 4,874 
llllhtarv and other ,ecuntr ()fflcial, '" ~,'cry 
secunty scctor, almost half of th~ cnnTc 
tt:gtun', tutal. Tlus mduded 2,266 in four 
nllhlary p"'grAmme,; 25 ill three nuclear 
seClmty programme,; IS m Dn~ p~ace 
'''pport "pentions tr~llllflg programtTK; 
2.2(,(, m ten b",· cnforcement pmgt"arns; and 
302 in bordcr and trAmp()"atiDn ,~c"nt)' progr-ommes (see T.blc IS). All ()f d,C Tabkt5 
trmnmg was prm';dcd.t a co,t ".-dl nCt:edmg 5G,3G6,()()(). In addtuon, South Afnc, had by 6<, 
m~ largc,t ,'ollUne of arms agreement' w1th thc US commcrcIal and govenlll1ent defence 
md""lric" with total, cxc~~ding $177,000,000 (",e Table 16). 
Bilateral Securitr 113'atie' and .-\liret!n enr~ 
In 1'\'99, dl~ U.S.-S.A. Hi-national Commi"ion (J-INC) cr~atcd a new cotnmirtee dedlcatcd to 
anti-crune lS,ues, The New,lu,ticc .nd Ann r:rim~ ( Dop~ratiOn Comrmttee became thc focal 
po"'t of U.S,-S .• \, ~mi-crune and counte!' narcotic., C(~)pcr~H()n effort •. In response to the 
c"tabl;,hln~m Df d,e cotn!nm~e durlllj'; FY99, the countrie, _,ign"d , trcaty on mutllal assistance 
m cnmmal tnatt~rs> ~s wcll as an EJ<1nditlon Treaty which both went intD ~ff~ct durmg FY01. 











Ih~ protection of cia",fi<'d nuhtary matenal .nd 
an agreement regardmg the stams of milnary 
personnel .nd cIvIlian cmpl0i'~e< of the U.s. 
Dol) who at<, I!\ South Aftica on mUOlally 
agreed upon exel'Clses.'" 
In I'Y()(J, rhe \ jSG and South Aftic"~ abo "'gncd 
a cu<tom, mut",,1 ""Wlance agre"~nt ,nd a 
Letter of Agreement on "'\nticmn~ and Counter-
narcotlC< l\""rance. The Ler.tct of A..,.~~ment 
pmv;dc" U.S. tmming and commodity a"Mance 
to "c"eml Soulh Afncan low cnforcement 
agenCIeS. 
Dunng r'Ylll, the USG and South Africa signed an Acgtusition and Cro",-Scn'lcmg T.bte t6 
i\greement, which prm~des for mumal exchange md coopcrnuon m ill leW"'c, maue« rclated 
to ddencc." Th~ agre~mcnt opcn~d rhe way fot mutual asSl"""cc in mattc~ of loglstical 
,urpol1 in matter, of J>CacekeL'Ping ''f'CI""J.tlOn,. hum,nitanan ,nd dl,""et "UPport, bibu'",l 
e~erc"e" and unforeseen contingenc!es." 1111.. was a key d""clopmen! as wid, the agreement d,e 
USG gamed acce"" to .rrategic beiliues m South Africa. 
Mibrar)" obiectiye. in the pre-9/11 years wert: pnmarily [(> prm~de middle and semot l~vel 
offic~" with professional lIalllillg III ot<kt to d~vdop p=on.l and professional t~brionshJps 
with n~w South Afnean :--lational Defence Force (SANDF) leadership. The U.S .• ho wanted to 
hdp South Afnc. htuld ind'genou, p"acekeeplllJ.: capac!!) md mtegr"~!~ ttl; po,t-apartheid force s. 
'!b~se goals kd to 2.266 SAt-.:DF members p.rticipating in a huge vanety of I:\IET progrnnune" 
at a co,! of $\(.)<),000 (se~ "!"abl~< 15 and }(». Beyond IMET. ()n~ Soud, Afncan pilot tnined 
" United Slates Uepartment of St.te. Trealie, in Fcm'e. Semon I' Bil"te",1 Agreem ents. lI!""i] 2007. p. 332 
.. United St.te, L>epartmrnt ofSt.te. Trealie, m Force. Semon I' Bi"t.",lllgreements.. 1Ip<i 12007. p. 332 
""'Mozumbi""e: Mililary .{<:recmcm will! Ihe I!n,'ed '>laId'. Age",,;a de Jnti>fmac;Ln M,>c"mhiqlle , 2 May 










with the FS. Air Force in 1<Y98 prior to the ALP program's suspension and the SANDF was 
active with FS. Special Forces via JCET training in FY99 when 42 members operated with C.S. 
counterparts at a cost of $611,000. Like all other Southern African states, the SANDF and MoD 
were active in ACSS programming with nine senior leaders attending seminars (see Table 15). 
~lilitary HIV IAIDS Assistance 
The FS. DoD initiated a DHAPP needs assessment and initial survey of the SANDF in FY01 
in partnership with South African Medical Health Services (SAMHS), paving the way for future 
. 42 
programmmg. 
Peace Support Operations Training and Assistance 
Given that one of the CSG's main goals for South Africa was to see it take on a lead role in 
international peacekeeping, six SANDF personnc1 were sent to peacekeeping courses in FYOO 
via IMET at the U.S. Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIlLS) and to the FS. 
Nayal Post-graduate School's Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capability (EIPC) 
programme. Fifteen SANDF officers were designated Peacekeeping Trainers between FY99-01 
(see Table 15). 
Arms Authorisations and Grants 
South Africa had $177,160,000 in FMF, DCS, and FMS agreements, technical servlces, and 
grants, more than half of which came during FY01 (see Table 16). Agreements and deliveries 
were established in eyery sector of the arms industry including, but not limited to: aircraft and 
helicopters and their spare parts, rockets, small arms, ammunition, chemical agents, satellites, 
missile parts, sonar equipment, torpedoes, communication equipment, etc. 
42 United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Research Center. The First Four 
rears: Synopsis of the Global Effort. San Diego, CA. June 2005, p. 58. at 











Nuclear Security Training and Assistance 
Between FY98-01 the USG trained 24 South Africans under the u.S. Department of Energy 
(DoE) Non-Proliferation/National Security programme (NP /NS) and one through the DoE 
Defense Program (DP). Given South Africa's nuclear history, it is reasonable to assert that the 
USG would want South African officials to be involved with U.S. national security energy 
programmes. 
Law Enforcement Training and Assistance 
South Africa was the only Southern African state for which the USG listed specific law 
enforcement and judicial strategies in its annual Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign 
Operations publications. It was the only country in Southern Afric2: where the FBI, DRA, 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) and every other major U.S. federal 
agency set up regional offices at the u.S. Embassy. Much of this was coordinated through the 
new Bi-national Commission. 
As evidence of the large support it received, 2,498 South African law enforcement and legal 
officials were trained through 10 law enforcement programmes. The FBI accounted for almost 
half of the total with 1,096 law enforcement officials involved in their ITP. 
Legal and judicial assistance training was well represented through ICITAP and OPDAT 
programmes with 57 U.S. attorneys sent to train 571 South African Ministry of Justice officials 
in a variety of legal areas including legislation drafting (see Table 15). 
Counter-narcotic assistance was also well represented via DEA-ITP and International Demand 
Reduction Training and Technical Assistance (IDRTTA) programme numbers combining for 
277 South African officials (see Table 15). As part of the assistance, during FYOl the U.s. 
donated two 4x4 trucks to assist in counter-narcotics activities in rural areas. 1be same year also 











new counter-narcotics legislation while laboratory technicians from the Drug Enforcement 
Centre attended training in clandestine drug laboratory investigations.4} 
USG law enforcement agencies and officials trained the South African Directorate of Special 
Operations, known as the 'Scorpions' as the bureau was being developed. They also provided 
extensive police training for the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and the South African 
Police Services (SAPS) on a variety of law enforcement topics such as gang crime, sexual crime 
investigation, interviewing technique, interrogation, fraud, and major case handling.44 In FY01, 
the United States provided a complex fraud investigation computer-programming tool to the 
organised crime units of the SAPS in an attempt to facilitate increased sharing of information 
among investigators in different parts of the country. The USG also provided extensive training 
to the Scorpions, SAPS, and SARS on issues including investigating sexual offences, interviewing 
and interrogation techniques, gang violence, drug detection and monitoring, major case 
management, and complex fraud cases.4S 
South Africa was also the lone recipient amongst Southern African nations of an A TF 
programme in K-9 dog handling for six personnel and with a FS. Secret Service (l~SSS) 
program in personal protective details for VIPs offered to 120 South African agents (see Table 
15). 
Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance 
South Africa was a participant In several border and transportation security assistance 
programmes in the pre-9/ 11 years. 'lbe first was with citizenship and immigration training from 
the USCIS in FY98, which trained 80 South Africans. There were also fairly regular training and 
exchanges with USCG programmes as 10 South African Navy personnel visited uSCG 
43 United States Department of State. Bureau ofinternational Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001. March 2002 at 
http://v.'Ww .state.gov/plinllris/nrcrptl200 I/rpti 
44 United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001. March 2002 at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/8701.pdf 
45 United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 












leadership in the U.S. and 21 navy personnel got in country training on maritime security and 
law enforcement (see Table 15). 
The U.S. CBP provided the greatest amount of training in the border security sector. Between 
f'Y99-01 the CBP sent 16 American CBP officers to train 191 South African counterparts. 
Assistance also included CBP officers sent to South Africa during FY99 to advise and assist with 
the first Regional Border Control Course conducted by the South African Regional Police 
Commissioners Conference (SARPCCO).46 Part of the funding during f'Y99 was for a IT.S. 
Customs Seaport Contraband Enforcement Team training programme, which focused on 
proper searches of maritime vessels. Training was for port security officers and South African 
customs agents.47 Also, in !::;YOO the USG and South Africa signed a Customs Mutual Assistance 
Agreement, which was designed to 'improve conformity to current operational practices at 
borders.'48 In FY01, a team of experts from U.S. Customs and the Immigration Naturalization 
Service (INS) inspected border crossings as part of an effort to improve border control 
. 49 operations. 
SWAZILAND 
During the pre-9/11 years the U.S. had cordial relations with Swaziland, which were described 
as, "open and fairly cooperative."so Due to the power of the Swazi monarchy, U.S. security 
interests related to the establishment of democratic reform and institutional strengthening. As in 
other Southern African countries, the USG felt its main security objective was to encourage a 
4~nited States Department of State. Bureau ofInternational Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999. March 2000 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1999_narcJeportlafrme99.html 
47 United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law En forcement Affairs. 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999. March 2000 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcoticsJaw/1999_narcJeportiathne99.html 
48 United States Department of State. Bureau ofInternational Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2000. March 200 I at 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrptl2000/887.htm 
49 United States Department of State. Bureau ofInternational Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001. March 2002 at 
http://www . state. gOY Ip/inllrls/nrcrptl200 l/rptl 
50 United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. CongressionalPresentation for 











stable <Uld apolitical ddenc,' and ,ccunty 
forc,' that could eYenU1lilly partlClpare In 
intematioru>l peacekeep"',.; l1llSSi"fiS_ 
To 1wip achU,T ,ccuntr goals, the l;SG 
trained 256 Cmburfo SwuIland Ddenc~ 
h),ce ([-SDI<) and othn "'clint}" offic'als a' , 
total co>! of $1,S61,OO(} (".,. Table, 17 ami 
18). 'Ihe malonty Were tramed na 1~IE'r 
COUT>e" JU·T cx('tcise" and :>'IA prOlSramn","_ Swa:r:tland w"" not 1n'-ok",\ tn p"ace T~bl~ 17 
,uppOtt operation, traUllIlg, nuclear S('cutltr trrurung, military 11IV/AIDS ""lStance, 
'lbe lME'r prngnm, with fncus on d.-iI-military 
relations <Uld profe>SlOnal deve1,pmen!, was the 
pr11n'I), medium thmu,.;h "h'Ch ,he USC; exerted J(S 
",f1uence on the CSDF "i11k trnimng ')7 pcT>onnd in • 
'-anet)' of profe>slonal cou'"",.. 1m, "'IS at • cost of 
HII9,nO(j «ee 'l'abb 17 and 18), 
PRI "'tt_I't Rrl\ ('"'PI~'tl''' 
I>K""~"1'1I1"'1'D11(HII"1\ 
_" VII I'" 
'" 
, .... ' ., I _,' <1 •• _, 
, , , 
The VS. also pro~1,kd $1,046,I)O(} ,n e'lutp1n~·1lt .nd ii:=,'"<C:2'ii::=",=,,t=: 
mil-to-mil trammg to build CSDF dc-min'ng c.pabihtJ_" In the ,limmer of I'Y99, U.S. Tabte 18 
SpeCIal Operat1ons Force, conductcd pha,e om' of th~"r tr .. n_th"_!.,",,-in,,, pn )g'~tn1nes 
fnr US))F mihtar), personnel. Lin :I,pnl 1, 21))() SOl' trainers returned to Swaziland to conduct 
pha&: tw,) "f the tra,rung progratn1ne, with the go,.) of creaung .. , m,hgL~lOus L'SDF capabih'y 
,,, conduct humamtarmn de-mming ope .... tlDns," i)c'plle the l ;SG', alIocaoon of fl1ndmg for 
" Un".d State, Depanme", of Stm. Bur •• " ofPol;ll,,1 Military Aft;,i", Olfice ofllum~nilali"" o.,mining 
Programme' "To lI'al' lhe Earth in Safer),," W.,hington: GPO April 1999, p. 15 
" U"~ed Stat., Dep.n",.", of State B" .... " of Pol i,io.1 MllitJl)' Aft_i". Offlce ofH,,,,,,"iLario" O.,mining 
Programme'_ "To Walk the F .. rth '" S.tdy," Wa,hinglOn- GPO July 2000 al 











tnlfIe clearance, the Swan g"vernm~tlI illd nnt <ubrrut a request to usc the ftmd. and de-lI1lIIlIlg 
of the border area with Mozambique did not take placc bd"re or dunn~ I'"Y01. Thi. an~en:d th~ 
esc, wh'ch 'aw n" ~>gisuc~1 n.:ason f"r d,e de-mining to not take place." Ileyond dc-mIning, 
SL'< MoD "nd ,eniol USDF "ffic1al, parucipa1cd m Americ.n-led ",mmar. w1d, the ACSS dUllilg 
FYOO-()l, Addni"nally, Amcrion Spec;"J Force. <Dldiel< wurked with I)() USDF ",Idlers "n 
lIainUl~ ~xerClses during FY99 and FYOl at a programme coot of$148,~~) (sec Tahle, 11 "nd 
HI). 
Law enf",c~me1lf co<'pcrauon ~nd assistance was tlli1llm~1 dUImg pre---9/11 years widl just 23 
offkl~l, invoked in U.s. pt"wamme<. SL'venteen "j ,h"'e "ffic1al, wete pW'ecu["r and M1111<I-,)" 
of )Ulitic,· offiCIals involved in the 01'DAT legal "dvi,ory progt"mme~. flqond OPDAr, lwo 
Sw.zi, Wen.: llimed by d,e DEA m counter-narcotics and four by d,e l\'n' in inveStlgatlOll 
teChll1'llles. S\v~zil~nd w.s howe,-er, the recipIent of ~ nnetime $35,1)()() IntenutIOnal t'i.rcotics 
and Law F.nj..,tc~tnent Bllt~au (IN!.) gr.m fmm the U.S. DnS ill FY99 fO <upport manjuarut 
crop etadic~tion." AI.o, In IN01, th~ L:.s. nn) <po",n,,"] a cnn,ultant tn ''''ll to Sw.~iland ", 
advi,e d,e ASSIStant Attorney General dufung ami-narcotic, lq,~,latiofl. An ~d'"],tion~1 ,urn "f 
tn"''''l was 'pent to conduct a workshop for severa! Member. of P"rliament on the new 
kgt<l.tion and tn purch~'e compurers for th~ p<,Jice." 
ZAMBIA 
Thwughnut the pre-9/11 y~:us, d,e l;SG ,aw Zamb'a a, "ne of the 11""t p.."ittvd)' progte,"ng 
<taTI:, 'n the n.:~"n. Security "bjccu",,, were based around enhancmg Z.mbian pc~cck'-'ep'ng 
~b,l1tk', and de,·cl"p!tl~ the defene,· forc~s' app.eclJltion "f and respect for dcmocrat1c v~lu,"" a, 
" Inletnal<onal Campaign to Uan Landmines. Landmint' Monilor Rt'pon 2001 at 
h ~\ p: ii",,,,w . it; bl, 0<!!-iln1l2()() l /,,,,a2111l1d/ 
" Lnlted Stale, [)cpartm.r~ or Stat. Bureau of Polilical-Military Atmi",. Conwe.,,;Imai Budget .I~."ificat"m 
jil>'" Foreill,n Opa-al""'.,: Fi«·a] )"ea,. }fJfJl. Wa,hington: GPO, May 1000. p. 310 
" United Slale, Depattment of SIOI •. B"",,,,, of 1ntenmlional Narco/ie, and La" Enl'>ITc-menl Aff .. ", 
InlemalionaiNa ... OIi.~Co.umiSlmlegy Reporl}OOO. MatCh 200 I xt 











well a,. "an .f[!fUty for tile L.S, nuh[m-y."'" 
The esc; wanted to Mtengthen the Z.mblan 
Oefence l'o,-ccs (ZDF) m order to COWHer 
the potenual for instability due [0 [h~ 
ongomg cn-il wa,-s on the Z~mbian hOJ'der 111 
Angola and the ORC" 
In these yea" [he USC; tr'1I1~J 410 ZUI ' ,nd 
other "ecunty officI.\, through .even 
nuhlary, law enforcement, ond coastal/border security programmes. Z"mhia " -., ,.},,, T.ble 19 
on the recetvmg end of more than S-'.OOO.OOO m U.S, commercul anru sale, 
agreemenL' and gm-enlment-to-g",'enlment attnS gr~1l1S (see T~hlc, 19 and 2(j)_ 
ZfllIlblft ",as not l1lvolved l1l C.S, sponsored peace support operations tr~ and aSSl.tance, 
milimry HJV I AI US '''''''In=. ,omt nuhury exercises. or nudear seCUIl\)- prngt:lmmes. 
-!be 7.DF acu\-e!j parflClpoted 1fl IMET 
proh".mmes through which l_n ZUI' soldie,-, 
received aprroXl1D~tdy $510,000 1fl profe"MOn,] 
t!ftl1ling over the 4-ye"r perIOd, mostly for middle 
and semor gr,d~ officers and MoD officlllk 
\ddmg to th~t, $.'Il1.flflO "'~IS 'pmt on 240 'l.Dl-
pe!"onnd of the Fint C<Jmm.nd" Hatt.lt"n ",-h" 
tral1led w,th e.S. SpeCl.1 Forcn m FYOD-OI a, pan 
o[ the JCET pro~",rune. The ZOF ond MoD wer~ 
acUve In ACSS SCffiill'rS through which eJg\u 
personnel ,mended SCfllOI leadership programmes m FYOO-Ot (see Tables 19 .nd 20)_ T.ble 20 
'" United State, [)epanl1"'ot of State Bureau of rolitic~I.MiliW)- Albi",_ CQnW~·'-'j(mal!'F~.,"nlali()~ J()f" 
Fore,gn Op£Fi1liom Fisml reW" /998, Wa,hinh~on: GPO. M.}' 1'197, p. 341·.142, 
_., lJnil<:d Slal<:' Dep.nmon[ "I' State. Rurcau "f r"litic~I.Milit"') AITai"'_ ('Qnw~.m()fJill IIUdgN JlL>tifh-arwn 











::'lilitaIY HIV /.A, IDS A'i'l.'Jau~J; 
'The DaD" DIIAI'I' I'togr,uJUlle began wotkinp, with the Zambi.n p,,-,vcrnment In FYOO "hen 
.n mitial nccds aose,mlcnl wa< contluckd. '[ bi< lcd tu tevehtlOns lhat :In esru:n.ted 35"', of the 
I.DF ,uffered from IllV/.A,IDS, a figute fut al,,-,,-c Ihc n,tional ,ycrag<: of 21 " ',. DHAPP 
follow~d up m 1''101 wilh meetings wllh the ZDF HJV/AIDS coordinator to learn morc ahoul 
ZDF effort,. [)I[ AI'I' contraCis for ,ddi rlOnal aSSlstance were not sIgfled before FY(}2,'" 
Anus Authorisation, aill! Grants 
Ann, aulhori.,li,,.,, ,nd grants fwm the l-.S. commercial and government ,ndustric, ta\"Ucd 
$3,011,000 In thc I'tc_~/11 y~ats. -rhi, waS pnmarily through Ihe conunercJal U.S. defence 
mdustry Wlth $2,511,000 111 arm, agtccment' (s~~ 'hbl~ 20). J\1o<l of Ih~se OCS-A agr~ernffi!S 
,,"cre fot hclicapler .nd .ircraf1 parts and mainlCn"n~e, 'wlth brge dolht ""Iucs at(ach~d to n~'W 
a"craft ~ngines. 
L.w Enforcemcnt Traln'ngand '~~(I,lJ;t:!l)~'!: 
"'ot man) Z:lmb,an I:lW enfurcemem officials received USG-'ponsorcd tr.ln111g in the pre-\l/ I 1 
years. Thai' bcing said, Iwo Drug Enforcement Commission (DEq officers tram",! 111 FYOO with 
thc DEA and In FYOI ,,'h~n Iwo I.ambi"n DEC bb t~chfllC1:1ns recer..-ed trainm!; in cbndes!me 
drug lab ulVestig~tion"" The 0I'D.A, T ptag",mmc ,,"as abo r~pr~""ntcd dUrin!; FY'JIl. ,,·h~n It 
1T"in~d N."o Z:lmll1"n kgal profeSSIOnals 111 pro,"",cutol1al skill, (,cc T abl~ I 'J). 
IlQr"lj;La!Jd "L IJImpott:lllun Securm- TtailunV and '\ssjstance 
:\\",t bordet ""cunt} a,,;,{mce for Zambia occurred U1 FYOO and FYO\. It began 111 FYOO whcn 
the USC donated compukr< ,nd 24 drug-{e,ting kits {o the Zambian Drug F,nfutcc1nCm 
" li niled Slate, !K'pan""'n{ of Ikfensc !)ep"rtmenl of (he ,,"oT Navy Healih Ro",arch Center T!oe Fir.'/ Frlw' 
rra,,: Sy"op.m '1 the G/oh,,/ EjJrIrI. San Diego. CA. J lillO 2005, p. 74. a{ 
hnp:,'/"'''''', n hrc. nU V)'. mi i/prog,"mme,/ dh "PP/ coumryropom/lou ryoanTirs1F" ur Y c",-'. pd f 
>J Unl{ed S{ate' !)ep"rtllkn! of State Bureau of Jn1emal;ooai "arrnhc" and La" E" fo.-cemen{ Affairs. 











COlllnru;"on (DEC). which was usct! for drUf: control efforto 111 111.crn~t1<Jnal airport, and at 
hower I'YOI ,~w lhe L;SCC; canduCl a Mannmc Law EnlU,cement l',e-Trauung 
Su,,·ey m Zamblll, wlllch led to a MobJlc Tr>ll1llflg T eam condllcting a Boardl11g Officer and 
Counter-narcotIco M:rntimc Law Enforcement class." lblS WaS patt of an effort to )'''4' th" 
Zambllln horder patrol monitor n'-trs alon" bo,der< wah Nmnihia. Zimhab"". Mozamhlq"". 
and the DII.C "' welt ~, an Lakc MWCfll and Lake TangAnyika to tnon;!"r cro,,,ng' from 
T~m2fllJl.. Additional horder asSIstance ca1l1C during FYOt ""hen LS. (,1.11' and ]l\:S officer.; 
nw"d Zambian border Cro"Ulgs with T~n7.ania to ~dvise Zamb1JUl bord"r pat",l offiCIals an 
mote "fiicltllt controls.'" 
ZIMBABWE 
ca,e to follow Ul So"dKm .'>'frica dllnng 
the pre-9/tt years. "lllC FY98 
(. ongre,""Jfl~j Budget J lJ.,tifICauon for 
Foreign Clpcranon. offcn; [,,, Z;mlYJhwe 
the most glmnng prruse of any Southern 
Afncan m,jllftry. Th" '''port 
"/.ttnhahwe .. ~n e<:onotnlc and politIc-JI 
«JTce m S"uthcrn ;\fnc~ ,upt",tt, I -.S. 
policy in milit~ry ~nd peacekeepmg ap~I<Il:1on, m and often ,ah"S a lead,,"hip 
tol" ill meillaun" regIOnal conflict."'" It cOlll:1nuc. WId, pc-usc of the /.;tnbabwun 
T.ble 21 
m1lt"',!' (Zl\i.-\) a,. "hi"hly pwfessioru.l ~ccepting af nvih.n comrol. "nd h~, lx:~n a sowu, of 
stability ill the tcl5'on.'''''' U.s, "":<l!:l'y objecu,e, mdud~d ImplOring Zllllh"hwean m.ll. ,,)" 
~, United StOles Deportment of ~tatc Bureau of InlOmoti<mal NaITo!l"' "nd Law cnforcement Alfou, 
InlernMion~1 Nurcotic', Control Strate?;y ReI"""' liNN!. March 200 I at 
hn p :.I!ww,",' ,slm., gov/piin II, I sin,c'pIJl{)()(li8 8 7 . htm 
" United Stale, f).part"'"'"' of ~t;,tc. Bureau or1nterll ",;o"al "ar<otics ond Low Enforcoment II fT,i" 
Int.,.'w;on~1 ,V"r('O/ic.< Co"trol Stratc~ Rop()n lfllJ/.). March 20{) I. at 
http://I>'wI>'.qate.~ov!pi;''I.'rl ~,'nrcTpt/2{HI(l.'~~7.htm 
" United St .... [kpart"",,,t of St;dc. Bun:"u of l"tefIlational l'arcOlICS and Low Fnfonement A tf.i" 
/"umationai ,\·armlio.l COI1troi S'ralog)-' liopurl 2()()1. March 2002" Seclion X, 1'1:. 81 , 
" Um",d Stal., DeparttnC"flt of State. !lureoo of Political -Mllil",)' /\flO';rs. Cn~we.'.'in""lI'ro,c"'afwn f'-"' 











mfrastrucmre to hdp them deploy ill peacekeepmg opernuons and help"'>: tht:tn dow~,"'~ Ie) 
build an economlc,]l) f~a,ible force, They wanted them tu take on 'mtetn.t1onal leader.;hip in 
pcaceke~'Ping openotion.' Clearly, the U.s. thuught highly of Zimb.bwe', defence stetor 
through I'YOU. However,"" the polil:Jcal "m.tion m 7.imbabwe cre.ted econonuc, pohtinl, and 
social CriSIS, USG security sector support wan,n:d con,idtrAbly, druppmg to nothing more th.n 
a $621 ,0Cl(l gnont to tram and "'-Juip a de mining platoon of the ZNA ("",. T abJe 22). 
De.pite. malor drop ill ,ecurity relanons, 357 Zl'<A and other .ecurlty offiCIals rtceived It:unmg 
m military, law ""forcl':lT1ent and border seCtinty program,. Of thm"" 353 were in"uh:ed 111 
lIlilitar~ ') rmning and ASSlstance, three J1l law enforcement, and just one'" border .ecunty 
programmes. AU of the lralntngwa • • t • cust or $5,011,500 how""er the m'j'Jfity of that w" for 
equipping .nd lr~10ing fout Z~A de-rruning platoons, which was the most significant of all 
security cooperanon programme, (see Tables 21 and 22). 
Zunb,bwe dld not rcc~~"e .ny tmiffing Of ."lst.nee in military HIV / , \IDS, jomt eXerc!ses. or 
WMD I c[l\Inler-prolifcranon tr~10jng. 
Hihter.l Sccunty Trc.l:Jes and .\gn;ements 
An extradition tre.ty "goed in Jul), 1')')7 offici.lt), came into force ill ' \pril 2iJ()() . 
.\Wituy It.imn!' .nd , \ssjstance 
Th~ I:SC; provided apptoximat"l) 36] 7.NA and '\loD rcf'onncl with tr.lntng ill FY98-00 VIa 
I.\IFT. \lA, RCSS, and JCFT programme •. Due to the politicol erisls and uSC; Jisaf1"ement 
wah /,jmb,bv.-c p"liClC', .n fuodtng w", c.ncelled in I'YO!. \\'h"o they wer" of[",ed, I.\:IET 
course, were primarily fo, .enio, Z~A offic"n; and ~on-Commissioned Officers (NC.O) with 
focu, Of[ budg~>t control, dcmocmnc value, and m.nagement to encaura,,'" military dowmuzmg. 
'" Unitc-tl State, Deportment of Stale. Bureau of Polit;t. I-Mllitar)' AlTai". Congre.,,\·/nna!Pre,enlatum Jm-











Thc programme wah the gte.test "UPPUrt ($4.264,000) was the '\L\ programme. US(; 
a"ststance funded L.S. Special Forces Imm;ng of folIt 
plaloons of Zimbabwean Army Cumbat Lngi~eer.; ill 
mtncfidd "Ur ...... v pr"eedures, ba",c de-nurung 
lechill'lues, med.tco.l orderl) skills, and \chICle 
ma"'lenanc~. as ",dl as t.hc pur~hase uf cqUlpmcnt and 
,"chldcs nc<cc""af)' 10 outfit and Imnspon th .. platoons" 
In July 98, Ihe U.S. trul!tH)' sDrled a proJt""Ct prm1d!ng 
seve,.,.1 ad"so" and eqUIpmcnt f"r ZN.\ rnin~ 
dcaran~e at V.uuna hlk In I-"Y99. $1,743.000 m U.S. 
dc-nurung assismnc~ purchased eqmpment. Vdlld~s, 
P~I ., II -I' I Mil \ '''''I'I ~ II ,,'" 
r~"'.~I"\1I 1\1'1 -"'>111 ~I ,", I 
,1\11< \t\11 I 
""'" .il _.i II"., 
and suppli~s [or a second de_nurung plo.won ~s well as provided a [earn of U.S. anny Table 22 
tramt"rs."" This conwlued I1l I--YOO when another $1,900,001) wa, provided to e'lmp and tram the 
third platoun. Dunng FYlll $(}21,1~K) was 'p~"1lt on c'lu'pping a fourth plat("",," All four 
piatoun, wer~ traine,] and operanollal by the end of I'YOI (' cc Table 22). 
Anns AuthoosauOlls and (;ra,Wl 
Hoth the DeS ami FMS programmc" wcre activc \11. 71tT1b~b\\'c thto)llgh FYOl, wim yillte ~ [ew 
annual DCS-A agreements (totalling $1,758,000). a large unc time 1'.\lS_A af,"'eemcnt dunng 
FYOI (tollilling $858,000). It IS tnteresllng to note that the liSC; authorl"ed tnore than 
$l,fJ()()JlOO 11' I'MS·A and DeS-A af,<ttcm~no, dunng FYOl wben th"y had stopped funding ali 
dcf~",CC and law ~",f,,[{,emen' ptogratn1T1e. ~nd w~r" publod) \ ocal ill criticism of me 
::r:'mbabw~-~Tl g""cmtTlcnt ("~"C Table 22). 
"lbe lllillorll}' o[ DCS-A licenses authonsed during the pre-9/11 Year" were for a)r~",ft and 
hellcoptcr 'pares, "lllilil artns. ~nd m111e componeno,. 
" LJnll~J Stales llep.rlmenl of Stat~. t3lL""lL of PoiLtic.1 Milital)' AfT.i" Office of fh,manitariau De-mining 
Programs. "Ii, Walk/he /:;"r/h In Safely.» W.,hington: GPO No.ember 200 t al 
http://w ... ·wstalegovtL·pmlr!slrpt .. w. lkearthl200 116QW hIm 
... Uniled States Dep.rtment of SI.le. Bure", of Pol ;t",,1 Miliml)' A ft.OfS. om« of Ih,mll"'lOrian Dc.mimng 
Programs. <To W.lk the Eanh in S.fe,},'· Washmgloo: GPO lull' 2000 .1 
http;.'/"'""'..,...state.goYi"wwigk>ooli.rmsipm'l1dpiw. lk .fric a htm I ~li m 
., tnlcm~li<m.1 Compo,gn to Ran l.andmmcs. l.anJm~ M",ulOr Reporl2002", 











Law enforcement co"perat1on anJ a"'-'1an~~ wa. ~lmo" no"-cx"'t~nt '" the prc-9/11 ye~", 
wnh the most oignific:o.nt ",-ent being a" extra,hno" treaty bnwcen the t,,;o natio", that "'ern 
in'" fot~c i" April 2()()(1.'" Beyond that, the DEA tramed t\l.'o Ztmbabwea" wunter-narcotlcs 
official, during FY99, Addinonally, thc OI'DAT-IVP bto'-'gh' one Z"nbalw.;ean officL.,j '0 the 
C.S. to met't with Do] cou"terpart, (scc Tahle 21). 
O"e Zunbab",ean bordet / L~"'\OtnS offidal train~d ""lth thc LJ .S, eRP ill FY9K (<= Table 21) 
CD.NCLUSION 
Gi"cn the colk-..:tcd ,b.to. II i, ~~Sj to ~ondude tha, Southenl Afnca ag ~ reglOn wa" as the CSG 
acknowledged, not of ,tratcgic Imcrest. \Vhtle S"uth A fri~~, Bor.,wana, and ~"Tn Mala",,; ~'11ioycd 
fairl) strong relations. the region a, a ",I",k' did not gom tnuch. It wa, no <ene1. that. thc defcnce 
,cct.or.' of the Soulhenl .\ftJCafi naUons were ill equipped, ill tromed, and under-funded. The 
'luantity of 'CL"tity U)!'Pfiati"n W,,-, nurgmal and dead) the USG ,uategy wag to prO\ide a lot 
of aid to South .>\fn~a In "rJet 10 build illflue"~~ and gct '" Ihe good gnce< of the regiOnal 
power. figullil!': that SOUlh Afti~a muld lhcn ptfn-idc 'lid I" i,~ ne.ghbours in a trickle down 
effccI without lhe L'SG hanng to g<'t 11>0 d"e~tly iIwoh'uL Thi" fir "mh the well In'-N''' 
Atnet1~~n a>croi"n 10 getting dlttctly Involved In Afnca" secuaty issues duc t" ih fiasw ;n 
S<,maitJ ""me yeats bcfor~. Therefore, promoung fricnd,lup and assIStance toward" the region.1 
po-wers """,Id rrodu~c thc 1><.:." t~<u1lS . 
... Ullited SUlk> Dcpllrtm'j~ of Slale. 13ureoo of lntO'llillioll.l NarcotiC' and I.aw Enl'..-ccmm' An",,,, 
/"'ernariOlwi Narmli,' .• Contl'ol Sirulegy R,p>rll(}()(). March 200 I . 1 











POST-9! 1I SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
FY2002-2f1f15 
, Ily th~ e.rl,. to Inld-ZWOs the populollon of 
Somhem Africa had 1llcreaseJ from ~ pre-9/11 
b'd "r 1](),51~J,I.)O to 117,7iX),OOO, On,rall 
TRAINING TOTALS 
20,000 to 271,400 and regIOnal police sIZe had 
Itlcreascd slightly to 225,500. Th~ region faced 







)'et W1tll th~ add~d wn~ctt' "f letron,tn. The ZIM 
att.cb brought on an lnlernaDOfl.l out~ry 




0 0 '" lO l l " '" 1137 " !>u " 
, 1'7 
26' m I'&~ 
0 0 '" " '" 21~0 , 
conJetnlllllg terr"ri,m anJ Sou':hem African nations scrambled to do [heir part. 'lbi, 1'ablc23 
IncluJed llKtca,~d "'lennon "n ~nmc, bower ~()ntt()l, :lnd emmler ItttOmlIl, which. Itl 
tum, hi j" ilL"'" j~gI,bt"'n_ Tctronsm became a gl"ballssuc. The (lSG did IL, par! by shifti.tl~ 
pohey .nd rhetoric, l",umg a "\Vith U, or Ag:un.t l-." b"tt1~ ~ry. 
The n,Uon, of Southern ,\rnca dcncJllnceJ the 
a",,~h and he~amc pann~n; of th~ USG ,n 11 . 
'Glob:ol War on Terror'_ With .n American 
pbJg~ to help all mnon, combm terrorist 




and traming "pp<)rt,,,,itj~,,_ .. \11 told, hc,wcen SA 
FY02-lJ5 " tot~l of 12,475 r~g; on~1 mi!Jtaty, low 
~nfotCtlDem, and mhet ,ecurlty personnel '\'ere 




POST_9/11 REGIONAl. ARMS 
AUfHORT,,, nONS .nd GRANTS , , 
M, ,~ 02\\ 
• ,"" 0 
y~ 0 ·17'; 
].1511 126'1l Y>.II·ll 
0 ~, 0 
~ y >:) 10M' 
0 0 0 
programme,_ 'Ihi, 1llduded 3,270 Ul the millt"')' ,ector; 4,733 through th~ EIPe .,, <1 T.b!~ 24 
.\COT.\ peace support operattons programme.; 361 in !Iu~kac ,ceuMls; 3,54il 1n law 
enforcemtllt; and 571 In border and transportanon secunty. Morc than $4~.O()O,()O(J wa, 'P""[ 











In .ddlUon to increased traj1l!ng, the L'SG rni"ed ,,'giOl\al arm, autho",ation, '0 $7()(,,!l42,0CI0. 
Th" w'" hroke11 down 11l{0 $20,2.R3,OOO for the Foreign l\tilitary Sale, (F~IS) programme; 
$17,ll51,1)00 in h"";gn .\liliTary Financing (FMF) grants; $476,Oll,(}()() 111 Direct Commercial 
Sales (DeS) au{h"ri,a\1m),; and S I (H,S97 ,fj()() in ()1tt,~r CommerCIal Sak, Teehrue,u 1\grt:ements 
and Set",,!ee.( DCS-TA). These were ,ignifkant fum"ng m~t~,"e, (,~..., T~bk 24). 
All told, South"m j\fll~' ,"olunt"Arily cn{cTed into , much more interdcpendenr strategic 
l~art:nership with the LJnited Smte" who on the b~~k of tem)ri,rn, exT<,,,,kd i[$ ",gional influ~11"" 
and l'enetl',ned the region.! ,ecurity ~omplcx on it. own n:rm,. 
Dunng th~ post-\l/l1 ye"" th" LJSC bc~amt' mote ",,"olved aT ~Il kvds wah the Ang"I"" 
.",--urit}' seclor. Angolan strategic importance to the l;SG grew tIIpi,Uy "' the fiu,h 
AdmmiMmtlon ~cl1vdy solIght to increase oil imports from the Gulf of C1Jlllea reg>Ol\. Given 
th.{ ;\ng<.>lan oi1 produ~tlon waS projeckd to dOllble between 2oo} and 2.00Sw, a push to a"j,t 
Angola )1l protecting "i1 ~'''"''(. ond enhancing l1lternal gecunt)' become an American priority. 
leSe; official. g(al<-<l that, "a ne .... ' stability in .-\ngoh can "n,ute that the ~"untry" remlm,. '" n'~ 
u,,,d a, ~ ba,,, of operatl''''" for ,,,,.,malional terrorists, drug trafficker,. and orgonized come."" 
lnl<,mai ,(ahii1ty heL~me ~ h·y concern of {he l;SG who feared insurgenCtcO could threaten the 
oi1 indu,tty and b~' ptoxy, 17.S. ",,"eWnLllt. 
Th" rdal1ve powet and =e of the Angolan defence a,nd polin' f"r~", to <>th~"t st"t~" in the 
region ha, not heL11 io", on {h~ L:SG a" "'Il'e Angolan .\nned Force, remain OI\e of .,!,ftin', 
strong<'" mij"ane, wnh a Jemon'tl'aled ability 10 proiect power beyond Angola's hOTde", ."" 
Recogrurion that (h" Angolan tn'~tary " a gtrong force ill a gtratevc S(ate, located in .n 
Imp"rtant ",gi<~l, ha, mean! increa,<-,j att<-lltlon and tesource, from the ,-\ mell~an g()v"tnm~"'L 
.. SllllTWriteT. "AngoLan Oil ProoLK:tion to Double by 2008;· Aliic.n New, Agency. 18 FebTUal)' 2007. at 
http);'w"",,,", ,"lTol.com!~rticl",,'1 1314 
'" United States Derartmcnt of Slate. Bureau of Political-Military Mhi" Conilr~"'ional Rudget .Iu.rtijicm/(", 
far Foreign OpeN/room: }oj"",,/ YeaI' 2(}()'<, Wa,hingtoo, CPO, May 2004. p. 222 
'1 lJnited Slate< DejXlrtment of Slate, Bureau of Pojiticaj-MililllJ)' Anai,.,;. ("ongrc~,mna/ /Judget .Im'iji"",wn 











Beyond lflt~-rnal ,cohillty ,",ues, concrete USG 
",curit)' goal, lflcluded de-ttllning, destruction of 
Sttl.1l ann, and IIgh' weapons, and profe'"'onal 
'rAimng of Angolan 'milt:":> force, through the 
re,urrected [MET prngr:lIlune. L.S. efforts 
focus~d on Cl..il-rmht.t) ,dation" human nght~, 
And EnglISh bnguoge 'Talnmg, "' few Angolan 
offiClols could commmucale "mb .Amettc~n 
officials, 
I" reoognluon of ,.\,ngob's 
Importon,e, the lTSC ,pon.ored training for a 
total of .315 Angolan officlal, at • coM of 
approxlttl.tdy $1,261,I~ X ). Addmonally, the 
USC spent appr"'''motely ~16.s7.3,OOO on de-
nllillflg and ,moll arIll.'l/~ght weapon destrucuon 
and approved $21,991,000 ill arms export.'! 
agreement. (.ee Table. 2S ,nd 26). 
Bilateral Secw:itl' Treatjes and '\vleementl! 
E 
" " 
Angola "'!l"ed an Art.cle 9fl Bilotetal Irnmuni\\' A~ernen( with d.e USC ill FY05, ",luch 
ensured th~t AmerIcan citizen. wo"ld not be ,,,rrendered b), .-\ngolan ,uthottoe. to the 
[nternauonal Cmninal Court without .-\merican gOYernment consent." Without "gnlng on 
Amcle 98 agreenlent Angola wOllld h.ve hkcl)' ~"t.1I defence a.d. 
0-1W\OIY Traming and 'h'btancc 
The po,t- ~/ll :·eat • • aw " .igmficant m"reaSe ]1' Angolan p.tt1cipation in nl.ht",y 'r~""ng 
programme> a, 75 FAA and MoD officials were lflYolycd "1th the [MET and RCSS oemlnot 
" Pre" Stat,ment by Rkhard B'tuch .. , S.,oke,m'n. UnHcd Stat .. [)epartment of Stat., Wa,hmgtoLl, D,C ,. Ma) 











programmc,_ US cxpendi1l1,e amOllI.t, totalled 
S4Gl,0\Xl" sprcad out ovcr thc fou' ye., perio.J 
«ee 'rabies 23 and 26). 
Sigmfican' annual Th11('r funwng incre~'e' Wtere 
()b'~"ed between FY02-05 ~s the cinl \Va! end"i 
"nd the l,;S(; rei",t~ted the I.\I/-T progr.mmc. 
1''1'03 law ~II 42 I"IFT p~rtlClpants receive 
FY().4-05 f,,,-uscd Fnglbh languag<' 
Program ht~h bghted FY04 dden~e ~oopcution 
Ii-,r the Angolan .\hn,,,,-t of Ddence and ten of 
hi, semOf deputics. TIus crc.",d the firs, 
opportunil~' for ,en'ot Angolan defenLe official, 
TR) dNTNC 
'M' 
to directly illtCroCI with semor C.S. Dol) staff ('ee T ~hle 2(,):' T .ble 26 
Angolan offinals .1", paniL1pated in U.S. 'p'-,n"oted reglOn>l ,ecunty semm:us through thc 
A(;SS. wllh 1_, officials attendmg event. between I'Y01-OS_ 
FY05 <aW the fitst evcr U.S. military excrc,,~ in Angola. ~'pat!. of the [',S. European CotnmO.nd 
MEDFLAG c"cnt_ Th,s WAS" pttnUrily hum~llitarml ~sslStancc cvcnt compmcd of a 10-.Ja~·, 
three-ph~se crcr~1,e_ It brol1ghr 212 Arnen~",l milil:Uy personnel ~s p:ut of • .\[obllc Arm)' 
Surg!~al HosPJlol (),L\SIT) unn to Angol" to ,tali" a <i'muated rnass nsualty drill, treat 1(~) 
surgrcal panent., an.J provide medical ;tnd dental ~are ill three rural Angolan villagc~_'" 
",ee T~bJe 26 
,. Un,te<l Slate, Ocp.rtm.mt, of Ocfe""" and State_ [}ureau fcor i'oliticol-Milita,-".- Mtai",_ Fort/gn Mil",,,)' 
Tmi";n~ i'l FI.,,'ai r ..... ]IJlJ4 wid h_"w Yeac I1Jl)5, Volume I, Section IV, pg. 1_ at 
~ttp; Ilwww_,tate_go.-ldocume"tsicorga1l'liltioo/4 5 7 8 ~. p<!f 
"Boy~, Tmy_ Star>; ""d Strop,,.. "L'n,ts Deploy to !'Ingol. for HLlmal1it",ia" WmiC 4 September 200~,.1 











Additionally, Angola participated in the lJ.S. European Command-sponsored Africa Endeavor 
2006 Military Exercise in South Africa. This was a major CSG-sponsored military 
communications interoperability workshop focusing on command, control, communications and 
information systems (C3IS) among 20 participating African nations.~6 
Military HIV /AIDS Assistance 
Angola has not been affected by HIV / AIDS at the same levels as other regional militaries. 
Estimates range between 3-11 % of FAA personnel afflicted with HIV / AIDS as of FY03. The 
DHAPP programme expanded in I'Y03 when two F.AA staff members were sent to an All-
Africa Military HIV / AIDS Conference in Gaborone. It continued to grow in FY04 when FMF 
funds were designated for HIV / AIDS laboratory infrastructure including screening and 
diagnostic technology, computers and computer technology, rapid testing kits, and staff training. 
A total of 10 master trainers and 49 peer educators have been trained via DHAPP.~' 
Arms Authorisations and Grants 
Prior to rY05, there were fairly marginal levels of arms export authorisations and grants for 
Angola, although it was a recipient of both FMS and DCS agreements and FMF grants FY04-05. 
Post-9/11 FMF grants totalled $350,000 and were designed to help Angola pay for CSG 
provided training and services (see Table 26). 
Ibe majority of arms authorisations came in FY03 when Angola secured a DCS-A of $343,000. 
Approximately $180,000 was for bomb detection equipment and $126,000 for miscellaneous 
technical assistance.'s However, a more than $21,000,000 DCS-A in FY05 proved that the CSG 
had become serious about opening up to the Angolan military. 1be C.S. DoS approved sales for 
76 Captain Christine Miller, "Nations Plan African Endeavor Exercise," Unites States European Command 
Public Affairs Office, Stuttgart, Germany, 19 April 2006 at 
http://www.eucom.mil/englishlFuIlStory.asp?art=912 
77 United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Research Center. The First Four 
Years: Synopsis of the Global Effort. San Diego, CA. June 2005, pgs. 6-7. 
78 United States Department of State. Office of Defense Trade Controls. Direct Commercial Sales 











three helicopters, which accounted for approximately $19,000,000 of the: FY05 agreement. The 
rest was for aircraft spares and communication equipment (see Table 26)."'9 
Law Enforcement Training and Assistance 
As the USG sought to expand influence and assist with reform, there was an increase of 
cooperation in the law enforcement sector. Over the four years Angola participated in ~ix 
OPDAT, DEA, FBI, ATF, and ILEA-G-sponsored training programmes, through which 1,+0 
Angolan law enforcement and legal officials receiving instruction. Forty Angolan law 
enforcement officials were trained by the FBI; 15 by the DEA in counter-narcotics; 23 by the 
ATF; 57 by courses at the ILEA-G, and five lawyers trained via OPDAT in counter-terrorism 
legislation writing (see Table 25).80 
As the USG became more invested in the ILEA-G, it encouraged and funded Angolan police 
officers to attend training at the academy. lbe first offer for training at ILEA-G came in FY02, 
but Angola did not designate anyone to attend and lost out on the programme.81 1his changed 
during FY03 when 12 Angolan police officers attended courses82 and later in FY04 with 17 
police.83 Participation doubled to 28 during f'Y05. 84 
Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance 
Angolan personnel participated in SLX border and transportation security training and assistance 
programmes in the post-9/11 years as coastal, border, and maritime security became a malor 
79 United States Department of State. Office of Defense Trade Controls. Direct Commercial Sales 
Authorisations/or Fiscal Year 2005. pgs. 2-3. 
80 see Table 25 
81 United States Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY2002. March 2003 , Section X, pg. 3. 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/ris/nrcrpt/2003/voI2IhtmI/29913.htm. 
82 United States Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY2003, March 2004 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/ris/nrcrpt/2003/volllhtm1l29839.htm 
83 United States Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY2005: Volume II, March 2005 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrptl2005/volllhtm1l42361.htm, 
84 United States Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2006 











foeus of Amencan mlcrest 111 the Gulf of "'linea. A (ot.al of 94 A"l'0lan ,""curil), ,,(lid.b were 
I1lvolvcd '0 the ""nOllb programme, (>cc Table 2S). The new foeu" on border and tramportation 
",~-unty was dut· to a concern that relaxed borders at the end of the en.! war would mcreasc drug 
ttaffichng, smuggi.l1lg. and cross-horder CfllllC. ",\n mcre.sed FAA capacity to ,",CUrttv nuril1lne 
borde,.,; will protect fishing and oil re.'Otitcc.' ,nd help pn:n-nl1.hc COUnt')"; u'c ~s ft tr,,,",t POInt 
fot ICTtunst>; and Ill egal dtug"_ '"" 
One element of the mantime foeu, included USCG-conducted coo'Ull sccunty traimng for eight 
,\ngolan navy personnel In FY{)4-0S. Adillt1Onall}, SIX A"l'"lan ()ffi~,als Were lflvHcd to the t '.S. 
tu "h,c ..... 'c and lntcrA~l with L~SCl; offidab ., part of the USCG-IVI'. This was finan~cd 
through I'MI' grants as part of the USG', re.urrec{ed African Rorder and Coastal s"curity 
Programme. of whIch Angola Is a member.'" 
As Gulf of Gum"", .",,,';tnne "",unt)' hcc~me a more p",.,.,;np; i'""e for the L'SG, 11 hn,ted , 
three day Gulf of Gumea M~nnmc Secunty Conference ~t the U.s. 6" Fleet Ileadqu.rtcrs m 
Naple>! , It:dy dunnp; £<Y05, AngoliUl na"alleadershIp pilrtlClpated along With 16 other n~tlons to 
discuss, "commnn IDle"'Ms, challenges ami dueats, indudl11g combating pm,,); lhe illegoJ 
"aflidung of weapons, dtugs and people; and the need to rcdu~e manumc thr"",!.' m economl~ 
d",,-ciopment, ,;u~h ~. tho.e over naltonal ft,hlllg right, and off,hnre oil ptodu~tion_ ' .. ' 
Tramport~tion >oecunty a"ist~nce w~s abo enhanced a. 16 Angolan offiClab received """,non 
security tnItl1l1g thmugh fhe Safe Sk,es for Afnea Progr:o.mme m FYO.'-OS. Direct ,,,istance 
came durillg P,'OS a. the L'.S .• pent $kfl(),OOn on ttam'ng and equ'prnC11t to l11~tc:>_'e ~Itport 
",-,curit)'_ On top of lhal, the uS DeparttnC111 of Homeland Sc~unt(. (DH~) Tr-an'porl:ltton 
Secunt)' Agency (TSA) tratned 62 Angol~n ,""cunty offtctab tn airport and avi~tton :<e~unty 
through their ITP in P,'OJ (see 'J able 25). 
" United Stmes Dep..-tm<nt of State. Bur.au of Political-Milot",)' Aff,;rs, CongrejS;on~1 Budge/ Jon/ifi.'aliotl 
Jix Fore.!':" Operal.otls: FIsc'a] Year 2005. Wosh;ngton: GPO, May 2()().l p, 222 
'" Un;ted Stme, Department of Stat • . Bur.,u of Politlc.I-Milit;u}' A ffairs, Congre'5;on~1 Bud):e/ Jon/ific",;"" 
Jf"- Foreign Op",-atio,,-, n,,,al fear 2007_ W",hin~t"" : GPO. Mav :'006_ p_ n5 
" Armed Force' Pre" Se"'ice_ "Mari'i"'~ Se.:unty Conference Br;ng" "'",w., Toge.hei"_ 05 (J<;t"""" 2()().l, at 












The l:.s _ I\o"wan~ ,~curit y rdal1<>1ls1np h~s 
remalfled Ofle of th,- "tong~'" ,f nol th, 
'trongesl, amon!,;st .U Southern Afric",,, 
model of ptok"ion~h.,m ~nd a partner ]fl 
the Global War on T~rrot, l.h~ cou"'t" ,,; 
des",i):"'d ~' , "advancing regional stablht)" 
and ,uppott1v~ of L:.S, goals 111 Solltl,ern 
,'\frica."wuh an 'mportant tol~ to ph)' 111 
regJ<>1lal ,ccunty an d conilic! t~wI1lLion ,"'" 
'l111s IS srr( ~1g1}' e,id ent Ul the amounL of 
tnllit~ry. law L11forcement, and peacekeeping 
asslStance which ha\e b~~n off~r~d to the 
nat;on. "Ill<' p rimary ,eeunt)' wnc~nl of Lh~ 
[ :S(; is the tremendonsl), ddnlitaring dkc! 
IIIV/AIDS IS ha,-u>g on tbe capabtlit1c, of 
tIl<' 1l1)1 ' and oih~r sen"il y forces, 
'1'0 l11cre., e Bot,wana', domc,uc ,emruy 
cal"~C1ty, the USG 'l'I('nt mor~ ,.h~n 
$16.I~X ).I~ Xt' eraulln!,: 3,59~ BDI' and othe r 
I'DI' pan>c'paUoIl ill peacekeeping 
progranunc .. , whlCh tto.in~d 2,249 B))I' 
personneL Compkmcnt1t\g Ihis "'-~re fi,-e 





personnel; nine law enforr"lT1~nt Irmnl1lg progrnmmcs for 669 l~,,' mfotc~lT1~llt Tabk 27 
" t;nlt.d St.le, [l<:partn>cnl of Slate, Sure .. , of Pol itio. I_Mililary AlTai". Coogressiooai Rud~N Jumjicatinn 
fOl' FOl'dgtl 0puGltom: Fi.le,,/ lear 20(15 , W. <Jl in!" Oil: GPO, Ma)- 21~14. pg, 22~ 
"Figure d,,,', no" indude U.s. ex!"'nd;!"r. on th~ RoI'w.n~ "'COlA programme, "hld\ i, puhlicly 











~r""nnel; .od four border and uansponanon secumy ualnlflg progmmmes for 334 personnci 
(,ec 'I able 27). 
L~w enforcement cooperatio<! saw a big bcoost 
WIth th~ ~stablIshll"l<:nt "f the International La" 
Enf,ltcernent Academy (11.I<:A-(;) in (;..,I>o<one 
The 11.EA_C Is slaff",j "nd mught by U,S. and 
Eot'wanan officIal, and ""rye' as " foc~1 point 
ILEA C; sh,,,,.-ed great confidence in BOlOwan" 
a, a hy pl.yer in Afnean >-(,curity afbi". 
In ,ddmon to th~ trairung figures, th~ USG 
authorised more than $142,IX)(),OOO 111 attn, 
covenng • ",de range of delenc. arude. (see 
'fable 211). 
Collewvcl,., th,' rhctoIlc, progr"mm,' funthng, 
and coopn.tiort prove that B"tswana enlO)" a 
,.~t}' .<trong bil.kral <d"unnshlp ""1Ih the U.S. 
IlilateIal Security TIeaut; and Arrecmcnt; 
]lot,,,,",,o. Hgmd an Article ?8 Eilneral 
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I I I T~b"'2S ~nsU!1ng that Amcnnn dl1zcm would nol be suTTen, etc, by 10 the Int~tnationa 
Crurunal C"urt by the Botswan"n gmTnlmcnt ""thout fir,t ha"ing USC; ~on.'enl.1" Withoul 
"grung an Arnclc ~H agreement Bot"""ana would have likely I"st all def~n<:c a1<L 
>It Pre" Stotement by kichord ~ollCher, Spoke,man Unitc'<i Stote. u"partment of State WashmglOn, f).c., MOY 










, \Iso in FY03, Butswana signed an "l\C(lu~'ltlon ~nd CW,,-Scf\'lOg ."'gr~~mrnt" Wlth the L-s(; 
whleh Of'<'n,,,l the war for tnlltllal ~""tanc~ ;n matten; ,,[ lo)!.i't\cal "'ppot( in peacekttpin;; 
~['.t1on", hum'''\Jt:Jr1~n ond di'"",e[ op~,..~t1"m, llllateral eXetCf"eS, "nd unfote"e~n 
connngcnoes." Addltlon,lly, lIo"wano hu, "g"ed an "greetnent Wlth th~ L'S(; to serve ~" " 
U .S, military 'CoopcraoYe Scculi~' we,rion' "" pnt of lto global po",tionmg "t'"tcog},_" '\ 
Coopcr:lt1~-~ Sccunty Location i, deflfl~d as, "a h,>'t-n"tion facility ,,~th littl~ or no pennanem 
U.s_ p=onnd preoenc~, wh'ch may mm~lO pte-po<ition~d ~qwpment and/u,- log"tlcal 
arrang<'ments and """,-e both [or ""culity GK)pcracion ~ ctivjt;~, and mnUn;;ency acc~,,_ ,,}) 
Miltl:lt)' Tn;ni"i' and , \s<iSlanee 
,\pproX1ITlmely $2,131),1)1)1) "'"' ~lIocJ.,~d to [[ain 319 BDF pcrsonnd 111 D.-I ET courses. 
Bo,~""~n~n offiCIal, also continued to b~ active in ACSS progr;unmL-'; Wlth lH personn'" 
attending var1ou, ,L'tnman; 'lOd fuur BDF pilots att""ding avi,cion uatning in th~ t',S. through 
th~ ALP progmtrun~ (, ,,~ 'rabl~" 17 ~nd 211)_ 
Th~ JCl.n' progrmmne was ,cOve in I'YI)2 Wlth two ~xercis~s cunductc..:! for 41) and SO memb~n 
of the B DI' Commando Stjuadron.'~ 
As coume[-t~rwJ1,tn b"c;une a foell.' of Amencan secUI1~' intde't, fllnding was all"catcd 
bC)(mll111;; in FY04 to help Bon;w~na ",t,bh,h a muntcr-terrori,m urut."' Botswana .bo W", 
invited tn FY04 and FYOS tu '~nd fiye officiol,; to wunret-tetton'tn traming ,etmna" as part of 
rh~ new Regtonal Comb~!mg '/'erron'tll Fdlowsh;p Progn.mme (RCTI']»_ 
" ".\foznmhiq"e, Military Ag""'"clOI wilh IN" United ,\'tiJle,», Agc"da tie I"forma,"" Moc.tnbique, 2 May 
2\){)7 at http://albfrieoCl,,n'sto[''~/2007()'()10'80,''tml 
"Plc",h, Lauren_ C(~lgre"ionol R."'o'ch Sorviee_ F,,,,,i!!,' AlTai"'" Defen"", o"d Tr.>do Div;,iml.' __ '(n-i<-a 
Command: US_ Sira/ey;i" Irller"" llnd INc Role (,(INe US, Mil(jerry irl ,.f);-Iea_ Wa,h;nll''''' D,C. Dcccmlx-r 7, 
l{HI7, p. Y 
" Un~ed State, Lum"""" Command_ !>llp:,!/ww" ,eumrn,miIJenglisi1ITrnnsformationiT ran,fr>ntl_ Blur ,a,p, !3 
January lOOS 
"' UniteJ Sto,., Departme"', of nof""", and State, Burea" for Polilicol"Militaf)' A rTai,,_ Fnrcign Mililary' 
T"ami~g;n Fi-Ie,,1 re,," 2(1(12 , Volume 1, Sectin" IV, pg, 1 
'-' UniteJ State, Deportment of Stale, Butea" llf Plll itical-Mi!iTaoy Alfair<. Con,-,;rc,~,km~1 Budget Jw,liflm/iorl 










J oint Military Exercises 
Botswana participated ill the U.S. European Command-sponsored Africa Endeavor 2006 
Military Exercise in South Africa. The event was a major l)".S.-sponsored military 
communications interoperability workshop focusing on command, control, communications and 
infonnation systems (C3IS) among 20 participating African nations.9() 
~lilitary HIV IAIDS Assistance 
HIV I AIDS is greatly affecting the BDF, which suffers an estimated 40% infection rate. Given 
the high level of military relations between the two nations and the l)"SG's desire for the BDF to 
be a regional leader in peacekeeping, HIV I AIDS is greatly undermining USG security goals for 
the BDF. 
The DHAPP programme began in earnest during f'Y02 as funds were allocated for revision of a 
train-the-trainer curriculum; the purchase of nine modular counselling and testing centres, a 
Toyota Land Cruiser for staff travel, computers, test kits, lab equipment, and mass awareness 
materials for the BDF. Funds sent two BDF personnel to an international HIV / AIDS 
conference in Barcelona, Spain and during FY03 Botswana hosted an all-Africa HIV / AIDS 
conference, all of which was paid for by DHAPP. Additionally, two BDF HIV clinicians were 
sent for training in San Diego, California and to an HIV / AIDS symposium in South Africa. 
Since programme inception DHAPP has trained 55 BDF master trainers and 314 peer 
educators9~ 
Peace Support Operations Training and Assistance 
Botswana participated in three PSO programmes in the post-9/11 years. These included one 
officer sent to the u.S. as part of the now defunct EIPC programme. More significant PSO 
96 Captain Christine Miller, "Nations Plan African Endeavor Exercise," Unites States European Command 
Public Affairs Office, Stuttgart, Germany, 19 April 2006 at 
http://www.eucom.mil/english/FuIlStory .asp?art=912 
97 United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Research Center. The First Four 











training came through the Professional Military Education (PME) programme, which trained 30 
and 60 BDF personnel, respectively, during F<1'02-03. This was in the form of an introductory 
peace support course given by a mobile education team from the u.s. This meagre PSO 
assistance has been eclipsed by BDF participation in the U.S.-led AC01~1\ programme with 
2,128 BDF personnel trained between 1'1'04-05. Programme structuring included a variety of 
senior level PSO management training for battalion staff and eventually full battalion exercises. 
To date, three BDF battalions have completed the ACOTA training programme.98 
Arms Authorisations and Grants 
Post -9/11 arms export authorisations to Botswana totalled $142,244,000 with the majority via 
through the DCS programmes. The agreements were primarily for aircraft parts, 
communications equipment, and military electronics (see Table 28). 
Direct USG arms authorisations though the FMS programme totalled $4,017,000. FMF training 
and equipment grants added up to $2,724,000. The FMF grants helped Botswana purchase C-
130 aircraft parts to help with future peacekeeping troop deployments (see Table 28). 
Law Enforcement Training and Assistance 
Post -9/11 law enforcement training exploded as the USG built the ILEA -G and trained many 
Botswanan law enforcement officials. USG and Botswanan officials share administrative and 
training duties at the ILEA-G. This is perhaps one of the most uniCJue aspects of the U.S.-
Botswana security relationship. 
As far as courses are concerned, the FBI-ITP trained 310 Botswanans while the DEA-rl1> 
trained 94 people and the ATF-ITP 135. Subject areas were agency specific such as forensic 
analysis by the FBI, counter-drug operations by the DEA, and counter-small arms smuggling 
courses by the ATF. On top of that, 35 mid to senior level Botswanan officials were sent for 
training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in unspecified disciplines. 











A. for the iel':ai ",de of law cnfOf~cm<ont, OPDAT ""is actIve dunng FY02 when four US. 
Ol'DAT attorney. were scnt to Botswana 10 meet ~ounterpart' 10 various IIUIl1stncs. One 
HOls",an.n a{{orney wa, <ent to the VS. in a rc~lpr<",.J training arrangement. In F'IO" eight 
OPDAT "ttonK')"' ""cnt to Hotsw.nn and trained 60 counterparts in pru<e~ut"n~l man~'f'. The 
P">gI'~tnIT1C al;,o worked wlth Bor,w.nan officials Ofl domesti~ COlUUer-terron<m le;\l,ht1<"'.'" 
"I1lC ATA programme \Va< acti,e for 10 FY02 when ,,4 offioals pameJpatcd 10 courses in 
Ddaw~re and Tcx",. CSA on Vit.l Install.tion Sccunty and Survdllancc DctccDon. !i~ Addition,,] 
AT,", fundlOg m J'Y04 was Uc5lg1latcd for a lcchrucal consultation on sc~urit)' at the Sub-Africa 
'\Imi Congress (L\CP). "" 
Bonler ,md TUllI:op<>tlatJo1J Sewn!)' Tuinuw and ~tang; 
Border security a,"isrance was active as three CHI' officcr md t2 ICE officc,.,; were sent from 
the L.S. '0 lnlJn .Bl BoL<wanan elL'tom,. border. ~nd 1ITUTIlgt"ltlon offic.als m horder and 
lmm'Watm" ,,",cumy «ee Table 21!). 
LESOTHO 
u.s. ,,",curIly relatron, with l..c;.otho ",maUled f~lrlj" cOI1;.i't<..~ll In the po,t-9/t! yeats. although 
Lcsotho'. small Mature .ept it towards the hottom of l'SG regronal '~"CUt1ty prionoc". esc; 
,ecunry goals remamed thc solne as prc-9!!! ycar, and mdudcd encoUIllgtng eMabll.hmcnt of 
an apolitical, professlOnal. nuhtar) and la,,' enforcement agencies with respect for Clvil-millt.'}' 
affaIrs and humm ngh". 
B.lateral rel.tions did ho,,-wer "uffer a ,ub,tant'al ,etbad in I'Y02 when rhe eSG enacted the 
A"",ncan Servlcemcmbers' ]'rorcction Act (ASPA) in responsc to the Romc Sramtc. De'plte 
'" United SLate, [)ep.rtment of ~t., •. Bu",au oflnl.matioo.1 Narcotic, ant! Law Enlorcemcnl. imcl"naiional 
VllJ""Ol"" Conll'()/ StratcKY R.'pol"t FY l1K13. Rele.,et! March 2004. at 
hllp:iiwww .• I.le . gOY Ipii n lirl slnrcrp</200,! "0 121htm 1'299 I .'.hlm 
l~' U,u,.d S!a,c' Dq,artmcnt of ~loce. Bureau of DiplomOlic Sccunly The An""7FOI".'''' A5.i,wnce PI'OI!T~m' 
Rep&llu Gmg,.,,,.,jur h><"(1/ Yeal' llKll. Febru"')' 2003. p. II 
'" U"'!ed St.le, D~portme"t of ~talc. Bureau of DiplomOllc Security. The Am"emm.'''' A.,.,i,wnce P"'!!l'am' 











USG threalfi to withhold a1<1 tnomc" 
l .c",rh" Tc1u""J to "'gtl ~ Bilateral 
immuml}' .\grcclm:nt (;\rude 9H) wuh the 
, ;SG, """hng ,n • loss of 1/1.110:'1 tnilito.ry 
a",istanee li.lndo, "'n"d\, JCCTC'Slllg total 
Ira,,"ng figures . /I!.,re than $33J,OOO w", 
'pen, on I ",otho ,enmty tram1f!g for 181 
l.f)F and la" i cnfo,c~m<~l1 o[ficial, ill the 
post-9/11 yrars, Th" 'nclLJd~J 75 1...01' 
tr~111ed in two military- rdated prograrrum,,; 
105 la", Ll1f'>fcemem .,[fioa], truincd In 
five b" i cn[orc~m~n! pn>gr'~tll1nes; and lust 
one official by (h" l.'.S C1W 111 b<.rokr ~nd 
1,..~n<portali'Jll ,ecurity l,ee Table 2')), 
, 
Le,:<otho v.'", n,,, invoh'eJ wuh ~ny arlm deals or nuekar ,ecunty ,nd pe.c~ 
Bilateral Secllruy T g.u.' amI Agreemcnts 
lk' pHc L'S(, entreaties, the usotho goven11'nem 
optrd nO( to , ign .n .\rude 9H Bilateral 
immu~'l}' AgnTnwnt wtth Ibe USC; and In so 
dOillg ,va, prohibited from "'cewing J.ir~ct tmlu~ry 
Iralnmg assIStance. 
ilolET ~\ 
Th~tc v.'", " marked downgrade in the nllmb~t of 
LDF personnel itallled by the U.s. In the po, t_ 
9/11 years wIth nutnbc,-, falling It) 75 person" 1bat 
52 
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[)~"pn.c that, 1",,,,11,,, o:kf~..,cc offic,al, Werc actJvc 10 U.S.-sp""sotcd ]tess acl1;-,tI<:" at the 
ACSS wtln 1 H ",ni!)t leaders Invoked 10 ,pptox;matdy $223,00J worth of seCUrlty ~~'fl1ina" (,ec 
Tables 2~ and 1lJ). 
TI,e RLDF partiapated l1l the U.S. European Command-sponwred l\fnca Endea,-or ZlI06 
/l,hhw,'Y Exercise in South l\ftlC~. "Jhc evenl IS a malor 1'.S.-_'ponrorcd mliu.f}' COffilnlUllc.tlOn, 
mtcrop"rab,h,y wurk,hop f(>cu.''''>; on comma",], control, umunuruntl,,"," and informatlufi 
"y. tems (C31S) among 20 pamc'panng Afnnn nation']"\ 
:'hllla!}' HfY LAIDS AssjsUlncc 
The 1 )11 A PI' p"'gtarnme began 10 J ""-,,,rho during Ff()2 when a ptclinunary need, asse"m" .. m 
wos condllcted. "'" of that year, the geneul p"pulal1on of l;.:,,,tiw wa, e,titruJ.rcu '" haw, a 29"/. 
Hrv I AIDS infection rate. No ,mdJe, of the 1 .oj' ha,-c bc~." conducted. but ratcs arc c,tlmated 
(l c'l"al that <>f the general pupulatiun. FY03 saw lflcn:a,ed cullaboranon a, DltA PI' pto"dcd 
fundmg f'lr lab c'lwpm~.,lt. test k"". cumputer hard and sofm'are, haem.tology ,nalpcr, and 
nutritional ,upplements for the t"~)P'. Funds w~"'e .1'0 'pc'" un nurse. physician. and lab 
teclmician traJrur\g In California whleh "'''-' fon.l"Cd on J,agtlUS1< and clinical pwcedure. FY().j 
and Ff05 ftUlilln~ wa. dcsIg!lated for the Cf""UOn of a peer cdu<:atot I~aming proW"""""" a, well 
"-, a mass cducau""al campaIgfl for the defence force,. to. 
'" F.herh~n. Sally. Coolition for liJc lnlc"1"T1ati<mat ("ourt. CmmlrJ~' Op!",uJ /" S'8~m8 " HII,,/eml }",,,,,,,,Uy 
4w""",ent US .4,d V).<t m Fin~ and FHl5 and 1'n.'-'1biy FW6. pg. I !II 
http:i''"'ww i ccn 0". o'llict()Cum cnl~1C ou ntri "sappo,niH 1 A _ AidLC>SI. Jurrmt. f"If 
,OJ (""plain Chri<lm~ MilteT, "N~tion, Plan Afnc,," Endta,or bere;,,'," lIniles Stme, Eur"P"all C()fIlnl,"d 
Public A j);'i.--. OfTice. Stulll."'~ Gmnlln)" 1 \I Arnl1OO6 at 
htlp:iiww,", .~ucom mi L,'cngli,h"'FultSt')f} .a'r"art : 911 
J<o4 Unil"~ State. lkpartmen{ of Oden,e. Depaflm<n! or (he Kav)', Navy llealth Res".,oh Center. The FIY!<I 











L-1w Enforcement Trmmng amllmlstancc 
A (otil of 79 Ram{ho law enforcement p"lsonnel "'eTc tr~in,d und", DI(A, I'Rl, All', ond 
I'JETe "l!,rnal1on~1 'rllmng p'''gr~mm", hctv.,~,n FY02-05_ Lnfommately, ,ector trrurung 
Jmppcd ,,[f Jramaucally OY,," th, C()ut>;~ of the four POM-'>! 11 ) e~", (see I able 29). 
Sever.1 meml.en of the Lesotho Mounted Poke ServIce (J .,\1 i'S), Le,,,,h,, Re"",n1'" Authorlt}-, 
and j);tt:ctorA{e of Ecun"mlc C"rrupttDn and Offenc,," "I{~ntkd cla,~~, at th, lLEA-G,"" 
",eluding 26 in FYfl2.' ''· Mott: k'''otho I"w enfotcement rnvoiv,mrot rncluded pamclpauon ill 
FY03 seffilDar, on counwr-terrorism le,.-J,bnon writing and ~ 1",,04 ,\ssel Forfeirure ~nd M()n,y 
L.undenng cOflfcr~nce Ofl pubhc COtnlpnon.'" In the borh years E.S, ad\'iwr' ftum th~ 
Depat1men! of rhe Trea"'r)", Offic~ of T~ch"'GlI A,~j'lanc~ w~nl to J"""tho to hdp ,enlot 
mini,lt)' and h.nk offie~aJ, ,,~th fi,UnL,.1 and {a~ rdonn a!med .1 money bunderrng and 
finanCIal crime. ''''' 
Ilortkr and tr.n,!X'Ii.uon ,~curity Rsototanc, fot usotho wa, vitrually non-cX1S!~nt in the P"'t-
<J!ll y...,.rs with iust on~ offiCIal tmined dUIUlg FYQ.-I, A us. CHI' texule pwducuon ,-erification 
{e.m, op<:r.{~d 111. I """th" to a"i,t with 'el ~\"e' of coun{~rf,'il cemficate, for ~ppatcl,l(" ThIs 
sector wa. clearly not> priority for d,e USG, 
""UnlteJ Slates Department of St.te, Bur<au ofPoJitical·Militory Affai", ('on;:res<ioflal Ilud;:rr Jus/jflcaUon 
lor Foreign Op"r~lion,.. F;,,'~I 1 e~r )1107, Washingt"''' CPO. May 2006, pg, 289. 
"'" United Slate, Department ofSm'e Bureau for ImemaliooaJ NXTcoticsxnd t .• w Fnforcemenl,.,thi" 
Intern,,/ional Nal"('Ofi~" Control Strate!;)' Re('f'rII-T111I!1, March 2003, Sel'I"," X, pg_ 32_ 
oa· Unit ed SL'lteS Departme"t ofSI",._ RUT"'U fOof !nlern",i",,.t N=otics and t .x" tinf"","me"' AlTa,,,,_ 
Internallonal Non'Ofic< Control StrateliY ReporII-T111I!5.- Volwno /I, M",'C'h 2005 P.29 
,., lini,ed SI"e, Dep,rtmen, of S,,{e_ Bureau for Internal],,",,1 Narc"ti", ami Law E"forcemon{ AlTa;,,_ 
ImemaI;""al --"armlio.< Comrill Siralegy Report FJ'2tll!3. V"'ume II, M..-c!l 2004 
]""United S'"tes Dep.nment of SlaW, tJu,""U for t"tenlati,.,.1 Narcot;" ami Law Lnf",eoment Affai" 












DUling tbe post-9/!! rea" Mabwi 
tnru.t1truned a ,<)lId <dauon,hlp with the 
USG. l k,pn~ llnilc< funding i,,"~, and 
~ gem'ral lack of law enforcement and 
mtlllar}' te",urc~,. the l "SG C()n."der~d 
thc Mala,,'an .ceutit), ""dOf. parJteul~tl)' 
thc :\lDI', to b~ vc')' ptofc.stonaL 
l'nlok~ oth~t SOl1th~m ,\fn~an 
coumtic" t~ttoti"tn wa, ,kstgtlated a 
pIlm.ry secunty conc~m for th~ l:SG in 
l-.loh"'I, AmerIcan officul, upres.ed 
wn~~tn "'ith the potenual fo' ~n 
cxtctfla l tht~at to Malawian and l: .S, 
!lUereslS from nsmg terroJ1St aC!lvlty m 
Ea<t Afnca and trans-n~tJ{)l1al crime, Ll " 
C.S. offiC1~I. nTn named Malawt a 
p~rtner and pantC1pant m as Global 
\X'ar on Terror in th~t, "Mal~wi has been a strong ,upponet 10 COl1nt~<-t~rron"''' 
TobIe 31 
cffon, ... "lab,,~ ha< e()opc<at~d wIth the United State. m coordinal1ng anU-t~ttori'm 
aCIDities"'" 
B~}'ond tem,n'fll concern,;. L;SG security Interest m :\falawl j" sirruJar to th at of othc< SOllth~nl 
African eountn~", WIth mam oblecU,·C, being to mCreaSe p<'acekeepmg capacity, ~n'\lJmg a 
continued apohtieal millt",), "!UL-tli'~ and po"'U~e civil-milit~ry rdations, and working to combat 
th~ ,k ... 'asto.ttng effect' of HIV / AIDS on the MDF. 
L" Uniled Stale. Department, of Slate Bureau of Politic~I·Military Almi"" Forelgll Military Training and DoD 
/;"gag,'melll A,'li"ill"' oj flllere.". lai'" Ii'porl '" ConWe:;, jor FY2004 Mard' 2005 
'" United St"'.s Department of SUIte, Flur •• u of T'oliticol.MihW)' Aft.,,,. COlIgre.'-'101wl Budget JU>lijiealioo 











' ro m~~t USG ,e"llnty go-al,. tun"ng was pn,,·,ded for 1.442 nuiJtarl' and ,ccunt;· offiaal. 
through 11 ,hf[ereIH ttaming p"'grammes. nus mcluded 303 !fl military programme", 1,011 in 
the .\COT,'\' peacekeeping support openuons programme; 126 In law enforcement 
progranunc-s; and two 1n border and tnnSpotUlJOIl sc~unt)· programme, (see Table 31). In 
~dd1U"n to the h"nd, -OIl training ptun.1cd. the l-SG authoru;ed $6.846.000 l1l ann, .,ab to 
boosl dornc'lJ~ ,ec"\mty capadty (see Table 32). 
Malawi 'igned an Arncle 91'- Bilateral hmnunitr 
Agre~ment ,,-ith the l ' SG in FY03, en<unng thai 
Amencan UU/c~lS ",111 !101 b~ surrenJcR...i to th~ 
Mlliran Trmrung md A«!Sl~lI\;c 
Collcern'ely. l:rulJmry tml11l1lg "",1 a .. lst"nce 
illtlllll15hed rather abrupl1y between (7);'02-05 
d~.puc the paniup"tion of the MDI' and _\\oD III 
,,,,-end programme'. t\ ,otal of 303 \IDF and 
MoD per"OlUle! w~rc provl<kd ES.-<ponsor-eJ 
tml1ling via lMFT. lU;SS. ALP •• n.1 l enT 
Ilowevcr, {he mai''''''Y wa' "'1th the 1\Il,'T 
progr~mme. wh1ch tr.incd 257 :'IiDT' "n.1 .\\"D 
I'''~t··, t1~I,J;IKtt' u'"PtK,{lU:'>. 
PKo(,H.\M'1f L:\pl."m n Kt II \ t \ 
,,~ ,"l 





pcr50llnd ~t ~ toml o;ost of$1.16~,00tI (see T:J,ic< 31 "",I 32). 
Despltc these c<>mbincd num!,,,rs, th~", wa' a notlcemlc J",p '" :'IiDT'I:\U·T tr~;niog figure .. in 
FY04-0S ,.., compared to FY02-03. De"pM that. the R(:~S wa, ,-,:ti, e Mth a tot.l of 11 
," Pre" Slatcmcnl by Richard lloocher, Spokesman. United StOles Dtpartment of Stm. II.' ashingto", D.C., 











MDF/MoD personnel attending security senunars at the ACSS. 
Additionally, a total of four MDF pilots were sent to the L'.S. for training through the ALP in 
years FY03-04 and 30 MDF personnel from the Parachute Battalion of the MDF trained with 
l!.S. Special Forces in a JCET training mission in FY02. 113 
Joint Military Exercises 
The MDF participated in the l!.S. European Command-sponsored Africa Endeavor 2006 
Military Exercise in South Africa. The event was a major G.S.-sponsored military 
communications interoperability workshop focused on command, control, communications and 
information systems (C3IS) among 20 participating African nations. 114 
iv1ilitary HIV (AIDS Assistance 
HIV / AIDS infection rates in the MDF are estimated at around 15% of the forces. The DHAPP 
programme began in Malawi during f<Y02 when the L;SG awarded a contract to the company 
ResourceLinC to build a programme. During FY03 Df-IAPP sent two MDF personnel to the all-
Africa HIV / AIDS conference in Botswana and one MDF physician to HIV training in San 
Diego, California. Funding also went towards condom distribution, lab equipment, mass 
awareness campaigns, establishment of three Counselling and Testing Centres, and for 18 IvIDF 
personnel to attend HIV / AIDS diagnostic and clinical treatment courses at the Malawi Armed 
Forces College. Since programme inception 25 MDF master trainers and 275 peer educators 
have been trained via DHAPp.1I5 
113 United States Departments of Defense and State. Bureau for Political-Military Affairs. Foreign Military 
Training in Fiscal Year 2002, Volume I, Section IV, pg. 14 
114 Captain Christine Miller, "Nations Plan African Endeavor Exercise," Unites States European Command 
Public Affairs Office, Stuttgart, Germany, 19 April 2006 at 
http://www.eucom.mil/englishlFuIiStory.asp?art=912 
115 United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Research Center. The First 











Peace Support Operations Training and Assistance 
Having been the lone Southern African participant in the ACRI programme, Malawi easily 
transitioned into the ACOTA programme. Despite enthusiasm, MDF participation in ACOTA 
was hampered by a lack of Malawi governmental funding and inoperable defence equipment. 
Despite this, an initial Training Strategy Conference was conducted in FY03 when 29 MDF st~ff 
worked with u.S. DoS programme managers to design a general plan. The first stages of 
ACOTA training were conducted in l'YOS when 982 MDF personnel were involved ill 
introductory training. This included a battalion staff and company commander Training, 
Planning, Management and Development course and a Command Post Exercise. To date .. no 
MDF battalion has completed a full ACOTA training cycle. I 16 
Arms Authorisations and Grants 
Arms export authorisations were fairly small compared to other Southern African nations Wlth a 
total of $6,846,000 in FMF grants and DCS/FMS sales. The majority of the authorisations came 
in FYOS with a $6,18S,000 DCS-A for communications equipment and explosives cartridges. 
Other than that, only FY03 saw a DCS-A of $70,000 for pyrotechnics. There was also $441,0()O 
in unspecified uSG direct FMS arms authorisations and a FMF grant in l'YOS which presumably 
was to help the MDF pay for associated costs in the ACOTA programme (see Table 32). 
Law Enforcement Training and Assistance 
Malawian law enforcement officials received consistent training through the FBI, DEA, ATF, 
and FLETC-ITPs with 44, 32, 40, and 3 trained under each agency, n:spectively (see Table 31). 
Malawian officials were also regular participants in ILEA-G cour~,es; however no specific 
numbers of participants are publicly available. 











OPDAT waS a]", actIVe In :-'Iilawi In FY(B when ,eyen ':-'lalaWlO.n law mfo.reement .nd lcg>ll 
officials recelyed ass"ranee with countcr-tl'tron"tn lcg>slauon v,",I"'g. '" In FY05 the 
gov~rnr=nt o.f Makwi r'''ll1<:'kd hdp from CSAID tn developing an ,nti-corruptlon! 
adm,ntstt::!lio.n of jusucc ptogtamr=. In 1l1rn USAID apprmched ICITAP and OPDAf to 
b<:ginning d~'yeloping a country prngt::!mme focused on <e,-en componeot." (1) ~«eS""u:nt of 
the Mab",-:j law enforcement .nd )U51lCe sy'tem cap~Clt1c'; (2) b,",c poIlce ,kIll, dL;ccl"pm~nt for 
Instructors; p) fnud Inve'tJgaoon devdopment; (4) tnternal affaJrs deyelopment: (5) ca,e 
managc,ncnt dc,-e\o.pment; (6) fortons,c de\-c!opment; ~nd (7) ICI'fAP marutgement of all 
atn •. ,,. Euly effort~ "1 component~ (1), (2), aIld (.'J were coIlducted during FY{)(,-07, 
/j.o.ukr .tld T,an<portoUon ScCU[1tr Ipirl.lng and A~'Nance 
Border and transportatIon sccunty cooperatIon w~, virtually no.nex'"tenl, <aW twO. 1vIal~w",n 
offiC1al~ getung tralmng by thc CSCG during FY02 (~"" Table 32). The l;SCG wcIlt to' "'aloWl 
to) conduct a l're-Trauung .\Iariome Sur.-ey, pre,um.bly to' a"'lSt with patro18 o.f Lake Malawi to' 
counter ~ v'rIel), o.f ,mugghng operanom and better cOfltrol the borden.'" After FY02 no 
border or tran.portation ,ecullty traming WII.' lflltiakd or conducted b)- the lJSG. 
MQZAMBIQlJE; 
Po,t-9/11 1;.S.-i\lozambican security relation. hav~ mcreased and arc focu&ed on building up 
m'htary and law eIlforcement rdatlon"hlp", ba"'c techn'cal "kill. of law ,nd m11itary personnel. 
~ssisl;ng m coastal and marit,me management, and humanitarian de mming 
The esc; ha" named Mo.zambique a supporter o.f its co.untcr-terronsm "ffo.m m lhal 
Moumhi<Jue '"h"s p1"m'id~d poliucal support for the GI"bal \Xi,r o.n Trrrllnsm and has 
\Ind~rtakL'1l I" imptO\-e bonier ,",curity and anU-t~-rrori" acUY'Uc< that. ;t< limned resources 
'" United State, DepanlMnt of State lJureau of Internallonal Narcotic< atld Law Lnful'cemcot Affairs 
l~l~malwna1 Nan<YIia C onlrot Siralegy Reporl FY 2M3. Wa,hington: GPO, March 200-1 
'" United State, Depanme!ll of Justice. Crlminal Division. !nternational Dcvele>pmcm and frain ing Program 
"Mal<w<" La", Enrorr:e"'~nl Dn.topmenl Prvgram" (rece,,'ed via personal correspotl<lffl<e. 23 JanuaJ)' 2(07) 
, .. United SL>te, Department of St,te, RUT€.1U oflntem.1lional NarcotICS .tId Law FnfCO"cement Affairs 










"Il"" .. ,,,al De,1"tc th,t .cknowl~dgment. very ~nl~ has been done by the l.'Se; to help with 
border and transport~llon securIty. 
:-'Ioz.mblque a, helping the goyemment to 
gain, "control of J1ltenlauonal crime, terron&!ll, 
.nd narcotic, ttaffick1ll!( through c.paClty 
bUilding In law enforcenwnt and the 
Iudiclary."'" .", sizeable Incre~,e In law 
~nfo'cement "",",ance for the country 
follo,"cd ,hI> Jed .. ,.. . l""'- This occurred 
pnm.riJy 1n anti -corruption ""tl~tiYC' with 
",zeablc lechrucal ~nd ~dvisory assIstance. 
Collccnydy. the L'SG "pent $1,2.%J()() on 
military and law "nfotccmcllt tr"Hung; 
~12,269,1))) on nnne aSSlstanCe; and authorued 
S 1 ,426,1))) m ~nns "h"eemenlS and siles (see 
Table 34). A total of 1.670 miltt"t\' "nd other 
,ecunt>- OffiCl'ls wnc prm-,ded ' '''~''''''!( in the 
po'I-9/11 block illclmhng 277 III "" htar)" 
, 
progt"",tnc"; 1,137 in p""ce~eeping support operations tr~lfllllg progr"mm~,; 2Sll in T abld3 
law ~~forccmcnt pwgr-"",,,,e,; "nd 5 J1l border and transportation st"cunty programme, (,cc 
Table 33). 
I ~ I United stm", Department nf Slate Bur~"u of Political-Military Affairs_ Conwe'5iona/ fJud?,er .I"-"'jicatlOn 
jiJr F",-e;gn Ope"'I;"'" Fi,<eal rear 211m, Wa,h;ngton' GPO, May 2004,p_ 265 
1 'I UIl;t. d St;,,~, O"p..-tmcnt of State, Bureau ofPo liti""I -Mili"'y Alto;,,_ f'onp,re,'-<iona/ fJuJg~1 .Iu_"'fi<'ali()~ 











lIlozambique signed an , \rucle 9H Bilater.l 
[nunlllllty '\W"etn"nt wIth th" l -SG '" 
would not be surrendered 
["''''''au"n,l C.t1lnillal emrt b} th" 
M,,~"mblean g'" "mm,,", Mthout first 
flavIn!' l '::; (; ~'m,cnt_"-' )'I()zamtn'l"c" not 
• St.te P.rty to the Rome St.rotc and 
therdo,,, "as ne,,,r "bgibl" fo' 111lET and 
[')'15/I 'Ml' ,anet;on'_ 
In M.y 2007, the lJ .S. and MozambKllw 
Signed an "Acgll1SiUOn and c.w,,-Servulg 








2424 1431 2620 
IOglsucal ,upport Ul tn:Itter,; of peacekeepmg operauons, hrun.nitanan and disa,rer T.bt~3~ 
support, buoteral exercIse" and lmfore,een connngerJCle,.''' 
The L:.S. provided tra=g for 277 F,\DM and 11100 personnel m duee nulitary trairung 
programm~" IMET. RC.SS, and JC.El'. The m"J"rIty wa, 11IlE"l' wuh $4_'-',000'0< spent prmlarily 
un Infantr)' Officer. [-:.n"h,h I"",,~e im'ruetlOn. and mant1m~ ttallling co"",e, f"r 210 Ft\DM 
pet' ()D~cl (,"-,e Table 33) 
'02 ""lCgctown Uni,'c",","y L~w S-cl>ool Wehsirc 
http://ww w _11_gmrgdo wn. "du/in! t/ I!'u ide,'-art ic Ie 98. c tin H ,,,un tric .. 
,~, ·'A/ozGmb'quo. AIlI"ary Agreem2nt w"h tlu! I in"e.! Statd', Agcnei. de lnf'>rm~""" M,>combiqu", 1 M.y 
2(X17 at http://~II~fT; C>._ COm .'''",,~~,'200 70 5 020 5 RO _htm I 
," United Slate. lkputment of Stak_ BurcllU of lntcm.tion~l NlII"cotk, ~nd La" Enfo<ccmcnt Affairs 











Th~ l'ADlll paroClp.{~d ill JCET =g wuh U.S. Spec",1 I'o"'e, dunog I'Y02 In twu s~p.lra{e 
rruining activiti.". 'Ib~ fIn<{ w~, for .'0 FAIllll mem[",n; of (he I" Special Furces PIa{OOll and the 
""cond act1\~t~' was for 17 FAInt m<;mbeTS ofth~ Gucianu }mtiniu NavilaL " T ... ·ent) FADlll 
and /\100 offici.l, particIpated 1n ,..-gionil secunfi' SemUlars wuh the ACSS. 
Large purtions uf J\.L\ hmds .... e'" sph{ {o support FAIlM dc-mining ~.pabilitie" m -ilian 
bnrumne-rebted charit1~s .nd de mimng ~ompante" and th., 40 m<'mbers uf the Moz:nnbl'1ue 
Qu,~k ]{e'won Dc-mining I'orce. '''' In FY04 $120,000 went dJrcctlr (o FAD"! training .nd 
$2,500,000 was Jir~ctll' provided tu the QIl.DF, '" Dunn!; FYOS $1.666,I..l00 """ spent on 
lrammg and suppo,t of 1'1\1),\1 de-mintng ~~palrilit)' and $2,178,I..l00 on th~ QRDF."· 'Ine 
QRDI' ha, bern deplored '0 Bosma, Sudan, Sn Lmka, and Imq by the L .S. 00$ (",,·r,ble 34 )_ 
:>Iilitaty HIV lAiDS Assist.nce 
I JlV / A iDS has .ffected h\D/\I Imtnmsely. Whil ~ gme<al population Ill\, / .-I.IDS m{es s{and 
around 13"/0 , /\IDF infection Tates are esnmat~d tu k Y)O.'o. DHAPP began up"ranons witll 
FAD/\-'! during FYO_, wben a n~~ds assessm~nt was cunducted ami a ==g progr<lmm~ 
developmen{ conWlct awankJ (o Pupulation s"rvice' Int<;tllat1on.L I'M I' fW1Jing waS 
e~ttn.rkcJ to fin.nci211y support th., ptogr.tnm<;_ F ,\llM h .. almo,{ no ~'p'~1t)" for IllV 
dtagno,,., treatment, 0' ed,,~.tion ,_ funding has [",en fot m.<ter and peer trame' e't.bl"hment, 
tn." aW'rcne," Qlmp,ign', and the beginning of tnfta,tnl~tutc d""c!opmcnt_ A tot.l of 10 
master mHn",s and 43 peer educators bay~ been trnined.' ''' 
," Unite..:! States Depanmeots ofDefenso 000 Stme Bureau for Politi"I.Mititar}' A Ifai",_ F,.". .. !:n ~Ii"'ary 
Tmmmg in Fi,,,,,1 Yeur 2002. Volume I, Sectio" IV, pg. 18 
' Yo lotonm{iooai Coml'aigo t" Bao l.a"dmi""",_ Count!)' Report M,,?amhiq'''. Yean 21~)2,2003,2IH)4, 2005 at 
htt pc / /" " w _ ic t>J. O<'g,,' I m /liHI 3 /m"""m h ique 
'" iotom.{iooal Commine" to Ban t ... ndm in"', ("-"unit) Report 2005 al 
h l1p;/ /w",,", _ jc ht. '''g;' I m /liHI ~ /m"zam h iq "". hIm t II H''il.din g2 (, I 
" . Intemoli,,,,al Comm ill"" to Ban Latl<lmlU"', C,,"nl!)' Report 200ti m 
hnp:i/",,,,w , chl_org/tm/2IJ06/mozam biq ,", _htm I # lleooi ng3 \l() 
' 2'1 United Slal", lkp"'-{rnent or tJ.,funsc_ Lkp"rtment of the N",y Navy Health R"'""I'ch Cemer Ihe Fir,' 










I'~ac~ \'!ppnn QpcGunn< 'j-raining and Alsl~tanC\' 
:\j"zamblque began aCtIve io\-olvcmcm \\"th the U.s-led ACO fA pnJgrrunme 111 FY04. \Vhile 
FADM mterest 11l participation is h1gh, fu"'hng "ctbacb aoJ Jack "f "'JlI1pment have hampered 
the FAD~j'< ab1liry to become as irwo]ved as th~ gov~mment would hk~_ llc~rik <ome 
dlffiwlnc., an mino.l T'4,mng Str~le~' l.oofctcoce was cnmluc(ed in FY04 ",.,th I? FADM staff 
and a group of 250 Fl'1D:\! pen;onncl ~omplcting an AC.OTA cycle. Durmg FYOS mere was an 
lllcrease 11l ACOTA participatIOn as element>; of a oceond and third hatt:!i>()o (430 and 4.IH 
perslJnnel rcs~cm-ely) clJmplc(ed a full ACOTA cycle ("ce T.bl~ 33)_' " 
Ann. CO('pernOlJO was cxtremdy mruted with Just a total of $721,000 In h\!F grant' and 1':-'1$-,1, 
prngr.anmc< apr'''' cd (,c~ Table .'14). 
CSG efforts "ere quite .'trOflg in the 1",,"- enforcement sector during pust-~/11 years, TIle FRI, 
DI ·:"\, am!."'TF teamcd a total of 18() offic1alo III atc~. such as forcn<1cs a,uhting, anu-crime, ~nd 
counter nlrcotlc. , Mozamb1q"~ ~I"" r~c';lvLX! legal, ,ntl-coITuptlOn, moncy iaumicnng, and 
cnnunal prosecution assIStance rnrough ICITAI' am! OI'DAT 1n WhlCh 17 am! 32 offic1al" 
respecuvel~ , received trammg (see "fable 3.,)_ 
OP[)Af ad","or, "'~rc .cnt to Mo,amblqllc III I-Y03 [() ~,h'i<c ~nd h,,).,~n minlllg a new anti-
corr"ptiun urut.'" By J'Y04, the Government of Mozamb'q"e wa. able to op~n ant1-~otn.iruon 
offices in l\!ampula and B= WIth USAID funds.''' OrDAT v,a, also acOve III MozambIque in 
'''' GenlT). Ke"in L, ACOT A ACqUl,itloos and Operali"", Mana~er. (persoone] corre"f'O/lde""e. 3 May 2007) 
'" United Stales Depanment of State, Bur.,u of Imemation.11 Norc"'"," 000 l.aw Enforcemen' Aft;,;,.,.. 
Inler""l,onal N"rcollCs Con/raJ SImler<)! Report FY]()()] Pan II. Bilate .. 1 Activiti." W .. hin!<loo' GPO. 
M;u-<h 2004 
'" Unl10d Sial., o"p.nmen' of StOle Burea" of In'em"''OIlal N"'-C<~lc, arnJ Law Ellfofcemcnt AfT."". 











FY03 whe~ '"'yenl low e~forcem=t ~nd legal officl~ls reCely~-J a"btance WIth oowl!er-
lerrorl8m iegi,lanon writing.'" 
In FY02-03 the LJS(~ .'pe~ t $470,UOOJ '" to a,,, , t the Police Sciences Academ\' III be.<:m to m.ke 
the academy an effecm-e trainlllg insnrntion. To do thi<. lc.rr .. \1' 'ent ~o intermittent Technical 
Ad",""r to AC.lPOL (ll cunsult wnh ~nd pwvide t.raining for a v.tiety of law enforcement 
ofliCl~k in i'Y04 .<:"()u~dwork o~ the d~;-dl>pmen' of. ~.chlng fon'mie hb at ACIPOL wa. 
begun. The lab wn'ttuetio~, fun<k-J IlY 'he USC, ,,'a, completed durutg I'Y05 ~nd today 
ICITA!' provide. materiel ami tto.imng support to the ~""deml' III both forensIC ~nd general law 
enforcement di.,ciplines, ," ICITAP Technical Advi",r. also lmplemented a Cotntnu111ty-p"jiL1ng 
project with the :>'lozatnbiquc Pollee Service that eM.bh"h~-J bl<:yck patrol untts in Maputo 
n<-1ghbourhoods during FY14_ ICITA l' pro~idcd tcalOw" .nJ ~~'W bicycle. for the umts, 'K 
BorOCr 'wu 'i'ran'!2ortarion Security Tra!fUng and As,ust.1nce 
dunng FY02 and FYO.'\, trained a total of 52 FADM Anny ~ml N~~1' personnel on m.rlIDne 
.,ecllrit)' i"me,. To help w,th co~stal security, the USG mcluded Moumbique ~s part of its 
resurrected Afnca CoaM.1 ~nd fIorocr ~cunly Ptogr-amme. lI1 DespJ[e th~t, R'l'}' lmk direct 
traIning or e'lu;ptn,·~t was provIded t" l\fo~~mblcan border ~nd co",{"l &ecurity pergonnel, as 
jll.<l one .\Iozamblque customs .oJ border official "'0> ,ent to the U_S_ for tr:timng ~nd three 
othets ,·i"leu U,S. cOWlterparts dunng FY04 .nd I'"YO; through the CIIP-IVI' progratnme . .I u,{ 
one M,,'umhlque cit;7e~,hlp ~nd urunigrauon offici~l trained with me l ;SCIS-IV1'. At the 
,,' United State, lkpartmem "r Sr.te, R"re~" "nn\ernlliional Narm{ic, ond La" E"r""'~lT1<Ont AlTai" 
inwrnali"nai Narc-mid COnlnA Srrare>!), Repm'l FY }III)]. \>','a,hmglOn: GPO. March 2()()4 
'''UnikJ Stales DepJl1meni or S{ate_ Bur.,u "f Jnlemali"",1 N''''''lic, ~n J Law Enrorcemenl AfT.i,,_ 
IniemariM~1 N~r('oli(" Conlroi Slr~le~' Rq)ol"/ FY ]11I!1. W,,-,hmglon: GPO. M.rch 2003 at 
I~tp: 1,'-'" ww. stote _go v Ipli nLlr 1~'nrcrpl.,'100 2,'lIlm Ii I 7950 _him 
," United Smte, [)epanmenl "f .I ",tice_ Crimmal D"i,ion_ In{erna{"",.1 lkvdupllltrlt and Training Progmm, 
"Mo;ambWjUe /.IIW E~i:>rc"mcnl D<~-eI()pm{'nll'YlJgr~m" (receiwd "ia perronal corresponde""", 2.1 J"",,~r)' 
2(07) 
'''' United S1-11e, DCl'artment "f J "'lICe. Criminal DivlSiun. In{ernatlonal Development ..,d T mining Pmg"'m 
"Mm~mbliJ1" I..,,,, En("rt'oInOni lJi.'w/{)f'mertl J'mgmm'- (received via perroml correspon<ieno •. 23 J..,u0l)' 
2(07) 
'" United State, Department of S{ate_ Bure"u of Polit ical-M ,l i{aI)' A Hili,,_ ConWtS."irmai Bud",,1 .Iu'''ificalirm 











b~nmng of FY07. the CSG donatcd three coo.stfil patrol bo"," to th~ '\ijo~.mbtcan Navy to 
.ssi!51111 border ~nd manl1tne ,,",c!1nt}.' " 
NMUBIA 
t\:unibla has b~en "L·",ed b~' the 1 ;SG .. ' On~ of the mo,[ sLable cmmtnes m the rC!\lon. 
' lhereforc much rhetoric IS devotcd to the ptomol1on of democra,,~ yalues and nvil-miht:uy 
relaNons "'ithin the security forces. Namlbi.. 1, also ,~en a, "n ~cUve parttctpam in peacckeepmg 
op~r"uons and like other Southem African nauon_,. the USU has prioriused j" pnmary- ,L-.;unt)' 
goal to be to i[lne;t'~ t\~tntl",.._, peacekeep10g np~city. 
During the po,t-9jtl ycar, the L;SU sp~nt $878/"") '-'" mtlitary and la",' enforcement trairung 
for 4SH per&onnd In scve",l security scctors. W'itlnn the defence '~otor, 147 I\DJ' personnel 
"',,,e 1",;n~d thtol1;\h the ]"H':T. RC.SS. and JCET programmes. An .dd,uonal 46 NDI' staff 
mcmbet, began Iflvolvement 1fl the A(;O'l'A peacekeeping support operau01ls trammg 
programmc. On the law enforcement s;d~, P(, ,,",curity officials were providcd tramtng. as wcre 
7') hordet and transportaNon security officia]';' Namlbia w,,", abo un;'lue in that 1l1ne per&o1l11el 
W~te prO\,d~d nudcar _,ecunty traming through ,c,-eril CS [kpartment of I'.nergy (DoE) 
programme, (""~ Tabl~ _,_'i)_ 
In addiuon [0 securtty training, tbe l:SG p1O.-,d"d $1.,)(XI.OOO m de-nurting a"istance and 
""thon.ed SK43.1 "Xl 10 arms a).,'fCCmenL< (&ee Table 36), 
t\amibia refused ro sign an .-\rude 9811ibteral "nmunir), Agreo.:ment with the CSG. which led to 
a sancuon on J"IEf fundmg durmg FY04-06. In October 21~'6, PreSIdent H",h, who ha, to 
'" Ports .nd Sh,p' W~h,i[o_ .. us B€Lj' 111' Mozmnh,que ,~"':V Wi,h l'tlIrullJu~ts;' 16 January 21Xl7 .t 











prm,Jc wnttcn ,llthonsatwn 10 thc l :.S 
S~cr~t.ry of Stat~ for l\SPA sallcllOfl 
w'lVers, grunted Oll~ to Nan"bia, 
Partl~'i'ftn,," '" L\IE' r W,ll''''Uln~ JlIfill!l: 
J'Y07 ,"" AJJitwnal1y, Namib" "'gncJ all 
u.s. nulJtary 'Coopeunve 
A ;;ccllnt' 
Lac.non '" d~fin~d os, "a host-nallon 
facility with little or no pt"rlllftnem l ;.S, 
personnel presenc~, which may cont:un 
prc po"tioncJ .nd/"t 
senlrlty cooperal:1on .cOvllles 
comlllgency access," '" 
'Ibe L.S. ,'pem $829,000 on three 
p"'grAmme, whi~h n-.lllled 147 NDF and 
:>'lo[) offiCl",,- The m,jont;· of thl,' " .. as 
with S494J)()(l in IMET fund, (, c<' T.bk .'Ii). [)ll~ to ASPA ,ancn"n, l"amll"a I,,>! out T~bk 35 
, l' Rei •• ", by tbe Offioe of ,h. p",,, Sec"""", "W~,,'ing Proh,hilion 0" linileJ State, M ,Inat)' A"bktnce 
wIth Ro,pt."Ct [0 Yorio"," Pan irs [0 rlle Rome 5t.nne ES\<lhli,hln& Ihe Tntemalioo,1 Crimin,] Court," 2 Ocl<Jbcr 
2006 at bup,//frw~bg",e."<c~".gpo. gov/cgi. 
bin!getJoo.cgiodbnam.--2006 _pr<s;<!ent;ol dnc"",.,nt-«&dncid: pd I Ood)6,t"I·] I 
" . Plodt LaurelL. COlLgrI'"ion.1 Re",arcb S. rv;c • . foreign A n.i", Delcn"", ..,d Trode Di,i,,,,,,, . . ~ricu 
C""'m~nJ: US. Slrw~i!.i<' I,,'.rem and Ihe Rolo af Iho U.S AlJli'ary in .~frica. W"-,hu'f,to,, D.c December i, 
2UUi,I"~ 











on $325JX){) III !l<lET fundmg In I·Y04-05.'" That was a ,ub,tanti.1 loss .. ' 11 had b.,.,n 
Namlbl.·s tTlo,t well. funded ,ecuril)" pt<>gtoItnme. 
"!ll~ !I<IET trainll1g Narrubio. "' .. , able to take adyama!(c of wa, prtmanly in IIIV / A IDS m"d'c;ll 
Inunlllg and Engu"h unguai!:<" 11l"trll~uon. [11 
NDF and M"D officials were aJ..H' active 
l'art1~'l'=ts 111 .\CSS programmes as a total 
of 20 f><"opic ,.1t.,nJeJ ,e~unty rd,.t.,d 
'~lTllnJ," .nd ,ymp",n,m, at wtal co.! of 
5257.000 (see Tables 3S =.1 36). The -,eET 
tnWl1ng th., .t\DF teL,,!\-eJ m FY02 was for 
40 memberS of th., 12" . 26" . and Combat 
Support lInga<ie,'" 
101O( MWLaIY ExefUses 
The NO!' paruclpated In the LS, Eutop<:an 
Conun=d-spo"sored .\fnca Endeavor 2{)06 












, -,. . , ,. '" k h T~hkJ6 wa.' a malor C,S'-'f'Onsoreu mwtary-' comlnutnc;ltion, IntttoP<'ta[llJ1ty wot , op 
focused on comm.mi, comrol, comlnurucanons and ",formation "pletTl, (C3IS) among 20 
POtlH"panng AfoG'" nations.'" 
", E"'rhart Sally. Coalitloll for the tnlernatiollal COllrt. Cimmri".' Opp{)ud 10 S,gning u iJi/oreru/I"''''''nllj' 
_~gr-e~mem: US _~,J L"-'I m FHJ.I and FfI}J and I'".""b/y 1-1'06, pg. I at 
"'-"·w ,iCCIIOW ,o~,'ctocum.nts.-'Co\'"triesOpposedBIA AidLoss cu,unt pdf 
'" Umt.ct Stale, Dep"rtmenrs of Det-'n~ and Slate. Rur<au for Poti! leat_),j iii",,)' II n"ir< Fn"~'gn Mol,wry 
T,'amm~ In F;,,'ai reO" 2002. Volume t, Secl1on. IV, March 200) 
'" Un".d State, tJep,,,'!menr, of Defense ~Ild Stme Rureau for Poti! ieat_),j il ita'), II nair< Fn"~'gn Moiilary 
r'uming m Fo.,,:@ r,ar 21X12, Volum< t. Secli,,,, tv. M,,,ch 2003 
'" Capt.,in Chrj,!'ne Miller, "N"",,,,, Pt, .. , II ti-jean Fn<i<,w,,, F .. IT,"-'."' Uni! .. Stale, EL1tOp<all Cm"ma",j 
Publie IIn"i" Office. Stutlgort, (ionnany, t9 '\pril 2006"1 











"hlll.r}" IIIV IAIDS A"ispncf 
liIV/AIDS h"" affc~teJ tk ~DF m wcot~r p~r~entoge, than natl<>nRi averagcs, wuh an 
""urn.te,1 33". of NOF pe,,,onnei affkted, To help combat it. OJ-lAPP hejl;On opet<lllng 111 
:-.Iamibla during FY03 Rfte, R,,'a,ding a tnirung progmmme deyelopment contnct ro PSI. 
H"'VLTet, smce programme 111ceprrofl, rhe Natnll""n gon1"1ltn~nt h., not been terribly ;ny{)h,-ul 
In pLl,>"ing e~tm a,"iMan~~, ",,~h "" te'l"e,nng l.b "ml infraHrucrure ""pport. TI,e moM thai has 
I>< .... 'n Jone Is &11 educational vide" for NDI' p"<sonnel made, and '''ppon was proVlded in IT03 
to send th,ee NDF personnd, one member of the :-.I"nllbi&1l :'I.10D, the U,S, Defense "\ttache, 
~nJ a PSI tep 10 the ill-.. \fnca HIV/"\IDS c(l{lfetL1lce III Bot,w~na, An :-.IDF phr",Cl~n and 
nur~e WLIT 01", f"nd"d to ottend the H IV training ptoW.tntn~ in S.n Di~go, C.lifumio, A totol 
of 40 l"OF pee, educ.to" ""en' tmined through DI L>\ 1'1', '06 
:-.Iamibla h"" 'lg>led onto the U.S,-k .... 1 ACOTA prowomm~, hut to dote h~s only ~ondu~ted an 
!1lltlal Tr-:l1ning Strategy Conference "ttended by 46 NDI' personnel'" 
Arms Authorisattom ond C;r.;tDJ,~ 
Both the FI\L~ and rx:s arms prognumnes we,e "cm-e in l"amlbio dUr1ng th~ p<"t ~/11 yeo", A 
om' ~ J''''1S-.-\ of $'>61>,000 "'OS pwvI<led 111 FY02 for l111specified go"crnment sile" as was " 
total of S47S,OOO Ifl DeS-A (sec Table -'6), The m~l()r1t}' ()f th()se f"n<ls were fDt ,,,,-e,,,1 
hundreJ small arms weapons, mostly pi"h)1, and nf1e, and alm"'t lJOI,(IIMl cartridj;cs of small .. 
ann'runtnllll1Uon: 
"" United States [)ep<O'tmenl of Defen .. , !kparlrT1Cnl of the Nov)" Nav~ Health Research Center, The First 
FOUF Yeal" , ~),nt'p"i" <{Ihe Global Fjjorr, San Diego, CA. JUlie 2005, pgs. 4~-·J') 
'" Gentr~, Kevin L. ACOT A AcqUlsili"", ..,d Op"",lion, Manoger. (pefS<Jnol communicmion, 1 May 2(07) 
", UnLten StOles Department of Sl,le, Office of !kre"", r",de Control" Direc1 Commercial Sale.' 










Nuclear Security Training and Assistance 
Namibia is unique in that it was one of the only countries in Southern Africa to receive training 
through C.S. DoE WMD/Counter-proliferation programmes. It began in FY02 when one 
Namibian official was trained via the Regime Building/Non- Proliferation (RBNP) programme, 
which focuses on reducing global tension due to nuclear concerns and conflict. In complement 
to this, seven officials were involved with the Office of Global Threat Reduction (OGTR) 
programme during f'Y04. The OGTR focuses on the identification, securing, removal, and 
disposal of ,,'Ulnerable and other radioactive materials around the globe designated a threat to the 
L~.S. and the global community. Finally f<Y05 saw one official trained under the Defense 
Program (DP), which focuses on the military application of nuclear energy. Perhaps this training 
is influenced by the fact that, "Namibia is currently one of the biggest exporters in the world of 
"yellow cake", the uranium oxide that forms the basis for fuel rods to be used in atomic power 
stations." 149 
Law Enforcement Training and Assistance 
Law enforcement training was conducted for 178 officials, primarily through FBI, DEA, and 
ATF International Training Programmes with 65, 43, and 68 in each, respectively. Assistance 
had dropped off significantly by FYOS when only 20 law enforcement personnel were provided 
training of any kind (see Table 35). 
Members of the Namibia Customs Service, Prison Service, Immigration, and prosecutors from 
the Ministry of Justice have attended a variety of courses held at ILEA-G in the post-9/11 years, 
but detailed numbers have not been publicly released. Interestingly enough, the Namibian Police 
Services have declined annual invitations for training at the ILEA despite continued overtures 
from the CSG. ISO 
149 Catherine Sasman, "Namibia: Renewable Energy. Namibia's Future?" New Era. Windhoek, I June 2007. at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/2007060 I 0563 .html 
ISO United States Department of State. Bureau ofIntemational Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 











Namibia received $88,000 in de-mining assistance during FY02. The funds provided for 
protective clothing, supplies for field operations, and communications equipment for the 
Namibian Police Force's six Explosive Ordnance Demolition field teams. 151 Allocating $600,000 
in FY03, the USG provided refresher training, equipment and vehicles to de-mining and 
explosive ordnance demolition (EOD) mobile response teams made up of personnel from the 
Namibian Defence Forces (NDF) and Namibian Police Forces. 152 During FYOS Namibia was 
allocated Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) funding of less than $50,000 for unspecified 
purposes.IS1 Additionally, OPDAT was active in Namibia in FY03 when several legal officials 
received assistance with counter-terrorism legislation writing.154 
Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance 
Assistance to the border and transportation sectors occurred during FY03-04 for 79 officials. 
The majority of the training was related to transportation issues as 76 officials in the aviation 
sector were involved with the TSA-ITP and Safe Skies for Africa Initiative (see Table 35). Both 
programmes are dedicated to improving African aviation security and safety in order to foster 
growth of aviation services between the U.S. and Africa. 
U.S. CBP officials travelled to Namibia during FY03 to conduct an initial training needs 
assessment. 155 The only year with dedicated training for border and immigration officials was 
during FY04 when three personnel were involved in U.S. programmes. One Namibian ofticial 
participated in training with CBP, one with the USCIS focusing on immigration and one with 
ICE focusing on the investigative side of customs and immigration enforcement. 
151 United States Department of State. Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Office of Humanitarian De-mining 
Programs. "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The U.S. Commitment to Humanitarian De-mining" Washington: 
GPO September 2002 at http://www.state.gov/tipmlrIs/rptiwalkearth/2002/14869.hltm 
152 United States Department of State. Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Office of Humanitarian De-mining 
Programs. "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The U.S. Commitment to Humanitarian De-mining" Washington: 
GPO August 2004 at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rptiwalkearthl2004/37227.htm 
153 United States Department of State. Bureau of Diplomatic Security. The Antiterrorism Assistance Program: 
Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2005. March 2005 at http://www.state.govipiinl/rls/nrcrpti20051 
154 United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2003. Washington: GPO, Marc:h 2004 
155 United States Department of State. Bureau ofInternational Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 












It is no s"cut th" m the po,t-9/1! world. 
SOl1th "'\fnc. has b= one of the m,,,t 
Important countn", on Ih,· Afncan w"Oncn! 
to Amcncan ","teglc ""d ""c tmt)' lntete'''. 
P"';lo"m Bl1,h gmgl~d South i\fnca out III hi, 
fit,;t post-(}!11 l\,tiona! S~L1lIJLj Strar~gy "' • 
countt)' ha"tng. "a mal"r 'tnpacr on lts 
n~lghborhood" and king .n " a[lChor fot 
reglOnal r~qU1r1ng focu, ed 
~tr"ntlon .""· The U.S. largdy Vl""" South 
. \fric. as a powerful r.ttr"" ,n ,ecmit, 
dTorts, "It is • tangible partner In addte'"ng 
'err<m,1 ,"0 mr~rnaooll.1 crllllc d,r • • ts, non-
ptolife'"tlon, "'g:J,,"~1 tn'L~biliLj, .nd thc 
security of ;\meJ1c.n Clll?e", .-j,mng .'ioulh 
,\fnc •. " "·' 
To bu,ld the p~t'''e"h,p, the USC "",!.~d m " 
FYOS JioreJgn Op<nllo[" Rudge' i(eqllest that, 
"th" South Afnc." gmcenunent h., te'lut'ud 
.","rance to help It ,ddte", m{cro.tional 
org~ni7"d cntne and poknnal terroristn {hr""~'; 
.nd om combined government, h.ye ,d"nt1fied the final pnono"" for assistance: 
Table 37 
border wntrol, coun{cr-narcotic" youth and dorn e,tic vioic",ce, 'e" crime', m.jor case 
m~n>gcllkn!, and mo,,~}' Io.undcring. ,,'''' Beyond these ''"U"', and f~t beyond effott~ m an) orhcr 
Southern Afric.n country, the L:SG ha. '''l,ud ,n pol'ce reform ~no do,,, military cooperntlOn. 
,<0. P",;idenl of (he UnITed Stale,. Nati""o' Security "'-"',e",)' of !he United Siale' of Am.,;ca. Septeml>cr 2002. 
f,', ~nited State, Deportment of SI,t., B"r.au of Politicol.MililaT) AfTai", Omgrc".,ionai !JudXe! Ju,·tjficalion 
[01" Foreign 0P<iralions Fiscal rear ]1If)6, Wosilington: (iPO, Ma} 200~, p, 2t!4 
'" Uwled Slate, Departmenl of Stote. Bu":,,," of Poli!ic.I-Mi lirory Affairs. Cfm!,:re»ional Rud!,:ei J/lslijica/ion 











/1.10" of the focus i, on '~!l1or I~ad~r,h 'p 
d<'v<'l oplTI~nt and mcoumg<:m<'[!t In growth of 
ci,-il-miliL~ry rebtiom. 
ColI~ctlVd~'. th~ l :SC; prm·id<-J tmming fo, 
3,434 South Afncon n1.Ll.!tary and other security 
personnel between FY02-05. ' ]1", WaS achie\' ~d 
through ~1 sepanl" progn.ITIITI~', the tnO,t of 
afly S()uth~rn ,1-mCan notion, lllcluding th~ 
tnulllng of U84ill military progra,mne,; 216 in 
nude"," '''ellnt}' pT"W:l!nlTIe"; 227 ;1\ p<'ae~ 
,upport opcraIJon, (""nln;";; 1 ,('3~ JIl law 
cnforcement; .nd 48 ill botJ.:.-t .ml 
transportauOll ,ecurH:y progr<lnunes (see 'f.ble 
37). More than S12,'iJO,OOO v:,," 'p<-111 on thiS 
I~"l' II'I"RII' "»'PIRlllt'" 
~HOC,H "",. I "~I "IH II RI I) \ I , 
'U'IH\lRI<, 
,,,0,, ., I ' ,1.110,,' 
I~IF.T 14\9 
JCET " " . " • Ne 2''''4 1442 1'7  
lie • " " RCTFP - " ~ ATA 71 " 179 H4 
Table 38 
Ualnlng ('<'C Tabl., 38). Added to thl' ha, ixm more than $SOO,SOO,1XlO In appro,,~d 
attn, outhot,-atiofiS and gran" (",,~ Tabk 38) 
Bil;&\t:ral SecMly TreatJes and '-\rreements 
The U.S .• nd South Afnc, "Ign~d a Joml He,eMch Arrallg~""'n' eoncernmg co ll.borat,,)n on 
B'om~illcal Mil;L~!)' HL."lth and Clirucil Research in FY05. South i\fnca also ";";lled onto the 
u.s. Custom, kd Contain"r Seeuri,}" 111111"uve, v:hleh impTOve, U.S. Cu.<lom, po" securi,y 
collaboration in th~ Durban port '0 allow the USC; to hav~ gIC",jer eonll:ol, II1 eonb'n~rs he~d<-J 
to til<' US from Svu,h Afnea. AdditJona lly. South Afric" signed a Cu.,tom'-T,"d~ l'aTtrletship 
Agamst TnronslTI Agt~~1TI~tlt, wh1eh v.'Orh to met"a'" pnvat~ eomparue, ' supply ehalll secnrH:y 
from tertllrist aetJvlty. 
DUImg FY04 South ;\frica and the' USC; "I\!I<.-d • mctnor::tndurn of cooper~tJon pf(widing for 
the exchange of mformotion in nud~ar saf<-ty, "af<-guard" and phYS1cai '~L-uri,.y. i\ «'Cond 
nuclear agrttment wa, 5lgn<'d dunng FYOS ,,';th .n an'anl\<'1IK~" for th~ cxch~n;":" of t<'Chnical 











:>.lilitaQ' Tramml' and i\,,,,ram;e 
Po", -9/11 m,lllary' tralnmg w~, ~onuuneu thtough a v.net,. of ptogr.mme, mduding: IMET, 
RCSS, JCET, ALP, RCTFP, and the National Guard Slare Partnership Program a, an 
el'l'""rnture of $.,,791,000 (",-'to Table .,8). 
Llkc mhcr <tarc" rn thc T~WOn, South .>'fn~. dill n"t 'IgIl a ]llblL't:~ Immunity Agreement. 
WldlOlll a HL"', South Afnca lost out on an esnmO!ed $8,650,000 Ul milimry a"i,tanc~,L~' 
Despile dIal, l047 S.A:--lDF perwflnd particlpated!!l a huge variety of [\IET courses at a cost of 
$1,9 1 7 /I{~) (sec' fahle, .,7 and -'8) 
TIn, policy ha, been cnricis",l by ,ernor LT ,So milimry commande," at the merey of 'iVa,hington 
pohc),. D"pleosure from the top came ha, .ppeared ill te,timony by U.S. European Command 
C,mmander, (;enet,l B,ntz Cr4udock, before the US. I-lou,e Anned ServICe" Committee "'hen 
"peaking of hi, m"g"''''t:" " dr"ppmg m,I",ry' alu, "Due TO ASl>A ,aO~I1"O" wc orc n" longe' 
able to pro,;de 'p~[e ports or training under d,e F]l.IF programlne. One consequeoce is thO! now 
South Africa no longer has the capahility to tr~"'port AfrICan ti1l1on peacekeep"" !!llo Darfur 
anu oth~r peattkL"t-'p!!lg missions in Afnea. ,\s a re,uit the U.S .• nd "ther al~, mu,t pro~;de aU" 
tron'port ,t great co,L AnothL'" ~"n"e'luL1Ke " the ~omptr)m1<e of OUt On~e ,,,lid tclauonsh,p 
Ul1e to a pL1LepflOn thot thc C.S, 1< an uo,eli.ble .nu meTCun;l] ,comty partnet '>Vct the long 
term"'''' To circumveot d,e ill effects of 1;"1 ET and F.\\F sanction". military leauer, bave a~m'ely 
worhd wirh th~ SAls,'UF 1n orher m.ilitary· progr:>.ttUlle,. De'pJte their effort', W,d,out I'\IET, 
t .5. oS. \;sjDF nulJt"tI' inter",,[lon has dr"pped 10 10'" levek 
Eff"m in other p"'gr~nune, h"e mdudeu the JCi':T ptogr~mmc, ",Iu~h m J'Y03 brought L'S 
Spec!.1 Force, trainers to SoUdl .>'frica on three a<;~~sioos to trilln 78 membe" of du' SANDF 
1" EI",marl, S~lly. C""I;!;,,,, Io.-!he !n!cm~hOll .1 Court ('nuntrro< O{!{!o.<~d to S'P""!': a Rilaurallmllillmty 
Agr~emenl. IJS Aid 11).<1 In FJ'04 and Frt!.' and {!o.",hly Frt!~, pg. I . .r. 
'" w '" . iccn()w . '''-111 d()cumc'l1t,,"CoUll tTic"Opp"""tlB! A !I,dl."" ourrm ,. pel f 
J~' U.S. C""lI'"""'. Hou,c. Arm~d s"r.'c<"S COnJmin"". St"!<:I11<"111 of(;c~\ttll.1 Ban!L J Crat!Joc," USA, 










Sp~""al I'o'-';e" Bng"Ic.'" Beyond that, three SANDI' pllots h,,"e rt:c~"'~J ","",unn IrOJ1l!ng '" 
the U.S. via ALP: 28 S. \NDF s~mor officIal, ha,'~ pdtiClp"t~d '" RC.SS pwgtamme,; 11'"e were 
awanled f~Uow,h;p' ,,",;th the n~"i RegIOnal C.omhating T ertori"m I'cllowslnp Programme; and 
2.1 'emm olT1<:ets ",·ilh the '\hlitat} c.onta~," I'mgrnm (sec Table 37). 'rru.. plac~J L;.S, military 
ollker, '" the .\hn"try of Defeno;c to help ,,~th defeIKc teSOUf<:C manfigrmem and platuung '" 
well as provided SANDI' officers WJth mmilifioMtton tours in the ES .. conference,. ~1lllm,litaty 
,nd civilifin nchan~es with U.S. counterpart,. 
In the mO"! "ignifkant ,b'clopmcnt in mil ·to n1l1 rebno"" during I'YIJ] the N",,' York State 
Kanonal Guard and the SANDF began working tngeth~r under the USG Smf~ Pann~'T,h,p 
Prog",m. Thi, progr.unmc joined U.S. "'ational G",rJ mc:ml",rs with the SAi'JDF to enhan~e 
mutual "c~uri,~· VK'f'Cr-:o.tiOn. The SA~DF and NY NG wotk together to 'dentify tmit\\ng n~ .... '(b 
and mke p"rt til bllal~t:tl training exett;:;c,. joint fcllow"h,p", and d,,"~ and mil1lary le.der v,"ll, 
and exchange. South Afnc. IS one of only four countries on the African continent involved III 
the progr:nnme . 
• "pproximatdy 180 U.S.lIllltmry personnel were based fit Dnholo TrainIng Ha:;e find Ilot'd'pruit 
Air B""e in Sourh Africa as part of MEDFL\G 04. The eX=JSe tn"olved interchange of 
m~ili~~llnfonnauon, t~chruqtl~s and trairung. It also developed interope-rnbilitr be!v..CC1! d,e U.S, 
~nd SANDI' to unprove th~it allil,,} to re'pond iointly to an ~tne'l\~ocy Or n~lural d'"~"teL In 
F}"05 and FY06 the SANDI' particIpated In the work!', large't cotnmunical1on and infoffilal1on 
systems cxetClS~, the U.S. European Command 'pon,ored Combined Endeavor' ''' 
The SANDI' th~n hosted the Aftic,n ,-c"ion of the evcnt WIth the u.s. l'.uropcan Cotnmand · 
'pon<ottd Afnca Endeavor 2006, 'l1,e event was a cOrrunUnicatiOflS interoperabilitJ worhh"p 
'" UniteJ State. lkpartmenu of State, Bureau or'Political-Mili,",), Ana;r,. Forergn MI/"ary Training and f)oD 
Engagement A"ti"it;c,' (yinlereSf Joinl RCl'orlto Conwe.,., Jor Frlfl03. S~c'ion IV M..-ch 2()()4 p. 37 
," Captain tl,yan Walbfidge .. ~~ Sill-fl"l Command ~ni>J'O'tS Comhined Endea"",.," Vn ileJ Slate, Departmem 
of Defen", EU'''P''an C.ommanu. POOlic A II,,,,, Pn.',,, R~lc.,c. 14 May 2005 at 











f(}cu<~J on command. control, commun,eat1o", and mfotmanon "y"tems (C3IS) aln""g 2U 
pamClpaMg AfneJn nall"[",'" 
\IWtaty H!YiA!DS Assjslfillcc 
HIV / All>S ute , in the SAND!' are estimated at 210/0, which i, very close to the 20"1. llfitionru 
average. DI-IAPP pronded funding for four SANDF phr,ic'fins (0 ancntl the HIV lnlmng 
programme in Sfill D1ego, Cahfotru. and four SANDF phplclans to attend the aU-Afri"" 
IIIV I A IllS work'hop in I-\ot.wana dunng ]'Y03. ]"und. also "o"tnbtlled ,,, the establishment of 
four HIV /AIDS dirues that acimlflNer antl-reUoVlfa! tr<:atment to SANDI ' personnel Jnd their 
furruly mcmbct5. DHArr scnt U.S. 'mlltary mfccllou, dtSL'O.'" speculist, to e.ch cluuc to oversee 
programme impbncntaUoll and collfiixmHe wuh SANDI' sUlff. A total of 513 ffifi,ter tr..mer; 
and 1 ,(HZ peer "dtlcators have bcell tr~jned ,-,. D! 1 ,\ PI'. 1(,' 
In FY02-0_, the USG trrulled 201 S."'NDF personnel in the tr"J.J11-the-trailler EIPC progranune. 
E'-enmally the UPC coocept wa. melded 111to dLTeiopment of the ACOTA ptogranltne, and 
the programme wa< d"connnued aftet I'Y03 (<ce Table 37), 
South Afnca has slj!,1led on to participate ill the ACOTA programme with >n initial Tra1010g 
Strategy Confercnce condnctcd 10 FY04 for 2(, pe",;ollnd. Dcspae the Iar.':" size and ample 
reSoutce< of the SAND!', participati"n and plaoned .ct",t>c, haye l>cen l;mll~d, The SANDF 
tt:9uested Uf1l9ue tra'o1Og beyood the (YJl1call}' «ructurcu AlJ)Tl\ pt0W>fn!ne ""d 111 tum, was 
provlded WIth a ywety of enhanced med'cal tra,mng ("r ,mff bcginll111g 10 F't'fl6 ",hen 127 
meillcil petsonnel received a vanet)' of trainIng. Addmonally, 27 member, of the 43'" llngade 
<aff and 40 of the 46" Brig .. de <taff completed a Cotntnfind and Staff Operaoonal Skills (CSOS) 
mumng course wh!ch [ocu,ed on deCls10n making ill a PSO environment .nd a Conunand Po" 
~-~----
'" Capmin Christ ... M iiicT, "Nm,e"" Plan Afi"ican En"".vor Exerci,e," Ullito, Sr"w. Eur"P"an Commaoo 
Public Affair< Office, Stun""rt, Genna,,;-, I q Al"'il 2006 at 
hrrp ; i iww,", ,eu COOl, m i l/ o"~1 ishiFu II Smry "'P '.rt- 9 I 2 
.... lintled St.oto, [)c'P~rtmo", of [').,j"""e_ DC'Partment ofthc "lavy _ Na,) He.llh Re,carch em!c,- T'he Fir_II 











Exnci,e which I> I",t a pTOnical appbcanon of the C:iOS COUI.e and a computer-simulat~d 
exerCl3e (.ee Table 37). '0> 
South ,\frIC~ was appro,-cd for anns ~uthorIsations and grants totalling $511,S 1 7 ,000 h"m'<'~n 
/'\'02 OS. 'lh~ maionty of thl; came dutlng I'Y02 w,th totols of $300,361,000. CoUectinly. 
$568.5 .. 5,(:00 wa, alIthol1s"d v,a DC'>-A; $11 S. 771.0()() via IX:S-T A; $12,6SO,DW in I'M I' gr:.nts; 
and $14,551,(0() in F~IS-A. TI,e majorit}' of the funds In FY02 were for ~itcl1lft pari spares, 
which totalled $272,655,694 of the :mnu.1 figuus (s"" T.ble .,8). Th" ,,,,t of th~ DeS-A was 
pl1mJrlly COT "mall arm" arrunullilJoll. ,ubmarin" "'1uipm"nt. propellants. dectton1c". w~apon' 
,)'"tetns and oth"T defence articles. 
~IaJor DCS-TA included $~5,()()(l,()()(l in FY03 fot :nnmunition and otdnance. 1\lso, FYO~-05 
outhon>olJon, W"T" prltnanly for a,rcr"aft e'-lUlprnL~lt, iite contro1 ,y,("rn,. and 'pae<' 'y,t~-rns 
F~fF gr,mts supported l~ai1l1ng n"".1, and F~IS-A continlI"d to support transf"r of spar" aircraft 
parts. 
Nuclear Serum), Trajning- and Af.j.lallce 
Two hundred and ""t",'n So"th African offtci~l, patttc;p-ated 111 ,;x lluck"T s"clItit} ptogrAtntn~S 
in the post-9!11 years, far mor~ than any oth", South"rn Afncan country. Th" majom}, ()flh~ 
prograrrune parucipants were ,nvolvcd ,n the A TA, l)~fcnse Program (21) and Office of Glohal 
'[br"at R"ducnon Programme (OG-TR) (26) (see Table 37). FY02 AT1\ fund, were "sed on 
''-1''ling 1'>9 Jaw "nf"rcemcnr officIals to ~ mil) traming seminal. DUIlng ] 'Y03 the programme 
,,,n! 2~ S"u,h AfrIcan officiOls !o th" U.S. for a \'if.\IO Opel1lnOfls cour.e. 











Law Enforcement TraIDIng and ·\ss13twce 
Th~ law L'flforc r.mcn! ,"eWr recclnd the rno,! as""moce of any of the ,.curity sectors with 
1,769 South AfrlCon offiClJl.ls pronded tmirung and exchaog<'. "ibi, WIiS at II co,( of mote thon 
S8,OOO,OOO through Jh'L and AL\ funJing (see "fables _,7 and _,II). 
The large,' oumm'," ,,'cre through the two Ol'DAT-ITI' md IVP programme" which 
comblned for 900 parnClpants (,ee Table 37). South Afuca participated in multiple OPDX!'-kd 
selrunars focusmg on money iallfldenn,.;, Ifltcrnauonol a'''''' futfL1tutC, countct-terfon,m 
k~"lan()n. and pru,,'cut1<>n_"~ The ICIT"'P programme ".,to also very act,,"e WIth focu, aD 
a,,"tmg the Johannesburg Metrop"iJt"n Pollee Depamnem GMpl)). le!TA], placed a 
pnmanem ,'\mencan T.clmica].AIh-isor wldlill the police deparunent begmning in FYO'>. The 
advL,or worb WIth "'-'mor leadership to develop mateglc planning ond hdp th~ jl\fPD 
mo{ktruz~ b,,)"ond a It::>ffk cntn" .nd t~gulatlOn funcuon. '" 
Seconding lh. Ol'DAT progrnrntne was th e FBI-Ill', which tralned 417 official, and FLETC 
which trained 134 ill th~ U.S, Also t[)() Somh ,\fricons paruclpated in DEA and XfF-fJ'j> 
pro),rtal~S. Beyond th"s~, South Africa wa, Ull1'lue amon;o;<! all Southern African cOlU)(ries 
"'~lh 52 South Afncan Sect~t S. n'lce agent' ttained 111 FY04 by th e UIlae.d Stat", Sectct s.,n-;c" 
(1.;555). In FYll2-03 41 official, were a part of the Smte Department's InternatIOnal Demand 
R~dtICtion Train11lg ond Techmcal A,,;i<!ance (lDR'ITA) pro!-,'r.rnme which complement, th~ 
DEA-fl'P while focu<J1lg on mobih.,mg <upp<.)rt fot rounter-narcouc, pohcle<, pro),rtatnmes, and 
st.t::>tcgtc. ("''' Tablc 37). 
The eSG spent Sl,133,OOO on ATA trnining during FY02-04 In both the law enforcement and 
nuckar ,""cunty occto'" ('""c Tabl" .IH) Wahln th" law cnforCL'tn<:nt ,""ctot In I-Y02,' cou,-,;e on 
<un·dlanc" d~t~ct"'n wa< taughr t.o 15 p"toonnd, Allti TcrtOn"m Instrucl<>t ttainmg w>< 
proVIded for 12 official< 11l Ddawarc, and L1ght att~fl<kd an nplo",v~ detcct"r dog ond h.nJl~t 
,'-< United ~tal'" Oep.rtm<:1l1 of State. IlLlfea~ of lnt<:"",hOJoal Narcotic< ""d Law enforcement Affair,. 
}mernalio",,/ NamJii," COnll'u/ SIrI>leg:v RcpeJl'! fir 1003. W.<hington, GPU. M.rd 2004 at 
hnp: ilwwW.stalej\Ov!p!inllr l<I ..... rpl/2003IvoI2.btml/2.i.1l3.htm 
". tinned Stat« Deportment of Ju3lice Crimm.l [),vi,ion. Intt:IlI.lio".1 [)evde>pmt:nt and Training Program 












c"""'c 11l 'fcu,]"" 'Ih" w~, [olh,,:cd up 11l I'Y03"" 24 South ;\fnc.n offiCla], .nended. \Vfl.lD 
O!",rations course in N"ew :>OICXlCO al the ILEA facility in Ro,,,'eU. Fin~lly 90 personnel tcce!\'ed 
trailll11g on :>Obil Security (see Table 37),'" 1'0Uow on tr:Ullin~ and ~"<jU1I"n~'flt " .. a, ptovid~~l 
duri,,~ 1',\'Il4 at ~ co"t of$244,I~X) (,;u T~b1c .'H). 
Borde, and Iran<portation Seq,,;!;), I,..uunr and , \ssjstance 
support of any ,ccurit:-- ,ec'''r w1th I'''t 48 offici"l" 11l"0Ived with IS;\, ICE, CliP, and CSCG 
programme" .\1o,1 signlfic.ntly, ho,,'Cver, the l'SG a.stgned .. Cll!' Amch,; to the Embass)' in 
Pretona to f.cilitote oil honler and cu,tom, i,me,. That influence led to South Afr,,,,,', rugnm~ 
of Ihe U,S. Cu'tom, ~nd Border P~trol'-' Conta111cr Secunty lmtiati,e in FY04. Thi< initIa[1ve 
brought a U.S, r;;uW11l" offici~lto Durban !o work full nlTIc vmh S, mth Africa n cu,jolTI' offictal, 
on ,cr"elll11g contOl11~rs and ,hlpboord cargo Icav11lg Durb.n for U,S, pon •. The focus IS on 
pr~"ent11lg krron.<t uS<: of ,rupp111g contaJ11ers to trnnsport illegal or nuclear mat"ri:t]s, South 
AfnL"l .1", porticipa!e, 111 the l-.S, Custom, Patrol Customs-Trade Partnership Ag;tinst 
T~rrorism, which .llow, l'.5. CHP offici~l, to work ""ith ,he South Afnc,,, gov~t1llTIcm to 
unplem."u lomt 3eCllflty cntena for aU form' of t,.de 10gi<t1c,. In cxch.ng:c. South Africa gets 
cxpculIed .,hip ena~ upon om,'al in [ I. S. porl<; ond ceullcffi lJ:l'I>ectlons. " , 
SWAZILAND 
1'0,t,·9/11 l'SG intcrocuon with SW:lZil~nu h~, been fairly nummal. The most pressing .eCllflty 
concern" fm thc esc; involve the Jc"a,jatin~ effect.' of HIVjAJDS on the military and other 
security force" .. virtu~l wllap'e of the ju"'ce 'Y'tem, ~nd ~ lack of re<pect for hllm~n nghts and 
democracy. 
JU United Stale' Departmenl of Slolc. Bureau "f O;pl"matic Security, The .~nlilerrariJ", ASj,.""'"'" Pm!!.mm 
RrporllO Congre.u for f"'.'c,,1 r~w lOO!. Februfl/)' 2003. p. II. 
,'" United Stales Department of Slolc. Bureau "f O;pl"matic SecufIl)' The AmUerror;'", As<i""t/<'. PrOK'·Q., 
R_/>OJ"1 '" Cnnw", .• for Fi"cal r~"r 20tH. Februal)' 2004. p. j 2 
"" U.S, Cuslom, anJ Boroc, POI",! wcb'~e 









To address these wnce",. the LSG "-'ln~xl 10') per,ons In rru/nary, law enforcement, and 
border secunty prognmmcs (see Table 39). 
B!l~tc(;ll Secumy Tre~ues 
In the pr~ or p'"t -9!11 lea" Swaziland wa, 
not " "gn"tory 1.0 the Romc StaUltc and 
d,crefore was not prohibned from recclvlfIg 
military assistance. In FY()(, Swa:ubnd SIgned 
an A111de 9H agtecm,·nt "oth the USG. 
:-'hltto!)" TllilIJing Amstonce 
The L.S. sp''''' $-HIl,mO in ]",lET flInd, 
tta"''''g 4S mem ber.' of th,' LSDI' '" thc 
post-')!II yea" (.ee Tables 3') ond 40). The 
T .. ble 39 
malon!}' of lt wa, for mfantry officer courses, defence resollIce management, ond legal 
In addltlOn to IMET tffimIDg, 14 l'SDI' 
members attended ACSS semlnars throughout 
l\fnca md ill Washington as part "f the RC.SS 
programme. T" wmplement !l"s, one llSDP 
"ff'cer wa, """!ted to parl1c'p,l.e '" Ihc new 
RCTFP. 
Swaz.tland hosted the U.S. humanitarian eXera", i\IEDFLAG 02, wloch brought 8-0 Tabl~.w 
[ ' ,S. An J"otc~ medical personnd ttl th~ country for tw" weeks "f disaster response 
and hwnamanan meJtcal L-are. '" 










Military HIV IAIDS i\~~I~tanCt 
Nation"1 IITV/AIDS Infe~t1on "'Hc~ i[] Sv.-aziland are estimated at 39°10. Specific d~t~ "0 t he 
USDF" unknown, but i~ beheyed to be much hIgher than the n'Hlonal.ov~rag~. OllAl'l' began 
"peraOng 111 Swaziland dunng FY02 wnh a n~ed, .,"e"ment and programme development 
comra~t a\>.,.,.ded to ~tedl~.l Cat~ Development Intcrnaoonal. -l1us has led to rna .. ~w"r~n~" 
campalgn','o FMI' grant for tC'Oflg and medical eqrnpment, and pro"urt:m~nt of test kits and 
other lab eqUIpment. Two membe", of the USDF attended the all-Afnc. IllY ""thhop i[] 
13or..wana and Nco CSDF phpicians au~nded the HIY [raming programme in San DlCgo, CA 
during I'Y03. OHAPI' h", ,rai[]cd 1\>", m.oMet tra"'er. .nd 50 pcer cducalor~.'" 
S"'aziland wa, pro\' ided $203.000 111 8.tF grant' ro hdp pOi' li,t traiT""g .oml t", 'ning-rdated 
,upplic, and ,,;f""\1~e' ('ee T.blc 40), Onc can a"ume th.t th~ gram was uoed to ft111d 1:>'IET ~nd 
othct milit"')' "",istan~e ptogr.omm,·,. 
S"'azi1.nd hOld 14<!-bw enli>r<,""'~nt ~nd I~WI offic"l, r~~eh'e [raining through four C .S,-
>pon,ored programme, In the 1'0",-9/11 yea",_ Leading trainmg numbers were the DEA with 83 
offiCIal. !fl CDUnlet-narcotics opemtion" Follo,,-ing them was the i\ TF wh" tnUlCd -'7 pc""",nd 
and the I'BI who pro"id~d ill\"e,u"",-U\'e and for~o'ic, [raining fot 24 ('ee T"bl~ 39). 
A t.s. elll' tntil ~ p"x1uct;on vet1f",.uoo t£~tn \>.'a' ",-,ot to Sv.'aziiand ;n FY03 1ll order to 
~omhat illeWi tn:ok ,h;pm~tH~ aod quo,a "ltcutnvcntiotL Lal~t in FY03 the CBP htnught a 
'" United State, t>ep.nmell1 of [)of.nse, Llepanmell1 of the Navy, Kav)' Health Research Center, TIl<' FjrM 










S"''''7.1 customs offinil to the u.S. a~ part of Ib,- CFlI' IV!' to ""cr~ct ","h ~nd develop relauons 
v.~th U.S. col1nt~tpatL', '" 
z.. .... \ fBIA 
11l1crest, m Z..mb," h"v~ oc~n to cH,al<' 
l1lternal smbility ill o.dn 10 ,mpwyc 
ZambIa', I-'0&ltion as a p~rtner In til<' Global 
War "n T<:tto' 111 th~t, "Zamb", has few 
defence , agam't mt<,maon".,j tcrcor"tn. If 
~llowed to !<Ike root .in ZamlllR, lnroml 
n~lw"rh u>uld undernllne all effort, to 
cr~~t" a "able, JC'1llocrnllc, O1ld prosperous 
ZambIa,"'"' Th;, I, hnkcu {o Z~tnl"an 
proximlty to Tamama, wh 'ch ha' known 
IcrwrN actinty. If the USG helps to bwld 
'Miliht}' bl "nhanc11lg the ,cnIttty SeC' or, It 
sec , Z~mbla as bung abk to cnmnbllt.<: to Us 
Global War on TetrO' In that, "a p"acdul, 
,,,,bk Zambia will ass.!s! III the war ago.imt 
financial ot other ,uppott ." '" Th~ l :s.<:; has pro\'Jd~d quite a bit of s<'cunry sector 
a"iHanc" to h<"ip furthn ItS ,,'cunty go~k 
1'0,t.-9/11 '~t:linty SL'Ctor asslstanae ~.m~ in the form of mil1ta,)" p~acd"'~rmg, law 
~nfot"'-TIl"nt. co>l1nt~r-prolik ..... tion, ond border md trarnportanon ""curiry trn;n1i1g fo' 1,144 
f'C"onnd. T,,,, nurnl"" 1ncludes 635 In four nul1tary progranune •• 134 in ,h"", count", 
prolikration P"'gt:l!ntn"" 23 In the ACOT.\ peacekn'ping progratn""''' 3.'H in four Ia" 
,,-' W()fld T,"oc Org.'miLalitH' Wcbsik. 00h.a llevelopment Initi.t;"", T ,ode CoplICity Building. Datah .. ",. 
http:// to Wh. wt". '><8ilrta J'ro j<'C\.agpx·' prjC ooc"'\)2 j -063 5-0 3 -A& ben 11 0" 1 d- I I (, 
'" Uniled Stak, 0cp.nme"t of SWc. lJu",.u ofPoliti<al-Militory AllO"". Congre<si""al Budget Jll"ti/icalion 
jar FOI'~ign Opel'Oiiom Fi,-oaj Yea, ]006, W",hington; (]PO, ),lay 2005. p. 312 
,,, Unit.d Stm., Depnnment of State, B"re.u "fP,,1 it;oal.Mjl!tary Affai". Cungre$"jonal Bud"", .Iu"'I/ic~liu~ 











enfot~ement prognnuue", :lnd 14 ;" (IYC b.,rder and lr~n,;rortat;oo Sccllnt)' progt"~1nmc" (,ee 
Table 41) .. \dd,uo,,:lII}', thc CSG actiyd); ,;uppott~J humamtarlan d~-m''''nR progrnmmes and 
bega" to .uthori sc Slgruficant i'Ktc"'c' ;" attn , agreemt:llt< and g"'~m' '" both gOyt:m1nenl -to-
govcrruncnt "mllh~ P';\iotc commerc"l'] arms md,c'ltles, 
Zambia "grt~d an .\ tl;cl~ 'JS J-\ilotct.J 
Immumty .\",ecment "'Ith the USG 111 
I'Y·O.\ e,,"ming rJ,at ,\m~ttcan ci"z~n' 'Mil 
not be surr~nd~t~d to the ImeTn.rion,] 
Criminal Court by th~ /.:lmbi,m go,'er""l{'nt 
COflscnt' ''' 
,""dd'non.Il)" , Zambia has now ,"gnt:d all 
.gr~ement wah the USG to ""n'e 'l5 " U.S 
mihl:lry 'Co"pt:taU\ie Secul1t\" Locatioo' as 
patt of it> glo"a] pooitioning 
COCIpcratiYe Securu) Locatio" 
F' str.tcgy. ..\ 
i, dditted a." 
1''''1 I, It ,I , ( l<t 1\ ""I('I N, I 1":-';~oGi ,\1 
I\PI"IIII\IU UH,\ ".,.., 
FU,IHI, 
,,".~ .. f\ , .1 .. 11..". 
, , 
IME'J' '9.i " Jet:'!' 1«, ,71 
A'IA " " 
"a hO,'l-n.uoCJ boht,. wuh l1ttic or"o perm.ncllt U.S. pcr.otuld pr~<~nce, whkh may T,ble42 
~"maJll pl~-po"t1(m~d cqulpmcnt ondjor l 'l?,tic.~] anang~m~nm and '~"T ])(Jth for secum\" 
~oorctaUofl Je"tiviucs and c01ltingcncy ~cce", ,,]C" 
The USC; spc"t !nore th.n $2,249,(~)() If} milit.ry tr,;nmg a"1Sl:Inc~ beh"~cn ),YI)2 OS. The 
maionty of the training was deSlgrt.kd for rh~ IMET programme, wh'ch woo 'l,me 
pr"portlonally large as compared to oth~r SourJ,em .\fncan "",IOn" A toml of $1,1)62,1)()(1 "lOS 
"~ (ico.-gct()wn I;n;vc,,;ty I .. ", School Wd"ite, 
h Up: Ilwww II, J:corgcl()wn, oj LJi int II gLJ idc,-,'.rti< Ie '<8, dm# co"ntri e. 
m PI,,,,h, Lauren. C,onw-c¥;,Kl.1 Re,e.r<h Sen'ice, F oceign Affairs, Def"",~. 0,><1 T",J~ lli ,.;.,io"" A/;-;ca 
Command: U.S, Straui!,'c IIl1~re-'t,' and ,/u! Role 0/ rhe V,S. Millrory in 4i"('0 Washington ll.C. !)ecembc, 7, 
2007, p. '< 











spent on 434 individuals (see Tables 41 and 42). The majority of the training via IMET was 
designed to enable Zambian military personnel (ZDF) to, "attend courses through the Defense 
Institute of International Legal Studies179 and C.S. military staff colleges, and receive training in 
counter-terrorism, corruption investigation, and medicine. Medical training complemented 
Emergency Plan projects to address the crisis of HIV / AIDS in the Zambian military."lSi1 These 
courses proved useful as the uSG considered the Zambian military to be "severely hampered in 
its resources and professional development." They felt the government was suffering from a 
" ld li dId d . li ru1 "Ult co war menta ty eve ope un er socla st e. 
The JCET programme was also active in f'Y02-03. In FY02 the "CSG spent $146,000 on Special 
Forces training for 80 members of the ZDF First Commando Battalion. This was followed up in 
FY03 when $571,000 was spent on more Special Forces training for 105 ZDF personnel (see 
Tables 41 and 42). Finally, 16 ZDF and MoD officials attended regional seminars through ACSS 
programmes at a total cost of $206,000. No Zambian officials were invited to attend ACSS 
programmes in FY05. 
Joint Military Exercises 
Tbe ZDF participated in the u.S. European Command-sponsored Africa Endeavor 2006 
Military Exercise in South Africa. The event was a major "C.S.-sponsored military 
communications interoperability workshop focused on command, control, communications and 
information systems (C3IS) among 20 participating African nations. 1R2 
179 Run by the U.S. Department of Defense as a military lawyer international training group. Info at 
http://www.dsca.osd.mil/diils/ 
180 United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Congressional Budget Justification 
for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2006. Washington: GPO, May 2005. p. 313 
181 United States Departments of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Foreign Military Training and DoD 
Engagement Activities of/nterest: Joint Report to Congressfor FY2005. March 2006 
182 Captain Christine Miller, "Nations Plan African Endeavor Exercise," Unites States European Command 












Military HIV IAIDS Assistance 
General population HIV / AIDS infection rates are estimated to be near 21 % in Zambia, yet the 
ZDF may have rates as high as 35%. The DHAPP programme in Zambia has included provision 
of lab and computer equipment; social worker and physician assistant training; refurbishment 
and outfitting of a ZDF Counselling and Testing Centre; training for 18 staff members of the 
ZDF Counselling and Training Centre; training in HIV serology testing for 45 clinical officers 
and nurses; training for 36 ZDF personnel in HIV prevention programme management; for 
three physicians to attend the HIV training programme in San Diego" California; and for two 
physicians to attend an international HIV conference in Barcelona, Spain. A total of 31 master 
trainers and 321 peer educators have been trained through FY05.18, 
Peace Support Operations Training and Assistance 
Zambia signed on to participate in the USG-Ied ACOTA programme, but to date has only 
conducted an initial Training Strategy Conference for 23 staff. Lack of funding for Zambian 
participation on behalf of the Zambia government and other internal issues have prevented the 
ZDF from participating, however the first battalion is scheduled for training in FYOS. 1H4 
Arms Authorisations and Grants 
Zambia received $22,368,400 in arms authorisations and grants betwelen FY02-05, the majority 
of which came during FY05 when $20,989,000 were authorised. Tne majority of the funding 
approval came via the DCS-TA and DCS-A programmes. The FY05 authorisations were strictly 
for weapons systems including launch vehicles, missiles, etc. IRS Beyond the DCS authorisations, 
$300,000 in FMF grants and $600,000 in unspecified FMS-A were approved (see Table 42). 
183 United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Rt$earch Center. The First 
Four Years: Synopsis of the Global Effort. San Diego, CA. June 2005, pgs. 74-75. 
184 Gentry, Kevin L. ACOT A Acquisitions and Operations Manager. (personal communication, 3 May 2007) 
185 United States Department of State. Office of Defense Trade Controls. Direct Commercial Sales 











lnten'sungly "nough, the L;SG funded f"ur ZambHlll officlal.o; to n'c,w" tralntng through Iw" 
DoE defence progtamme_ 11n, indud~d on~ person "'1Ih the DP ill FY05 and th:r~e oUlers ",ith 
Ule RnPP ill rY02 and FYOS_ The funding of Zomhl"n parttc'p"lion m the DP pmgr"-mme is 
unck ... t, ~, the progro.mme focuses on Ule military applicaoon of n""kar merg)", which" nol 
applictbl~ to the capalulu",_, "f the ZDF. Addmonallv, Ule RBPP prognmme focu",," on 
n-ducmg glob,l t"·,,-,,on due to nuclear concerm and conflict and p<-"fh2p" m,,- be more relevant. 
The L;SG rna)' have w,nted to impart 11, vkw. on the imetn't1onal nuck-ar commllilitj' '0 
ZambIan officials who could at one POUll m ttmc be call~d to work at the L\EA or for UlC eN 
m nuclear prol.tf~tatkm, 
Although the ATA programme notrnally full. undn Ih" Low Enforcement ,~ctot, duo: to th~ 
naNre of trauung It i, being mclllded in thi, ""ction_ I'YW saw Ih" first and OI1ly pamdpanon of 
Zambian official, m the ATA pmgramm~ with S2('4,()(X) spent on LlO Zamhian officllIl, f,,[ a 
\'v!.t D Av.'an-ne<> S~mmat ('~e T ahb 41 ,nd 42). "'" 
Law Enforcemmt TrainuJg and AS~l'tllnCf 
J.~,"' enforcement trai1l1ng m the po"t-9!11 yeats was both dJrect and mdirect_ Direcdy, _,68 
offioal.o; ""-,,", prov1<kd I,.""ng vmh American countl'fparto, .nd In,hrectiy lelTAI', OI'DAT, 
and the L;,S. Deparunmt ofT[~sury brought Americ>fl ad,isor. to Zambia 10 ."I,t rnth"I than 
tram counl~rp-arL' (see Tabl~ 41), 
()n the dm'cI (Nlltung .id", quit<: a bll ,"'a. condw;ted by the FRI m criminal mvc.t1g-~u"n and 
forenSICS wllh 143 Zambian officllll, traint'd_ Likewise the ATF-In' tmmed 58 Zambian. and 
the DEA-ITP, 37. AddiuOfl.lly, Zambian law enforcement officials we[~ acnve in ILE.."'-G 
coul><"_ nl"pne ,pec:tfi~ fi8'Jres lx'mg u(]fdca,~!, tiK ~Y02 State DCl'artmmt JNL T('port stale. 
that, "over one hundr",! Z.mhlan law "nforcement officers, al kOSI a quarter of whom ore actIve 
". Uniled Siale, l>epanmem of State_ Bureau of Llipiomauc Security_ fhe Anlllerwmm .~»i>laT'Ce Program 










in natco!1L-'; control, completed U.lIUIlg ~t the l -,S,-sponsored Inl~rna!1onal I",w Enforcement 
i\cadelllles ill Gal)()ton~, HOL<wana anJ j{()'well, New \1 nlCO""', 
Oi'DA T "" .. u1<hrecd), ~ctiye WIth Zambian officioJ, ill FYO" when "eve,.,.!l Zambian lav,. 
enforc~mem and le>:al offic1al, rec,,",-ed ,,""i<[~nce ""th c()untcr ,tetmri'm legislatlon wrlring 
th"ugh ~ l TS(; "f'<)11<CJted 'emma, III S"uth AfricaH" In c()mplement 10 Ol'DAT U.lIll!lg, l-,S, 
Department of Treasury reSldent advisor' ~ssisted Zambia ill combaung n")"lel l~ull<lenng, 
Bomer and uansportation securit), asslStance ,,'~s e:{(remd), wruted in Z:lInbi~, ,lust 14 offiClals 
Were pnwiJed lr'.!ming: lWO w,th the CIIP-f1'P; rhr~~ ill FLEfC-l'I'P, cl",ee wIth CBP-IVP; four 
",,,h USclS 1'1'1'; and ju,t t,,'() ""th ICE-ITI' ('ee T~ble 41) 
Z IMBABWE 
poM-9/11 
relatiomrup with the United States has been 
wdl d"cumented, The USC; ha, been sharply 
caricai of the \lug.!k gmemmenr and In 
FY02 lffiposed a ban on the transfer of 
1mr","ed a ban on non-humanitarian 
,. "" governn",n! !" g<" emment "'''' Jc~', " 
has re,ulted 10 " compi('(e dmp off", JJtec[ 
,ecunty ~ss[St~occ, although Zimbabwe h,,". 
"coopctated WIth the United State" "n law enf",n""enl anJ 
'" Unired Stlire, Dcp>rtment of Stale, BU"'all of tn{ertlatio,,"1 N"rcotics "nd L"w Enf(Kwmcnl Am",", 
l~lCnMionul Nam)l.,,'.' Control S'YalOgy Rqx>" Fr ]UII], Washingtoo' GPO, Maret, 20C1} 
," Un'ted Slate' Dep.rtment of State, Bureau of Int''''"tio,,"1 N"rco!lc, ."d L.w Fnfo'"ement AOa,,, 
Imemalional Na'Cori<:.. Control S'Yalegy lIepo<l FI' ]()I)3, W.,hingtoo (iPO, March 2()()4 
Tabl.43 
to. llnired su.te, Dcp>nmcnt of State, B"",alL of African Mr.;r.; , Country Background 'vote" Zim~abw" At 










~ounrer-terrorism mattcn."''''' Only ,L'>en I.,mbab",tiln military and 'ccumy offic1al. 'c~cl\-cd 
tr~ming ,-;a iiyc L'S Jefe-nee p"'gt::llnmes m F,'01 and I 'YOJ (,cc Table 43). 
/l.1ilituy T r:umng tm"tancc 
Duc to ~c"atton of all miht~Ij' .... d. only two 
Z>J -\ mcmUcr> reeci, cd USG-'p()(Is",ed 
traUllng. both at an :\CSS ,c1Tl1nat in FY(J2, ~l a 
cost of$34/100 (see Table 44). 
P"'t<."'!'!~!!\ '"oPIB,!!''' 
~N'".~\''''' 'X". ,,,,,, ~I ,", \ 
/1'''''''''' 
, •• • • ,.,' d II,,·, 
Tabk44 
Cunously enough, of thc ,,,,"cn total ZirnbalmTan personnel ",volved m CSG trrurung 
programme •. tvw Werc lfl\-olved wuh U.S, DoE programmes- onc w1m RlWP m FY01 and one 
vmh thc DP m FY05. [(c ... ,on> fo' '7.unbab".ean participatton in such programme. are unknown. 
Law enfDteement ' ... A1mng and a"",,(anee "ia, virtually non-eX13tenf.. Due to "~ncnons lust one 
Zllnbabwcan Icgal offictal ~~,itL,,1 the U.s. a.' part of the OPDAT-IVP in FY(H. Despite tho.t. a< 
prcVIously stated, ZlIllhabv.-'C has b<'Cn cQ()pctanyc in law enforccment m~ttc,,; wuh the U.S 
I}ottkr and 1 nm'portati(lil Se~W-Jf\ TraumI!' and .\ssJStancc . 
One Zunbabwean border official wa, !tamcd in i'YIIJ thwu,o;h thc U.S. CliP-i'll', 
'00 Vmtcd Slale' Dcl'artmenl or Sunc. Bureau or Pohl]Cai-M iiilal) Affairs. C()ng,eHi()"~/ Sm/get J"'tifi<'~r;on 











In hght of d,e data, it " obvious that \//11 became a catalyst for duni':~ in Ihc '~mntJ 
re1.uonship bdv.'ccn thc U.S. anJ Southcrn i\fn~a. Whilc no, a h,.,spo' lokc thc Middle Ea't or 
Nonh Afnca, South~rn Afnca suffc,~J ftom many of th~ p",blctn, thc USC; dccmcJ amcnable 
to enco",agmg terrorISt acOVlty such as proXImity to E.st Africa, hi?;h cnme. unpavenshed 
p"pulatlOfl", poor int~rn.l.ecllrit)', we.k borders, and cornlptlOn at alllevds of the gm~nuncnt. 
no' to mL11Uon thc extr~md)' fr-~glie state of Zimbabwe which tL:d~rs on d,c "ergc of co!bps~. 
Wnh post· ~/ll US(; ,ccllnt)' concern" "ccmingl)· centr~J on nwcal I<htm. at fir>t glance t1 
would s~em Southern Africa is of no real conccrn Wld, tllilIgloal Mu,lim popuianon. In ",.Iny, 
how~"ct, ,~hCT fActOr,; playeJ ll1tO Amcnco.n fL. ..... 
Southern "'\ frica was ngh! to accept 'nc'c"s~d a"i"an~e f,um thc I 'S(~ anJ ,houlJ '~'lu~", more. 
patucularJy in th~ borJer and transport.tion S~C(lrity sector. SADC should nut he,i'atc to cng.g~ 
,,'th the I TS(; un .'CCllO!), .. ss~,tance in th~ futtLre. as Jt i, nol" mattcr of sm·c",lgnty. but rather" 
w.y to bencfit from a pannctshlp wilh th~ wotlJ" WPCrpOWL"f and Improve d,C global ,mnwng 











CHAPT ER 4, 
SECU RITY ASSISTANCE ANALYSIS 
1'H.£·9/JI >s. I'OST·9/11 It i, 1llcU'purable lhal Southern Afn~a re~e"'ed a 1,,[ 
1nor~ "~cunty eooperanon t,",ning and a"",",ane~ 1ll the 
post·9/11 y~a". Th~ 9/11 attacks w~,.., a catolyst for 
chan!!;<' In I~nns of th~ USG', approach t" regional 
KEGIONAL 'I ItA!NING COMI'AJI1>ON 
,enml}" poliL~e" Bur "'hile th~re ha, been m~lor 
'mpro,em~n'. th~ )nerea"" ha, not n~e~",anl}' reached a 
I~wl which will dranl.~tlcally aff~ct ovemll regioml 








(number " f p.",,, .md) 
P~ !; P 06'] •..• (\-lANGE 
'>0:1'.0 .P'( m",", \\' . 
I.?I 4 ' .1 ""' 217', " 'W pi", I)'"'' 
24 71 }Ii ."' .1)', 
p; So' l~u' 'iy, 
?,,17 171- I' '' ' 'P 
In breaking down th~ dam. ~ll sector:< ,howed fatrly hr!';e petcema!,;e Ul=ase,. 'hb k ~5 
wnh the exception "f nulnary tr:tlfllng. whlch decreased .150 1, (,e~' hbl~ 45) .. Chal being ,aid, the 
regIOn', colketlve military for~~ sin decrease-J fwm 291.2U() t" 271AOO and pollee "zes 
Ulctea,ed from 221l,OOO to 225.5IXI. Force S17C number, arc 
llllportant in th~ folloVilflg country anal)",~, as thcy are used to 
compare lI'alfllllg number rari<", 'Ihe,~ ar~ c lleulated b, 
mulnplpng the pre ,)t 1",,1·9/11 f"rce "ze by 4, whICh IS the 
number of }'~"'" in ~ach block. Th" number" then dtvlded by 
th~ numb~r of p~"onnd ttalI!~d In a ,~ctor wh~dlCr th"t be 
military U, • .illUl~ or combmed low cnfor~cmcnt/border and 
tr.llSp<lttatk>1l '~~llnJy rw~ramme'. hlt data ,m.ly'l< purp,,'e'. 
all non .mliltary' , CC\lnry offiCIal, arc l!ld\l d~d und~r th~ t~rm 
'polt~~ fore~" ' Thl" ""j,,,, ",-ith trmn lng ratio calculation. 
l'or ~xamp l~: 
Sl7e ofpo,t ~/11 j-\oTh,,~n" Dcf~nc~ Forces = lJ,l) )() 
BDl· ,,~e" 4 - 52.(~)() 
(fiDF size x 4) / total number of BDI, f, >rces tratned = .,46 
Therefore. U'"1Ill11g nUo = 1: I SO 
89 
PRE·9/11 v •• POST·9 /11 
P50 TRAINING l'IGI ' RES 
(numb,., o f f'C"onod) 
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~ " " "- t63,W SW,4. 0 .. , , 




Rog;OD 1491 47.1.' rh" '17' 










In terms of regIOnal tra'n1ng, overall numkrs 1flu~as~d from 
9.392 [() 12,·+75, a 3.1'-, jllmp (,~~ Tabl~ 45), \Vh , l~ all ""eto'''' 
exCep1 rnli1taty tr.m",!> " 'c"ea,ed f.uly dramancal1y, thlS overall 
Jump "' prunarily du~ to many Southern J\frI~an !lati()n, 
par'1L-;pa';!l),; i!l th~ ,\COr A pea~e <lIPP()tt "[>Cran,,n< It.ming 
pmgc.mme, Thi, dram.tically '''cr~., ~d CSG-'pon,ored 
p~ac~keepmg traL11l11g, ,,;ith ntLmb~rs ,hifnng fwm 1,491 to 
4}-'1. a 211"-. Jump "[,hi, L' k~ause pr~-9/11 onl)- .\hlav.'1 
pa11tctpat" d ,,, the' AeRI ptogr:lm, but p<M-9/1 1 ,ix nan"n, 
k~am~ mnJh-~d with "\COTA. 
I .-'1, pre,.-,,,,,, Iy menn"ned, te!':'"n.lmi lilary ttami ~!> figut~, fel 
~5% from 5,0.30 to 3,270, Thi, '''''' largely due to ,cver:ll 
PRI'r 9 /11 ,~, POST .~/1l 
MILITARYTRAINl N G F1GllflES 
(Hum"", nr I"'"on,,<I) 
C'~m"} I'RIO I'OS'I % CJJANGE 
'NO 0 " 1'''' 12j()'/ "V, '" U "- 21' 1,ES '" 
, 
,~ 6,'; 
,~ <I' M "- 32" 
MUL: 'U H, m~ 4'/ 
NAM "' U, "- j," 
M 22M U m ,"", 43', 
,'\'Ii'A '" m.m" 7,,'/ 
7A\! ' e " '" 66'/ 7JM JSI 1\\....,. <)<j ' / 
fleg;on SO',(J 3" "'", ... \j',' 
S"uthern ,\fnnn U )lIfltri~S rdusin~ tu sign l\tlldc 9l! Bilat~r:>l Imnmruty ,'\gwements 'hhk 47 
wnh th~ USc;-, "hid, te<ulted 111 ~"lKdl at1On or tn,I1l",-'y traJ[l1ng programm~s and 
govcmment-to-govenunmt arl11, "ale, and gr:lnt" Th" d"ctea,e m lr-lin111" tc'lliteu 1n ,h,ft, of 
t1 w r~gional training ratio from 1: 232 to 1: 3 '2, a la"g" PRE_9/11 YO. POH_9/t1 REGIONAL ARM: 
17110RISATJONS .,K! GRANTS 
n thou .. nd. '" I S,ooll." 
drop, 11, ~ [ ~ S(; L-..n!lot me~t Its own s~nuity goal of 
c"oattng m()te c.pable and prDf~",,)ru.l tnlJJ[arJ~' whue 
'llTIult.ncou,ly tcMricting mi litary aid ('L'C T:!ble 47). 
I"">-",,,m PRE J'UST ~. ClIAN{;1i 
On a m()T~ p"siu>·" no(~, WJth th~ addition of the 
DlL-'lPP tnJ I1t:n), I fIV/AIDS (".lining anu "s",,(an~~ 
progro.nun~ the USG p"",Jcd t.ta,," n), f"r 2,~ 1 ) 













.760 11 ,,, 
1"3;9' '"' 
7fl6842 ,I,,, 
Cl{tr~mdy lugh mt~ of lllfccnon .mong.;' mil ll:!t)' member< "f illnauons, this IS ,·;to1 to 







Ann, :!uthonsatio", and gra11l" ,,,crc-..,ed 21l7"', du:rin~ post-9/11 ,'~ar,. a mass; y~ jump, 
Numb~rs grew from S230,552,OOIl to S71l6,1H2,O()O. Thi, " mthL-auve of USG goals for the 










year. a, munbers jmnped from 25 10 361, wnh the m_jont,. of 
tramee, ftom South Afn~~, Zamhla, ~lld "'~m,b,~. (;well Ihe 
global I.hr~01 of counter prohfnanml and WMD n>rtc<-[t1', tlu, 
t}"p~ of 1n,11ling " t~gtnllall)' ,mpon.nt de'plte nnly South 
1\ fnca havmg nuclear capability and capacity (,ee Table 49), 
l.~", <-nfnn;<-mcnt1t''''omg figt,r ... jumped 43"1, from 2,471 to 
3,54(1. Th" " concal, . , law ~nforc~mem i, arguablr the most 
,mpnrtant '~CUt1t)' ,ector to build up In the region. 'l1,e 1!}crea, ~ 
,hIfled regIOnal trruning to.l"", from 1: 30') to 1 21~, a ",11<1 
,mpt(wemcnt C,v,l 'O('l~t)' will impnnT only with b<:tter 
lnternal scomty. Manr more federal agencle. became im-olved 
PIlE·~/l1 YO. POST ·~/1l 
NUCLEAR S.ECUHI ff TItAINI N 
FIGUItES 
(num oc' of I"'"wn"<I) 
C,~,"'",' P R.E POSTI '!. CU ANGE 
.~NC , , '""'" W, 
BOT , ,,,,,,,. W 
l£S , ,.,m 'J'; 
,~ , "",,, 'J'; 
MOZ , ,,- W 
NAM , "h" <J\OJ'i 
" " " ,,'" )(d " '<1l' A , , .. , .' ZAM , 11·1 plu. I }I(fI'/ 
ZIM " no., ,,, 'W, 
H<won 2.i \6 11 rl'" ,\.j·n 
w,th intemauonal tr,,,ning progn.mmc" In th c- po,t-~ /1 1 )~at', p~ttkul.tl)· ftom 
functions createu wlllu" th~ ne", l; .s. f)~partment of ! lomd~nd S~~urit:· ('c"C Tabk 50). 
T.bk49 
\lorder and tran'p"ttatton ""cunty OJW a 53". Increase ill traming figure., moving from 375 to 
571. 11"", i, pmiti,-e I",-en thaI porous Afric~" horde" are a prun~ty <ecut11:) concern.< on th~ 
conllnent, hnw~"er the'e numlx:" "r~ ,till i".de9uatdy low l;w~n South<TI1 .-\ frk.,.', H,44(1km 
In '''''-''''' ~ ... ).,thne; 4., 715km in inland navigable ,,'-aterv,;ays; 35,411 km i" border,; 31 potts anu l!) 
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rh~.( >< nn 'lu~"t1nn thai AnJ':Ol~ U"" bT~' PlOC:>..,. ill all kinds 
vf 'KlInt,. c",,£,<,.~non po "" 'J/ I I .. nh ~" r'Hr.t11 1Jlcr"""" of 
1 5 13~ . m numbe-r of lK",on",,1 lI'ltlnW, • 777"~ mctno;(' '" 
1",,< ~urlwn""uoR'i and grm'~ . nd I 5 .071'\0 In""'15" Ul 0\..,,,,11 
rr:llnt"g pr<>gNmn", cxp<'f1(bmr<' (~ I.blt 51), W'hile at first 
gbnc,' thl> '''~~' ' ''''m "'m"rhb!.:, ;1 's I'nrn:lrllr ~ rc"ili of ,h,' 
cnd of Ih,' cIVil war, wluch In Ib,' P'~ 9/1] ~'!':lr. put a "ttu"l 
hold ~II forms of 'ccunty "",£,<,,,,Ii<,n Th,' p ... ccnt:lg~ "'('t~"'~' 
m~~ !-<'em >lagg~nng In. p[~ " ', [,<",I 9 / 11 c<""f>'~n,,,n. but tn 
,,'3!tn. th~ chang~ IS num~uk- 1.{1\','n tb,' "7C "f Ih,' ,\ "~)b,, 
IIUbI3 .), 3nd 1>OIicr fOK ... , 
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popubaionlS 11,200,()()()L''' , wHh thc FAA sIZe at 0 "",cerely bloated 120,000 ond Angolan policc 
ami other 'ccurity fOTCC. at 8,'}()(), Mtlitaty t'olOlng ,ncH'a"'d from 5!X J'AA t""l1H'd FY'J8·01 ro 
81 between FY02-05, 0 12SO"/. mcreare, Thi. was at expendirure. of $24,1JO() and $44I,lIOO, a 
1731'% merca"" (sec Table 53). "ihi. was brgd), due to d,C FAA's remstated dlgibilur for 
partlClpanOn m IME'l cour'e' and an mcrease in nwnbcr of pcrsonnel SL..:It to ACSS 
p'ogramme.' (;wen the numbL"";, th,· p,e.9/11 ~'e~,"" saw ~ penod ~H'r3!(" of 1: 3D00(J l'.'\A 
ttll;ncd ,n Amencan ml~car)' programmes willie ,n the post-'J/ll penod "," 1: 5'J26. Togethn 
ther mdicated aD impIO~'ed, but reJ:ail-elr low 1",· e1 of militarr coopcnlnoo. ODC bnght .to.r m 
the post-9/11 t1mefrome wa, the lralrung- of (,1 FAA mctlic~1 pL..-'onnd m HIV/AI[)S 
programmes. whICh wa' not a part of P"'_'J 111 a."!Stance. 
Arm, authortsanoo. and grants saw 0 777",'0 merease p""t-9/11. W'hile pre-9/11 audloosation. 
Were ennrelr with the L.S, commercial defence llldustry, post-9/11 arm.' "gtL..:menL' .... 'ert: 
opened to govcrnmcnt-to-goH'mm('f"lt dcfencc .aie., programme. and Angola "'"s al,o a 
reClptent of military financmg grant'. Lsillg d,C arms sales niUe' m each pcriod and dividing 
th"m by the nurnbn of personnel m the military m that penod it is prumble to produce arm, per 
pc,"on ra!lO, which can bt ,,"<cd '0 tlC[Crmille an attn~ reClpiClll "ankUlg. \VbL'" cakuhr11lg for 
A'W,b the pte-9/11 artnS pe' pa.<on figure of $22 ,ncrea'cS to $1 8.'\ p~"- f><'tson post· 'Jill. 
Law enforcelnL..:Ir ,~ctor training roSe 730"·', from 10 to B3 persoond. The Sector also saw the 
~ilJt!lon of FBI and ATJ' rr~ming programme'. Borde, and tran'portation ,ecunty tr~11ling 
figures roSe from 0 to ')4 pen;onnel. th,· majority of",h"h foeu"ed on avianon ,<:cunty. Addmg 
thes<' scctors together and calculatrng the ttaming callo result. m 1: 201. De.pm· that rallO, the 
general ahsence of coastal st"CUrtty and land honk, comrol tnunmg I. trouble.OJTI<'. Onl~' 12 
Angolan offiClllIs Werc proVltlL-d co~,t~1 ~ntl m~ntlme security trammg ""d jl~'t thrcc cu,tom, 
and on" lInmigrAtk>1lS offic,al wc,," trained (scc "I abk 5.:1), Given Angola's 1 ,(,(IOkm of cIY1.<llinc; 
S,198ion ,n land honk,s; l,.,OOkm of nav1gabk Inland watc","a},,'; nine ports and I.wo 
m'L=~llonal "ltpon~, n ,v",dil ,eL"tn U'asonahlc to focus moH' on bordn ~nJ tl'An'p'>t[a!lon 
"ecunly. Thc US(; 1.< no' do,ng "n'''lgh, 











"K'"fi~antl\' '" ,h~ po"t9/11 }'~a'" rh" indmhl fitst nm~ 
pamdpatlDn ill pt',c~ SUpport "pt'raUlms a"d 
b lmlet / ("'''SP' 'tl a tEo >I, secunty "alllUlg. Th~re w~, a" ""L"tall 
l nct~a,e of 686"·'. 1n pcr50nnd tt",neol. ~ 246" ', lnctea,e in orm, 
autllDrlSauo", and grant,. ond " 631". Ulcrca,e Ul tr,ming 
expenditure (,ee "fable 54), "Ibis occurroo Wltll mcre .. e, ill 
both mll",,,;, and poli~e force ,u~;. WhlCh were 1Il.000 (B D I-) 
and 5.800 dunng th~ pr~_\l/ ll )Ta'" and 13,O()() (HOI') and 
(,.SOO 1'0,1-9/11, lbe gr~atcst Inct~.,~s wcr~ m tlIe law 
~nfotc~tn~n t and 1 ~'t.kt/tr.n"potl:lt1'Nl ;ecunty '~Clot>. WhlCh 
brought.n ILEA to nolswona_ 
PRF_~/ll >s. PU:lT·9/1l 
SF.C\.TRJTY CUUrHtATION 
1I0TS"'ANA 
Se..u" I'RI' pos o/. ClIAKG I' 
MIL m H H"""' !n 
"00 " "' pi"" 224?00'\' 
" " ... " 
~ " 00 ph'" 2.i'6" 
BTS , .11 ~lu, .1.1400'/ 
T",.l '" 119, ~l",< ~, 
,~RMS -I ll lS 14!144 pi", 24(,0/ 
," 22il ,,~ ~l"" 6J2''' 
T.bl~ 54 
lVhlitary tnull"g was the, >nly secr. >r 10 ,lect~os~ In voluln~, dCsplte " J.()()()·p""Ofl Incr~a,c m th~ 
"7C of thc no!'. Tr.imng numl.et< droppeol 2 1 o/~ frotn 4:'-' to _'>46. "Ibis leol to a pre to Pt)st-
9/11 traming raOo Inn~.,~ of 1: n to 1:1511_ \'\-'hilc th lS m"l' sccmcd f~itl)' s'W'i[ic:o.nt .. 'pending 
un mllitary progr~lI!me; increased fwm $2.24D.{)()() 10 $2.28G.()()() aod th~ BDF patt1cipal~d 111 
t.h~ ALI' .nol KeTFP, WlllCh ther w~r~ 001 involv~d Wlth pr~-\l/11. AddlUOfl,lly. th~ HDI' 
,igncd onto ACOTA !'SO lnming, WhICh mvt)],ed 2.249 BDF soldiers. Botswano did oot 
parnClp'l~ In ACRI dunng 1'",-9/11 yca'" so ,hi; matked a gre.t incte.", m military 
coope"juon. "1 b~ USG alw v"'ti}' Iflcrca,cd thc num bet ur mIlitary H IV/AIDS p~",onnel 
ptm' lolcol trnming It) 343 from 0 WIth th~ oddlt1on of DIl"'!'1' programming Arm; 
"uthon,al1on, and gum< were mcre""~d ,igtuficamly from $41.115.llOO (0 $142.J44.0I){). ~n 
almost tnpling of sale, (,e~ Table 54). Csmg tl,C,... nmnb""" to c.kula", arm, pet p~"'on valu~s 
within the HOI' p",Ju~~s a pre-9/11 figur~ of$4,112 p~r IID I: :;oldl~t ~n ol p .. ,,1-9/11 figur~ of 
$lO.9';1) pet soldier. which l' a major illcreas~. P~th"p' mo,t "g1l1ficant in thc milit~ry <cctot wa< 
the 'lgnlOg of th~ "."'c'lU1,ilJon .nd C",>,,-Sen"]C111g l\gre~mem" whIch opencd thc w.y fut 
much largcr coopeffltion bcrwe~n m.iJjuties. mdcilling flm"" SI.gulg, acei''' ror thc lJS(; lu 











!...o.w L'flfllr~~mL'flt and bord~rjtr:!flsportauon S~CUr1tr saw the gr~atest mcr~a,e, m 0,-=11 
tra,,"ng W1th law cnfllrccm~11t nsmg fwm 25 to a whopping (,(,9 and l",nkrjtro.nspotLation 
rl"lflg from 0 to 334_ Combmed, tho, mllvel< prc.9/11 !Taming ",Uos ffllm 1:92H 10 1 2(" ~ 
mal<S1V~ jump (,c~ Table 54). Law enforcement traIning for l-\Otl<wanan offic'al, """ added 
through two new programmes, FLETC and ." TA. 
The add,tion of border and trampottanon , ecurity ,~cror tra'ning v.-a, strongly Implemented in 
l-\or,wana as compared to other regiooal countne" noth CRP and ICE progranune twn~d farrl)' 
large number,; of p~rsonnd, Yd bt:rond th~ sh~eI numb~r of tramees, th~ dnlSJon to cOIIStru~t 
and opt:rate th~ [LEA w~, the gtcat~'t adwUIln til ,;ccuntr C<H'pcration, Th" can be 'een lfl lh~ 
$U.222,000 spent bu,[,ling and oper~t1ng the lU'.A m the p",,-9/[ I year" TIll. ha' and MU 
connnue to Increase American Influence m man)' security ,,,,,tors, 
LESOTHO 
W~,1c I .. ""th" ",creased the ,ize of lts nublar)" and police 
force, from 2,500 (LDF) and 2,400 (lJvIT'S) to 4,OOO(LDF) ond 
4,000 (LMPS) In the post-9/11 rL':In;, O\' ~ro.U USC; ,;e~untr 
~""tancc d~crea,ed_ J ",,,,th,, Wa" "n~ of five Southern A fncan 
nat;"ns t" ",e a d~ctea,e '" overall 'ecumy as",stance In th~ 
f'O,t-9/ll bloc"', TIll, was a result of a 34"', declme 111 nllmber 
of p~Illonnd tramed, pnmarilr In the m.ilit.ry sec[()r du~ to 
,\SPA ':!fl~""m . Dcsplle the dtop 111 numhen; "f pc",,,nnd 
tr~med. t"tal t~;unlllg expcnilltme mcrea,ed 4"'. from $jI9,OOO 
to 5331,000 (sec Table 55), Th~ one po,itlve devdopml'1lt w", 
111 Ia w ~nforc~ment tr:ll11lllg, which gre"-rly Inael.sed in f~w-~,_ 
PKE·9/11 ,'S, POST ·9/11 
SECLTRIIY COOPERA'fION 
LESO'iHO 
""'«0< PRJ': POS 0,', CIIANGE 
M" m " mm", 67" 
,ro 0 "- " 





, plu .. 100", 
'foul 2},1 , )' ,TI'flU' }~., 
,\R~IS " "- " n, m 1111 ph" " 
T.bk55 
Due to !..e",tho', refu,al to SIgn ~n .\ru~k 9R agr~em~nt with th~ USG, th~ numbt:r of military 
perw nnd ttained In ThiEl' dropped from 22R to 75, while the 1.01' lna~HN ill ''''~ from 2,500 
to 4,000, '11us ~hftng~d th~ dcf~nc~-tr~i1l1ng ral10 of 1: 43 to 1, 1(,()_ lvlil"'''-ry f-IIV ! AIDS 











"" ptc>10mly statcd, the law enforcement ,;ector cnlo)ed the grelle", growth In , ecunty 
couperaOlln as trallling numbers lun'ped ftum 6 to 79, ~ 1,217% 'nCtease (5ee Table 55). "Jrus 
~hanged th~ It.1Il11lg raUo ch~nge ftom 1:16(HJ to l. 200, a Inassive lmprovement. Borocr and 
Iran'portation ",uril}, J5"S1~nce was almost non-exhtcnt a, illS! one LeSDtlw ~U"tom, ~nd 
border officiOl w., prm'lded traJ..1ling as opposed to non~ dlIrlllg Ih~ pr,,-9 / 11 yc,,... 
MAl.eAWI 
:-'1abw. ",'as one of the five Southern Afn~an n,tiom [0 "'" an 
oWfllll decrcaS<" (3-1%) in sc~uri t )" ttaming de'pite large 
lll~reases 1ll law ~nforcem~nt trairung and arm,; authonsanons 
and gr,nts , I,\,'hat mak~s the lo"c, mOre Slg.niii~anr 15 that the 
~l1hta'!' and police fOfCe ",e" increa"ed ill Sl~e, The I>ID], 
Increased from 5,000 III 5,~~1 " .. htk pulK~ atl(1 other ,ecut11}' 
[or~~' qu.drupl~d from 1.500 to 6.000. Increases ill miImry 
and puk~ "Z~ brough, a It;9% illcrease ill orin, authomauons 
and grant' .... ,h,k toul traming expcnrutuf<" 111nca,~d I""t 1% 
("Cc Table 56), 
PRFr9/11 V'O . POST _9/11 
SIoCnUTY Cl>OI'hRATIUN 
~L\LAWI 
Sc<tm PRE M 'I, UIAN .. fi 
MIL " • ,runu' 32'.' 
,~ HC6 10 11 -"' 33" 
" " -- ", 
W " '" ",' 1'7,', 
BTS " - I~u, ]QQ'. 
T", .. ,I 193 I 1·\·' 0\1"'" '>4', 
ARMS 2172 "' plm ; ~ ,)'; ,M , u, 141' """"' 1 "; 
Tmal military tral1ling dtopp~d from 4-17 !o 303, With the loss in training and the Tabk 56 
l1letea'e in MDl' ,,",c, the tr. lfung raUo. shift~d [rom 1:4-1 to I: 7-1, 'lhe :\fDf' also 
participated in peace "'ppon ()perati()n, through ,\CRI and 1t " "u~~e'SOr ACar,\. although 
ther~ was a 330/. drop in number of petSOfind trainnl from 1,476 to 1,1111, The .Imp waS laTgdr 
Ix:ullse th~ gtwemment did no, budge! fur its pllrtion of .ACOr A training. The "tDl' 
""pcricn~ed a large ,nc,e.,e in rrulimry H IV /A 11)S asslst.nce ""th .~21 tolal pcrwnnd tn"llh txl 
In poM-9/ I I DHAPp programmlOS, Ihsed on the arm, aulhorisattuns a"d grant figute" the attn' 
dollat per wiruer 'penl pre-9/11 wo< $474 and almoSI tripled to $1,223 pet ",Idler po"t 9/11 
(sec T ,ble SG). 
\Vlth the ;nCtea""" 1t\ poke and utller security for~e m e, Malawi saw an ;ncreJ5e 1n la ... , 
enforcement and bottkr/'tan.'p<ltt,nul1 <e~lIrity trainlllg. Officials wen: rra;nl"d through thtee 










umefr."n~. BlIlk nlJ1nbt:" mcrt:",~d 1,4750 1, from 8 10 12(, (LE) ~nd 0 10 2 (IITS) (see Table 56). 
TI", led ' 0 , t,.~'mnjl; tauo moVe of l:750 10 l:lHH, wh ,eb"" m"rk"d 'mprov~m~nl.. MOSi 
concerning though is the utter LI ck of border and mmsponatJon ""cun~' traming ,nd a"i,tance. 
Given th~t .\Mawi h~< 2,881km of J.ordenng sutes; 700 kill of co"sthnc along lakes and rivers; 
fi,~ pons and two ml"nuuon,l airport>;, one would ~XpeCI Ih~ USG 10 I'tovid~ muc h mort: 
hd p. I':ven more worri",me;, Ihat the uSC; ha, ,tated that terronsm mfihfl<uon from Ta!l7anla 
" a pnmary seC\m~' conce'" m .Mala,,;, 
MOZAMBIQUE 
Wh il e Ihe mili tary :Urn,"'t halved from an e, lim. ted pre-9/11 
'lZe of 11,000 to 6,000 and the pohc~ and other .<~cunti' forces 
lllCI""",d shghu) from 11>,000 to 20,000 Mo>am bique rec~~'ed 
on" of I h ~ larjl;~"t mere.""" in .'ccutiti' a'"'"tance of any 
Southe t11 African n. uon, Ch--erall Ihere was a 198'''0 mcrease in 
"",,,bet of per,onnel trained . t~ bulk of wluch was 111 p~c~ 
.<u pporl operation" AddJu{)nally I h~r~ '-\"''< a J~e~pm ely I~rjl;e 
I'L'tce1ll.'jI;e ;netL,I'e ,n at1TIs aUlho{1sarions and gram, of 
23.~33n • . , ~lthough thai figure is ;nfl~ted hec~use Mozambique 
had only $3,000 m pre-9/11 ann> agreL"1llCm,. O,'eralJ trairung 
programme ~xpt:ndJrur" ",cr~a,~d .>401, from $H,BO,OIlIl I() 
PRE_'J/II .... POST"~/ll 
SE CURITY COUPER!. nU:>I 
M UZAMIIIQL1E 
&~ PRF M~ ".' CHANGE 
'"" '" 417 m._ • I'SO " 11.1 .. rJu' 11.1'(1(J"; 





, m mu, ,. 
T ",.1 '" liY I' " ' 191!'·< 
ARMS , 711 pi ,,, 2J9\1" 
no ! l "-' 'J.W pi ,,, W 
$13,466,0110 (see Tabk 57). T~bl •. ;7 
\Xlule sheer numbers of military tr:llillflli decr~a,;eJ fr()m 454 10 4.~7 , due 1.0 th~ d~cr"a,e 111 
FAD'\f SJze, the t r~tning ratio, , hifl"d ftom L % to L 55, ",h 'ch " 'luite ,igtufic:.lnl. 
AddJuonally. 1'",t-9/11 tr~111"'g aJded .lCl ·:T for J .... \ll~f SpcClal Forces. Mllim1)' tmming 
pw,.;ratntne expend!tu' e, incf("a,ed from $7.030,000 to $12,996,000. The USC also pro,;ded 
Imlnar)' HIV IAIDS framing fot 5.~ M,"am Lncan pcr",-,nnel. T he decLl'u\-ely la",e a'TIl' 
aulhons.t;om "'ere )UM on Increase from lust $3.000 dunng pre-9/11 years to a still stllilll 
$721,0(1) ,mhon,arion po-.t-9/11, A= 'were not " [rullor form of ""cun~' coopetatlOn hetween 












La",' ~"fot<;ement and bmder/tt:an'p')rtanon ""CUrlty trmung numbers mc=s~d from 16() t() 
256, "Ous led to an llllpro\'ed trammg rauo of 1:450 to 1:310, What j, wnc~-rn;ng rh'>ugh js that 
the number of per.;onnd ll"amed Ul the border and ttansportal1on 'eclltit,. ,~'ct')[ actually 
dropped fn)m 49 to ju.t s;~ (sec Table 57). (';"'en ,\lmambiqu,,' , 2,740km in co .. thn,,; 4,S71km 
in borders; 46()km of navIgable inland waterway' ; ,ix ports and ctght tnternational aIrpOrts one 
would expect a lot more in ~"lSmn"', 'lbe USG is flOt ma[c/ung its rhctonc of bein~ wncenleU 
abuut I\fo,ammcan wast",l and bonier patrol c.pabihty wllh non-ex;"cnt help. QlIit<.: ob,'w""]),, 
the l-SG is not taking border .nd transportanon security seriously, 
NAM IB IA 
Wlulc Namibia ,aw merea"" in the nllmocr uf personnel 
tramed in fnur of the five ,",curity sectors, wllh an ov"rail 
l1lcreasc of ~1%, thc dara ;, deo.:lVing. 'lbat L, beuusc 
i':amtbia's mihtary l1loeased ,n ,;7C fmm 9,000 tt> 16,000 and 
polIce forccs merea.ed by aIm,"t fivef"ld fwm 2,800 '" 12,500. 
Despite thc'e increase' m personnel, l\:amibia .Iso saw a morc 
than 5()% ,koe.'" ;" :Inns au(h"n,atlt>ns and grant, and a 
De'p"e t.hc 77% ;nc",a", m dx me "f the NDF, the l'SG 
milHa,.y trainmg dmpP"d from pre 9/11 level, of 454 to 437, 
PRE_9/11 " •. POSl'_9!ll 
~ECURIn COOPERATION 
NAMIBL\ 
s.:c'c.- PRE POS'11 '/' CHANGE 
M IL n, ", m""" IS"' 
~O , , e- ,-
N> , , rio" .m 
I.E " n, ,. 126..-'" BTS , , C" 7SOO'A 
Tnt~l 2·m " pO" ?n 
ARM~ nos " "'!fi\" ,> 
TIt$ 1:;\>3 "' ll""U' 16'.' 
1hi, was primarily duc '" thc fact that Kam,b", r~fused 't> "gtl an .\reide 98 Bilateral T.bk:;8 
Immmuty ,\grecmcm WIth the lTS and ,ubscquently It>" all milit"-')' fimding, It was 
al50 due to the oomplcei'ltl "f the USG de mmlng training programme (ltL\) fo, tI,C l\:DF, 
wh1ch had been, by far, the bigge.t esc; p,ogm1n1l1c in the count'!'. 'rhe combined result of an 
mCrea", in force "12e and reduced .-\mcncan ~'"'.tancc ,h,ft~xl tra11lm~ ",UOS fwm 1;79 to 1:146. 
'lbe 10 '" of IUE r fi11ldmg and n" jI,f A halvcd p'''t -9 I II ttafning exp=dmlIe to $878,000 from 
$I,59H,IXXl, Kanubia did siuit on pea"" , uPP',rt opcrat;otlS and;n the post-9/11 yean; optcd to 
SIgn "nr" the l\COT!\ tmming programmc. j\;o full b."alions or bngAde, were fuined Ifl p'>st 










~OUl1!~rp~rt.<, Whl~h mthcar~J great"r cooperation. Beyond traditional progrnmme" an addmoo.1 
46 MOl' health offio.]' were p""" .. h:d wuh t-/IVjAIDS rr~m'ng. up (rom ZLT<). 1-\","0 on th" 
rotal arms authonsations and grants pre-9/11 arms per ,oldler figure, wue ~t $196 and 
.leorAs"d to S53 po,I-'l/11. 
The po'I-'l/!! ,."o.n; .1"" Saw mne N~mil"an ",cun'y officIal, rr';n unJ"t t:S(; ,,"deat ,ecunty-
tra,ninS pTogrommL", Thl' wa.' faldy umque .munS'! Southern Afncan nal1o", and perhap' 
stems from N~rrubia', pubhc acknowledgetlknt of Illt"","! in fumr~ developm~m of a CIvilian 
nud"",. e"ergy cJpamy as well ~s lis ht}';" uramll1n J"f>"w~, Ir SL'Cm.< to be In Amenc"n ,ntetest. 
to uL",'dup rdatlonshlp. W1th NamibIan "nLTg)' offiCIals, 1f th1' Th the c~"e_ 
The l~w enforcement aruJ horocr/tr1!n'pon.tion ,ecunty ,,,eta,,, saw ",unbl" Iflcreases in 
number of personnel tnllll"d via CSG progrJtnme; ",hil" WCatly lflcttaS1!lg fnrc" Sl~e. The bw 
L'flfotCCmenl s~cror nmn1!lg 111ct"a""d fwm 13 to 177 and llTS lraining in<,.-re~""d (rom 1 10 79_ 
The BTS ""ctot hencfited th~ most due to NamIbian parricipanon in th~ Safe Skies for Africa 
programme, whIch prOVld~d mode" aVl:ltlon .eruflt)' training. Th" illcrea""s of forc" siz~ 
coupkd WIth inc",,,,,d USG sponsored tt:unmg Sh'(IL...! trainmg ratios from 1 :I!OO to 1.195, 
which IS qUlle a bu belt"r. ' In" uttL-r lack of cu.Mal security and cuHum., and bonler patrol 
;!SS,,,anCe pust 9/11 '" ver)' rrouf>long_.1 ,,,I three l'<am;blan om""l, were pro,~ded cuMotru; ~nd 
1mmtgr.tion tnl""rtg_ Given r-:mrul>1a' . 1,572 km of cOIlMline; two ports, and 3 inttllliltional 
:mports on" would think that bonlt:I and transportanon s~curity beyond aviauon is unportant, 
parllcularly whL'fl bom"r control~, a primary Am"ncan COncern 1!l Southern AftlCa. 
S.QlJTJ:i,~ERlCA 
\x'hiI~ th~ LTSG considt:IL"'! South Afnca 10 b" one of it" nuin '''''lItn} par-tn~rs on th" l\foC'Jn 
cOllunLlllm pte and pO'l9/11 run;, secunty cooper::"'on ckuly dropped po",-9/11 South 
African s~curit'i force .i7" remained ,,,niJar in the two penods dll" to ,nctta,eS 111 pollce fotee 
SiZe complementmg by a teduct;on of mdita!), "~e. 'Inc pr" 9/11SANDF' Il~d an L"umaIL...! 
acll,,, dut} ,tandmg fmce o( 73,500 with a pollee fotce uf 120.(}()()_ 1'0"1-9/11 th" SAKDF 
numbers dropped 10 57,000 ,md police S17e 1!lctused to 130.000 While oveull tno.1r11rlg 











1 !l9°"" ~, "'~' ">",",all tralOmg ""p."ndilut(· whKh in~rea.cd 92"1 •. South Afncm millwl"}' and oth~r 
",~urity officIal. participated ln 3D different trairung prognurune, in the P'"t 9/11 ),·al>. up 
from 22 in pre-9/11 r~a"" W1,i1e peace mpp'ltT opcrAI1"m and nuck~r 'CCllr1ty programme 
partKlp"TlOn mCr<·a<,.;,~ ~ll mllit~ry, I.", ,·nfmceITwnt. ~nd bmd~"T and Ttan'portatiOfl .ecunl), 
TrJining de~t( .. ",·,L l)C,pu,' that, S"uth Afn~~ ""~' th,' h",t "f ,c,·,·",ll:.s. mtiJtal"}- eur~lse. and 
10llled th~ State Partncrsh,p Program, 11mh help to cmmlcr the 10'" of over~l1 militaty traming 
yct do n"t makc up fut it 
Military training numbers ,k~rea.ed 48~/" Tn P'"t 9/11 yca" fTUm 2,2M) tu 1,184. n" wa, ,I",. 
to a 1o" ofll\lE'J' ftmdmg.llus mercased the truming ratio from 1: 13D to 1:193. Desplle a 1o •• 
"f g"n~rAI milit"t~ U-.w.ltllj;, the SANDF did cnlo}' a large merea", in military IllV / ,\IDS training 
and a,,,,bnc,, f"r lSS3 p.;rsonnel. Sollrh Afri~~ al.,-, incr<:~sed pt:a~e ,upport opcranon. 
coope,ation with th,· l :S(; by 16!lO% ",hen it Signcd onto th,· ,\COTA programme. 'J'raJjllllg 
numbct> lllcrcascd from 15 to 267. Also helpmg the milu"l}' 
and other ,e~l1rit" f"t",,, w~s ~ large 11\90/, lllcrease in anm 
aurhori,a1t"n, .nd grant" J)oll~r valll~' l11nL"s~d from 
$177, 16DJ~)) to $S I 1,51 7,IJOO, ,bpit<· the ~ancdling "f F"lS-
1\ ~nd /'tvl !' ,;rAnts du~ to South Africa's refusal tu sJgtl the 
BIlateral ltnmuntt}" A.':re"rn~nL 'nns ocnTIred largely on thc 
back of lal,!\" authori,ao'ltl in~tca,,·. '" it.h The l: .S, ~umm~tcIaI 
dden~~ industry. Based on the arm, data, thc arm, per ,,,Idler 
data .tuod ~t $2,410 ptt-9/1J and merea,ed d"'man~all}' to 
$8.974 P'",t 9/11 Another bright spur was Somh ,\f"can 
;ndu.i"n TO th,' St.,,· I'~ttn"",hjp I'to,;r.un wit.h th~ New York 
State Kallorlal Guard. Thi, allowed "'ltltinucd rnihtU\, 
PRE_9/11 ;". POST _9/11 
SECURITY CUOPERA TION 
SOIlTlI AFRICA 
Sa'"" PI<.E POSl ','. CH~NGr, 
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'i'I<.S "~~ I 12-10 ""' 92', 
T.ble 59 
c'ooperaUOfl <"'spite the negative I.tnpa~t "f the I"" "f f"dct~l rnilit:l.t} pro,;r.nune 
funding, 
One bnght spot wa, with n"deH scumt}" trwung, as Saud, .'>.["can offici,b ,nctca,,·d 
p~rl1upal1on in [;S(; progro.mme. by 784"" from 25 to 216. Given international conccm "'1th 











COl1"'~rp"rt", "" South Afnca (, one of the few countries ill AfrIca "mh nuclear 1~)wer. 
Continued interactIOn through exchange and ILaming n~~d, 10 h~ 0 I(lP priority for the L'SG. 
De'plt~ an incre->.,e m South Afncon I~\'i enforc~ment p"r>onnel dunng pmt-~/1 1 years, sccuntr 
c'K>pc~lion in the law enforcement and border and tnlnsportatlon security ' ~clo.-, dc-chnc-d 22", 
and Hi'I., respectIVely. nu, was ill Spll~ of more Ihan $i,OOO,(}(J() m <.htect law ~nf(lrcemenl. 
funding from Ih~ U.S. State Department', lc-JI. hureau_ Toral law enforcement trainmg numbers 
decreascd from 22(,(, t(l 17(,<) whik b(ltJet on" trarnportat](>n . ecurity numbers decreased from 
302 f.(l 3H_ Tog~ther, the"., ,kcreases coupled with an illCr~age in pohc~ fotce ,,,,e ch"n.<,,,,d 
tn1nlng ratJo.'l from 1,212 to 1:294. '\I;'hile cancellallon of mihtafl-- tr~1rl1ng ...,_,iM"nc~ w .. , the 
gtc"a1c.'t mis",k~ on America', p.n. more pmbkmanc Is the reducnon lfl these t\1m ,ectors' 
Itaimng. Sot"h Arnc" ne~J,; c(lntinu~d ""''"t''nc~ WIth a vanety of ,""cunty chall""ges, primMily 
", the law ~nforcemem sector and the L-SG shoulJ he off~nng mor~ a"'.'t~nc~_ 
SWAZIUND 
lksplIe a decrc-,.se in tt:I1n ,ng expenditure and a shght l!lcrease 
,n orlnS outhonsations, ,ecunt}' cooperntlon betwc-cn the USG 
and Swaziland l!l pre and post-9/11 y~ar.' t~m'lIl~J fauly ~'Tn 
Th~ USDF Jecre~.,ed ftom 3,000 to 2,700 "nJ p(lhce f'lrce' 
mc..,a",d fr(lm 2,SOO In 2,I:\U!J_ Spornored training decreased 
lH'!. "i:th" l arg~ dwp in USDF members tnllIted. However. 
making up for that wa, a vefl-' large mcrease mlaw ~nforc~mc~lt 
tral!llng. 
~1,I1tluy tra"" ng numner> dropped from pre-~/11 figures of 
233 W 60. Th" changed trairung ratios from 1: 51 to I: lKO, 
yuil~ ~ 10,,_ This was perhaps beca"-,,, both the JCET and ~L\ 
PRE_9/11 •• _ POST _9/11 
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ptD~.mmc.', WhlCh haJ proviJed (he greatest b,el of tIaml1lg, were absem m post-
9/11 years Swa7iland wa" provided with military mv / A IDS tr:urung and "sslSt:rnce for 5(, 
p","onnd ,n the post -9 / 11 years, which added ro ,,,-erall cooperation. It r~c~;,,-~J none pr~-9 / 11. 











help pOl' for m,ht",), U';UflIllg progr;ommes lnciudrng the HIV / l\IDS progntmme_ The post-'J/!1 
arm per . oldier figure is c"ln~at~d at $75, LIp [rom $IJ. 
I.aw "nfotc"m"nt ttmn;llg enj"yed the gr~aleSl 11lere",e in aid in the po,t-9/11 l'"ar< ""ith 
tfOining numbers 11lcreased by 54_,0,. , from n to 1411. D,,"p'tc th" sl1ghl· "," in numher of police 
forc,·,. the tnIlllllj; ratio inlptov"d fmm ]; 4_>5 to 1: 1(" a dtomoHc improvement. Only one 
1~'Hkr and !tan'port,"on ,""coot}' officiol wo , pt(,,;ded trairung po,t-9/11, up from zero. That 
"not" n:al improvement_ 
ZAMBIA 
Of "u Southern Africoo n"rions, Z"mbl" enloyed the greatest 
post-9/11l1lcrease ill s<'Cunty cooperation except 111 oord"r and 
tnn'plJrtauon ,enlIlty. ' Inese iner,,",e, Illciud"d an ovemll 
traming 111CH,a",: of 1 S5"'", up from 410 to 1 ,044; a (,4,,% 
111ere"-'" 111 anTIS ,\Jlho"""",n, ftnd gro.nts; ftod a 170"·', mcn",,' 
III trairung expcmhmre . • -\U of this occurred wIllie Zambia 
.kcrea",·d ZDF sue from 21,(,00 to 1 H,l 00 ftnd Idl its pI)h",' 
force 51'" at n.I~IO_ Zarnl"a is ckarir rnov"'g LIp '" Am .. T1can 
fftyoLIr ftnd "t<lU'gic lmpo,hlnce. 
'[b" number of post-9/1! ZDF personnel U'amed almost 
PRE_~/ll R POST_~/ll 
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'J'R\ 830 ::19 fI'" 1'<1'.' 
uOLIb!ed from _,132 to (,Vi 'lb" mai"nt} of the 111crea,e cam,- through th, It>!ET 
progmmm", whtch in~reft":u ZD[' pftnicipa,ion f'om 13.> to 4.';4. O",:mll ,h" oner,,"-," 
,htf'ed the training rao" from j: 22(, to 1- 114, a 1"8 lmpro",:m"llt_ Zamb,a ,,"', a!M' a maj"r 
.-c~tpien{ "f military IllY/AIDS 'n"non!,; "-' 44(, p~n;onnd wnt: inv"!v~d '" th" DIIAI'I' 
prog",mm~. Cnlike pr~ 'J/l1 reo'" wh~n th" ZDlc wo, not lIlv"iy"d W1th an) p"ace support 
"per,H, ,n' tnl1lling p'ogramm"" post 9/11 Zmnbia signn! onto ACOT A ftnd 2_, "ff'cia!, """, 
provided 11)]0,,1 tr,ming ond progt;Jrnm~ consulta" on_ 11", i, md'c;Ltive "f gH,atc' rr:ulitary 
confidence "nd ~o"per"o"n Wlth the USG_ ."', ""imng lIlcr,,,,,,,d d,,,ma,icalli', M' d,d arm< 











,c"cnfold to $22,3611,000_ Th" tTl~r~l>c tTlcrel,c, rh~ attn" p~r ,oIJi~r r"At'" of $139 ro $1.2.36. 
Cl.,.arly the USG;,; working to innst in the ZOF, 
Zambia als" " .. as pro\'i,kJ <jlilte a I>n of nudeat _'L-.;unly tr"~mull': for rhe fit_,t timc Juring post-
?/11 )'car:;. mostly through th~ ATA prograrrunc_ One hundred and thirty-four offiCIal, wcre 
provtded tmirung_ This demonstrates an Amenc:on corrunitment to educating parme," If! \V1-!O 
anJ counrcr-prohfeta,wn Jangcrs. 
Of any Zambian "c~unly ,ector, bw enfor~"mmt ,lW th" btgge" p,'rccnt3ge ~h.nge wnh ~ 
3.867"0 lncrea>e_ Post-9/11 tmirung numben; incre3,ed from 6 to 238. 'Ibi,., was due to large 
numbers of personnel m,-"Iv~d III FBI, OEA, and A'IF programmes, De.plle a big 
lmptovcm~nt III the la" .. enfo,,;ement sector. botJ~r anJ trA"_'p',tt:.l.twn _,ccunly ,uff~t~d ,,-1,,-,_, 
of 36"1 •. Trammg numb"", dccrea'cd ftom 22 to 14_ (k~,"llthe I~w cnfotc~m~m-t.raill'ng r"~I'" 
lIllprowd from 1:1.857 to 1:206_ 
ZIMBABWE 
Of .ll South,'m .A fncao o.oom, non,' 10", more ",'cun" 
coopenuon and a .. "tance l1l the po. ,-9/11 penod than 
Z,mbab,,'e. Tl-llS ",,'as due to , \merlcan sancUOns on all non-
humallltanan a"'''tanc~_ Z;mbab,,'C rLl>r~se"," the m".t 
dramltic ,Juft In ,d.oon, Wlth the' USC; from a JX>"1tl\~. do'~, 
and profe" lOnal one to ,-irmal "on-cXlstence, Th~ ,"ncnom 
calleJ for a WOO,, loss in military aid. arms authonsanoru;, ",,<I 
law cofot<;cm~ot tr~''''nK (ldJly cnough Z'mbab",~an offiClal-
.ltd puttclpatc l1l nucLu ;lOd om' borde, lnd tt1!n,pott.rion 
,,'wn!,}- progr.rnmc l1l th,' JX>, t-?/11 }'Clrs_ Zimbll",:t:", 
military- "7~ dccrca,cd from 3?()()() to 2'),000 
forcc, lllcreascd from l?,OUO to 21.800_ 
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\Vtth 3 100"'. 10" of nulitary- aid, thc number of ZDI ' per>onnd tn.mcd dropped from 355 to 2 











!mined were l1lvoh'ed with regtonal <errunar< with th~ ACSS_ As arm, ,ale. dropped the nms 
pet wld'et toU" t.!ccteo,ed from $67 to $0. 21mbabwc never participated in the military 
[-IlY / AIDS trnining ~nd aSSIstance programme. 
\'\'hile no /.imhahwean officiol, wer," mvolvedm nudeor ,ecurtty programmes l1l pre-9/11 years, 
as preyiously menUoned, Nro did participate in the OP and RBPp pro!,,,,,,,,me •. Thet~" no ea,y 
~xpl~nauon fnt the eSG', ~cUon. '~garding Ull' !r"~in111g. Zlmhah,,'e had the mOM to 10", and It 
c~,r..l1lly d.d. 
CQNCLl,iSION 
Bas~d on the data alx,,'e !! I< ro<,ihle to detetmln~ conectiv~ s~curitr c()(J~r~uon r~nking<. To 
determine tanking<, d,ta i< collected for L-~ch CDuntry in hoth the pte and po"t- ~/11 yL-~r, from 
three ",~as: military t""n,ng ratIO, police force< training r,rio, and atm, per soldl~"t tatio 
Counme8 can then he rankcd by th~:;.c figurcs to detcnnme whcre the pnonty for the USG was 
111 terms of <ecUl.ty ~ssi"ance. Based on the results, gcneuhsations can he made alxJUt th~ 
'mpott~nce of ~.,.ch country to the l:S(; "nd ~n ovetall tankIng c-..n he condlld~-J_ This tonk,ng 
can be t.!ctermined by adding up ,he ,p~"Cific nU1n<:rical tanking of an mdividua l country m oil 
three sectors and gctting a total number. The COUfitr,' tank totals are then compar~-d to 
determrne overall ranking'_ The country "1th the lowest total ha, the highe't prtomy. In 
dctennlmng th~ r,mkl1lg, ~ll th,~~ areas must h~ conSlden-ci ~gual in ItT1port~nce and for 
purpo'e,; oftlu, theSIs, th~"y ote_ The po,t. ~/11 t,ble rankmg 0['0 show,,, (1/_) and, nLltnbL"t 
",ithin each rankmg column. llus number m<hcates rankIng ch:mge from prc-?/11, whcthet the 
country has gal1led 0' lost III nnking munher. lJ.lllg thi, ')'Stem alio"" 0 more eV~"11-kce!ed VIew 
of "'gtonal a""i<t~nce rather than just lonklllg at raw numbers, which do not takc 'oto account 











pIIIr, • ." .•• . ~.'" " .. '.' " .~ ..... . 
I "",tho S .. ,",h ,\fti", lJo"Wl1U ~lih,,, , ~b], .. , S ...... ';h"d S.mth _ \Eti"" South AfrKa , S"" ... hnn M""mhlq"" ~!.",,,, Botsw.na , Numb .. )'bb .. , )..;"""1,,, :-':unJt.. T "hI. 6.1 
; 13""";",,, N,m,b,. Z"","', Sw:uu,,;d 
" Mn"ml~~u<' Il<,,,,,,",,,, 7.""h,bwe '\\OZlffiblqlO.' , S ... uth .-I.(",co I ".,,~lw .\n~b Lc""tho , /:om"'" Z.",h" .\!oz:unt.qu< Z.rnl", 
" fAmh,bw(' I-""b.b"", Sw",ll.JlJ Zunb.bv,c W , ,. \n ,,1. l..e><,tho ,\n ob 
Th~ pTe-9j 11 tonk",!;" "0' rtrnhiy 'lI11'nsing. with the ",",cepnoro of M ala"C1" ()yer~1l placmg. In 
relRtion to liS 'tn~l' ';'lC lI.blawl [~celved quite a good ~moum of m;ht~ry (tR",ing and ~ 
rea.unable amount "f law cnfor~etncnt ttam11lg. Due to 1\; c",,,,,stent p"311i,,~ In the top n~r of 
the three seetofl; " ,its at th~ tnp. Tr '" ~l.o unpott.m to note that Jl,bla",; " 'a" th~ onl~' ~()unl1'y 
to partlC1pate ttl the ACRl peace ,upport operauoll" t","'ing prngr.>nune ~nd th.t brought lrl 
more COlltRCt with thc l ;S(; Rnd helped J[ indJrecdr. South Africa would seem an olw,ou., clJ.olce 
ne.r the top gJV.., II. regJ(",al dominance; hU,,"'evcr 1l pro,e' "orpn,;111g that It r:mh near th<: 
houom tier Ul milimry trnirung ,,,,"tRnce re\a",'e to the Size of the SAKDF. Th.t ,,:., made up 
fot" 10 thc la",' enforccment -rr •. ming ""ctor Rncl in arms author"."on •. (Sec Table 6-') 
The po.t-9/11 rRnlangs qUIte dcarl) , how how ,ecunt;' cooperntiOll shifted ., Eo"",ana. 
/.~mh,a. ~nd :-..toz"mb1'luc enjoyed" jot mOTe ottenNon from the eSG. Despltc "lippmg onc 
placc in ,he ""crall r~nk111g frOln 1 to 2, Mal.W1 stoyed do"" tu thc top 10 po,;t-9/11 years. Thc 
most .tgnificant change "'a, South Afnc.'s 5 place ",'emil drop. l1ns WR" duc to. "lip from . n 
ilie"dy mediocre 7' place In pfc_~/l1 milit~r}' ... i,rance to 8'" pl"ce post-~/11 and an al.nnUlg 
8 pbce ilip 111 law enforcement Ira,,"ng. ThRt Nam1bi. and Lt",o tho shpped come" R" no 
"urpnse !?vcn theIr loss of milit'1)' Rs81"to~ce 10 thc po,t-9/11 ye~rB, ",ruch had mode up thc 
m~iority of 1',,-,-9/11 ",d . ."ngola may be ",,,ked 9'" oyc",ll. IU.'t ~ one-position illmp. hm it """s • 
• lung wtlh Z.mblJl.. the only CO'111tr)' to n"" ill the fRnkmK' 10 ner}' collllllfl. Zimb.bwes 




































Sou,h .Ifnc. ,\1.,],,,,, 
Zamb", Z"",b" T~hl< M 
~t.bwt MQ,.mbxl\·-
, \ ,,!;0I. Sw.tl~.md 
Mo,,,,,,b>qoc },:"",bo. 




j, IS ttas<>llable to conclude that lh,- ;'-,am b'a, :\1aIa",;. and \'I()zarnbi'lu~ po.t.9/11 positions at 
the top of the security COOP"r.lUOO tanking art: d l'" to n<ing krrorlSm concern, from Ea,j 
Afnca . Th~i' arc Ih~ gc()gr.>phjc~ll)' closest countrlc, 10 Tanzan'~, wllleh h,,-, a Slgll1finnt 1<1muc 
popul"UOll ~nd ha, rn,cn bc,ct b)- tcrtonst aCUv lty in ",cent years. ileyond that, all th"", nation< 
ha,·~ much hjgh~.- \Imlim popuianofl' than other SoUlhcm Afnc~o ru.I1OflS. ,\n estimated 20" '0 
of Mozambican anJ \bl~wi"n CllIZens atc :\1 ""tim, of ,,;h,"h ,b~ ""-" majomy are Sunru, W1ulc 
Z~rnbM may only ha\'c ~ 5°'. ]l,[uslim population, It horm'," T anzan", Mabwi, and ll'[ozamb,'luc 
all of ,...Inch h.vp Slgnll'c"1lI I.lamie fl'Opulations.''' It ;, no coincl<kncc ,hat Am~ri,", is 
,nct~a';n!,: a,d 10 rCglOfl" .... ith gr"""ng 1"1"",," ",nliCnc~. 
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ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM STATEMENT 
I¥ere the 9/11 temm'st attacks on the United States a catafyJj jor c!ynami.· .hange in the Jecuri[y relationship 
between the United States and Southern /~frica? Do the quantitative meew/re.r show (/ change or not? 
The empirical data collected in the course of preparing this thesis does indeed seem to 
demonstrate that the 9/11 attacks led to a change in the security relationship shared between 
America and Southern Africa. That being said, it would imprudent to believe that 9/11 is the 
only factor in increased security cooperation. One can point to tangible evidence of the increase 
in the number of U.S. sponsored training programmes, as wells as the increase in African 
security and defence officials trained, and defence article and arms support. However, in reality 
the increase in U.S. aid is paltry for a region the size and scope of Southern Africa. One only has 
to look at what other regions are being provided for comparison, For example, through FMF 
financing, the entire 10-country Southern Africa region received $17,051,000 in the post-9/11 
years. In the same period East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, and uganda) received more 
$27,573,000193 in FMF assistance. Sure, one can claim that comparing Southern Africa and East 
Africa's security situation is like comparing apples and oranges, as both Kenya and Tanzania 
suffered AI-Qaeda linked terrorist attacks, but that sort of disparity is quite telling. Regardless, 
the uSG appears to be more engaged in Southern African security as a result of its heightened 
global security awareness and resultant foreign policy practices. 
The data also suggests a newly dominant approach to post -9/11 lJS security cooperation with 
Southern Africa. With military spending declining dramatically; large increases to INL, ATA, and 
ILEA funding; and tremendous growth in the number of law enforcement and border and 
transportation security training programmes offered, one can conclude that the uSG is handling 
security cooperation and the Global War on Terror in Southern Africa with a criminal justice 
approach. This is a dramatic departure from what one might expect, but it makes perfect sense. 
Post-conflict nations are in dire need of improved law enforcement capability, much more so 
than the need for military growth, particularly in a region with bloated and underfunded 
militaries. 











Since 9/11 the USG has had to cultivate new and closer intelligence relationships across the 
globe. By building those relationships and networking with Southern African police and other 
security forces, American officials stand to gain greatly in terms of intelligence collection, 
information sharing, and joint-investigation. By focusing on criminal justice, the LJSG stand~ to 
gain the most, at a lower cost, and in a shorter period of time. 
Other Factors Affecting the Post-9/11 Security Relationship 
Beyond the USG's enhanced focus on global security ill the post-9/ 11 world, its military 
relationship with Southern African nations has been dramatically affected by the passage of the 
American Servicemembers' Protection Act in August 2002 which prohibits the United States 
from providing military aid to countries that have ratified the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). While provisions exist for waivers to the loss of military aid, such as a 
presidentially-decreed national security waiver or the signing of a Bilateral Immunity Agreement 
between the USG and other nations, several Southern African countries opted not to establish 
bilateral immunity for military personnel. These included Lesotho, Natnibia, South Africa, and 
Swaziland. They suffered dearly by losing IMET and FMF funding. This has certainly resulted in 
squandered goodwill in the early post-9/11 years and diminished the USG's ability to achieve its 
stated regional objectives. 
Continuity of Pre and Post-9/11 Influences 
With most Southern African countries in some stage of post-conflict, LJSG security policies have 
remained largely committed to prominent pre-9/11 influences, most significantly through 
building indigenous de-mining capabilities, growing African military peace support operations 
capacity, and offering professional military training. 
While the majority of regional de-mining assistance came in the pre-9/11 years, most notably in 
Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe, the USG did not abandon efforts post-9/11. 
Mozambique and Namibia continued to enjoy USG support in this security sector, as the LJSG 











been most richly rewarded ill Mozambique and across the reglOn as mine danger has been 
dramatically reduced. 
While America's pre-9/11 ACRI peace operations programme was more or less a disaster, 
America's commitment to building African PSO capability through the post-9 III ACOTA 
programme has proven to be much more effective in assisting Southern African nations. Many 
more have signed onto the programme, indicating that governmental hesitation towards greater 
PSO training has waned. Maybe nations are less leery of eSG intentions, or perhaps as the A e 
become more involved in African and eN peacekeeping missions, under-budgeted Southern 
African governments recognize a need for external sources of training and equipment, which 
ACOTA provides. 
Pre-9 I 11 security rhetoric from the USG clearly defined a commitment to the professionalism 
of African militaries as one of the primary security goals in the region. TIlls was primarily done 
through the IMET programme. As seen in the course of this thesis, however, post-9/11 IMET 
participation decreased for every country except Angola, who had been largely restricted from 
IMET training due to the civil war. Since the eSG has continued to stress the enhancement of 
professionalism in Southern African militaries, why of the five security areas outlined in this 
thesis, has only military training decreased - by a whopping 35% (See Table 45)? TIlls cannot be 
blamed solely on South Africa, or any the three other nations (Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia) 
who refused to sign a Bilateral Immunity Agreement with the eSG. One only has to view the 
post-9/11 American approach to security sector reform in Liberia, Afghanistan, and Iraq to see 
that professional military and police force training is the CSG's policy lynchpin to stability, 
security, and reform. The dramatic reduction in regional military training clearly calls into 












CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The comparison of the pre and post-9/ 11 security cooperation data undisputedly shows that the 
USG is taking Southern Africa far more seriously as a security partner in the post-9/11 era. It 
firmly demonstrates that the USG is starting to make a commitment to help improve the 
fundamental aspects of defence and law enforcement within state security institutions. The data 
proves that the vulnerability felt by the USG after the 9/11 attacks has resulted in a shift in 
policy, resource allocation, and urgency. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
]y the United JtateJ Jafir in the POJt-9 / 11 yean becauJe f!f the changeJ it haJ made to j'ecuri!J aJJiJtana' in 
Jouthern Africa? 
To answer the first question one must balance security cooperation with U.S. national strategy in 
the region. The U.S. Secretary of Defense's Office of African Affairs" which is charged with 
defence strategy and policy in Africa, outlines the basic assumptions of security interests in sub-
Saharan Africa as: 
(l)U.S. security interests are linked to the elimination of terrorist networks, strategic port and 
airfield access, open sea lanes of communication, and critical natural resources (energy); (2) 
vulnerable states create threats to U.S. interests because they are attractive environments for 
terrorists, and can lead to proliferation and crime; and (3) many African nations are willing to 
. 194 help, but they need assistance. 
In addressing the first point, if elimination of terrorist networks are a security goal, then surely 
the increase in relationship development between USG and Southern African intelligence, 
military, law enforcement, energy, and border and transportation security officials is buildmg 
cooperative networks to combat the terrorist threat. USG lawyers have helped Southern African 
194. United States Administration and Defense POliLY for Sub-Saharan Africa, Office of the Secretary of 











governrnents draft counter-terrorism legislation, hosted counter-terrorism training programmes 
such as the A TA, and offered several counter-proliferation programmes. Ibere was a large 
increase in counter-terrorism cooperation occurred in post-9/11 years. 
In terms of strategic port and airfield access the CSG signed several "Acquisition and Cross 
Servicing" agreements with South Africa, Botswana, and Mozambique, which opens up logistics 
cooperation between strategic nations. Additionally, the CSG has established a series of 
Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) across the continent including in Namibia and Zambia. 195 
These CSLs are described by the USG as "a host-nation facility with little or no permanent FS. 
personnel presence, which may contain pre-positioned eqwpment and/or logistical 
arrangements and serve both for security cooperation activities and contingency access."I96 They 
are designed, 
"to help partners meet the challenges of ungoverned and under-governed areas. A series of 
Cooperative Security Locations to enhance regional training, help African states build counter-
terrorism and counter-narcotics capabilities, and provide contingency access. They will be 
rotationally manned by C.S. troops and will come from host-countries' pre-existing inventory of 
military facilities. They will remain host nation property and C .S. forces will be tenants. '!be idea 
here is presence without permanence.,,197 
As far as open sea lanes, there is not much of a threat to Southern Africa at the moment and 
some small assistance has been provided to coast guards. Beyond that, permanent American 
navy ship deployments along the West African coast are designed to deter maritime threats along 
the weak West Coast while the South African navy can control its coast and work with 
Mozambique. 
FS. assistance in law enforcement and border, nuclear security, and border and transportation 
security has been increased to better combat the threats of crime and proliferation. Ibe United 
States is safer because of its efforts in Southern Africa. 
195 Scheinmann, Gabe. "AFRICOM: A New American Military Command," Policy Watch #1259, Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, I 0 July 2007 at www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2635 
196 Strategic Theater Transformation. United States European Command. United States Department of Defense 












Is post-9/ 11 Southern AfritLl more secure betLluse if USC security pol try? 
Southern Africa is more secure as its security relationship with the USG has grown. For decades 
the militaries, police forces, and other security services have been under-funded, overworked, 
under-equipped and trained, and quite corrupt. The USG and Southern African governments 
know that development depends on security. Internal instability dUl~ to high crime, drugs 
trafficking, or unhappy military forces affects national growth at all other levels including in the 
health sector, economics, and education. Societies must feel secure and protected in order to 
flourish. As USG assistance to the region has increased, particularly at the law enforcement level, 
the strength, professionalism, and capability of the indigenous security apparatus has grown. 
That in tum results in a trickle down effect of allowing other important civil sectors to improve. 
There is no question that there is a long way to go and that Southern Africa will need increased 
security aid in order to become a strong security partner of the USG and to better handle 
regional and continental responsibilities and threats, but movement is in the right direction. 
Have post-9/ 11 USC securiry a.fJiJiance polides been adequate? 
While the USG has made improvements in security assistance to the ref~on by increasing aid at 
all levels, it still is not doing enough. In the military sector, the decision to rescind IMET 
funding and government-to-government arms grants and sales has been terrible. Not only has it 
angered and alienated African militaries, but by punishing rather than working with fragile 
security establishments, the USG degrades its chances of meeting regional goals. The alienated 
military structures view the USG as bullying, mercurial, and a wavering partner. Trust is what 
needs to occur, not the dismantling of relations. If the USG is not involved with military sectors, 
then other competing powers will fill the void, the most obvious being China which is rapidly 
developing relationships with African governments. In order for the l~SG to achieve security 
goals, which primarily involve influence over African defence, it must prove to African 
counterparts that African interests are a priority, not purely American needs. The U.S. military 
must build friendship, cultural understanding, and assistance in order to be effective. Increasing 











Improving security relations means increasing interaction between American and African 
security officials and military personnel. To do this the L~SG must work to improve its training 
ratios, focusing on military size and need. For example, a country like Angola, which is poised to 
be a major regional player, needs a whole lot more attention than it has been given. To train just 
1 of every 5,926 FAA personnel is shocking and dangerous. Therefore, in the military sector the 
L:SG should provide Article 98 waivers for all countries in Southern Africa, increase training 
program expenditure for senior leadership at the ACSS and with mid-level enlisted and officer 
staffs via IMET, jCET, ALP, etc. Annual training ratios should be at approximately 1:25 military 
members. 
In the law enforcement sector, INL funding needs to be increased to bring ICITAP and 
OPDAT lawyers to each country on an annual basis to assist in judicial and legislative 
development, as well as in police force development. Again, this needs to be scaled to police 
size. Like the military sector, an optimal training ratio of 1 :25 should be worked towards, 
focusing on a train-the-trainer concept. Law enforcement is perhaps the most immediate need 
for internal security in Southern Africa given high crime. The lJSG was right to significandy 
increase law enforcement aid as well as bring on the ILEA, but more can and should be done. 
'The ACOTA peace support operations programme seems to be well-managed and quite well 
responded to. However, it is held back by a lack of ability of .African governments to pay for 
their portions of the training events. Given that funding is the primary reason the programme 
does not always occur on schedule, the lJSG should allocate enough money in its annual 
ACOTA budget to cover all costs including equipment. It is nice that the lJSG offers the 
training, but if it is not conducted due to financing then neither side gains, in that the African 
military capability does not improve and the lJSG does not get to further its goals of enhancing 
indigenous peacekeeping capacity. 
Nuclear security training is fairly well-managed; however the lJSG should provide trammg 
annually for at least a few officials from each country rather than a few scattered countries. If 
energy officials in each country are better aware of counter-proliferation or defence programs 
within nuclear security, as well as gaining professional knowledge and developing relations with 











Border and transportation security is woefully inadequate. Most of the rhetoric from the LSG 
discusses a need for much greater border and coastal security, due to the porous nature of the 
region. In four years just 571 customs, coast guard, and border officials were provided training. 
Clearly, this is counter-productive. The LJSG must get significandy more engaged in assisting 
countries develop border and customs security. This should be achieved through much higher 
offerings and participation in training programmes as well as quite a bit more equipment 
donation, particularly coast guard and navy vessels for ocean, river, and lake operations. 
The biggest problem with overall security assistance is that lJSG agencies are seemingly unaware 
of what other lJSG agencies are providing. A great example of this came through in a 
conversation held with a U.S. military lawyer working with the Defence [nstitute of International 
Legal Studies, an office funded through IMET, which provides a variety of training for military 
and MoD personnel. The lawyer I spoke with focuses on military and peacekeeping legal training 
in Southern Africa and I asked him if he was familiar with the ILEA-G and if he ever 
coordinated training there. He had been in his position a year yet had never heard of the ILEA. 
USG agencies seem to be competing for influence in African nations rather than working with 
other agencies to coordinate and design appropriate training programmes which do not overlap 
in substance or style in order to provide a better product. 
[-las the US poliry to mind military aJJistant:e funding and programmes for non-Bilateral Immuni!J Agreement 
signmproven harmful to US regional poliry aims? 
When countries refuse to sign Bilateral Immunity Agreements with the USG, they lose funding 
and support for programmes such as IMET, FMF, and EDA which provide military to military 
training and arms grants. Such programmes are described by the USG to be, 
"Foreign Military Financing, the U.S. government program for financing through grants or loans 
the acquisition of U.S. military articles, services, and training, supports lJ.S. regional stability 
goals and enables friends and allies to improve their defense capabilities. FMF helps countries 
meet their legitimate defense needs, promotes U.S. national security interests by strengthening 
coalitions with friends and allies, cements cooperative bilateral military relationships, and 
enhances interoperability with U.S. forces.,,198 
198 Defense Security Cooperation Agency Website. 











By defmition alone, a policy restricting security aid is clearly counter-productive to regional 
objectives. Most significantly, it stopped South Africa's FMF allocation, which led to a dramatic 
drop in professional training and support for arms and defence articles. GSG logistical support 
for the SANDF in AG and other peacekeeping missions was affected by the loss of funding, as 
G .S. General Bantz Craddock stated to Congress, 
"Due to ASPA sanctions we are no longer able to provide spare parts or training under the FMF 
program. One consequence is that now South Africa no longer has the capability to transport 
African Gnion peacekeepers into Darfur and other peacekeeping missions in Africa. As a result 
the G.S. and other allies must provide air transport at great COSt.,,199 
South African military staff, particularly cadre and senior NCOs who may have benefitted 
through professional military training for peace support operations certainly suffered. Even 
senior GS military and diplomatic staffs have decried the Bush Administrations' policy, 
"The Bush administration and Congress have slashed millions of dollars of military aid to 
African nations in recent years, moves that Pentagon officials and senior military commanders 
say have undermined American efforts to combat terrorist threats in Africa and to counter 
expanding Chinese influence there ... Some cite this as a case where the unintended 
consequences of the go-it-alone approach to foreign policy that Washington took after the Sept. 
11 attacks affected the larger American efforts to combat terrorism.,,2I)O 
Have SOllthem African nations maniplliated the USC to provide more than perhaps what i.f needed IInder the 
gttiJe ~r the "Cloballfar on Terror" aJ ma'!y other wtJntneJ eUTOH the globe helve? 
Throughout the course of gathering data for this thesis, only two countries requested specific 
security training above and beyond what had been offered by the GSG- Malawi and South 
Africa- and both were post-9/11. Malawi wanted criminal justice support for anti-corruption 
programmes and South Africa requested general support for criminal justice issues and extended 
military medical training through ACOTA. This very minimal level of assistance requests 
indicates that Southern African countries are more hands-off than countries in other regions of 
the world and do not seem to be demanding much more than is being offered by the DoS. 
Admittedly, Southern Africa is not a known hotbed of terrorist activity and is relatively stable, 
which means that perhaps it has less need, or less influence in gaining more from the GSG. 
199 U.S. Congress. House. Armed Services Committee. Statement of General Bantz J. Craddock, USA, 
Commander, United Stated European Command 15 March 2007 












Does USC security assistana: in Southern Afril-LI demonstrate that Ameri(a has embra(ed and enaded an 
amoral Realist type foreign poli~y, as it haJ' iften been aa:tmd qfglobalfy, post- 9/ 11 ? 
Hans Morgenthau stated, "Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applted 
to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered 
through the concrete circumstances of time and place.,,21l1 That being said, many American 
critics have levied claims of an amoral Realtst approach to foreign poltcy by the USG since 
President George W. Bush uttered his famous, "You're either with us or against us in the fight 
against terror" phrase in November 2001. Data in this thesis demonstrates that the USG is not 
engaged in an amoral Realist foreign policy agenda (at least in Southern Africa); most 
significantly in the way it has isolated Zimbabwe and curtailed all security assistance. The USG 
has even referred to Zimbabwe with fairly damning rhetoric as one of six: "outlaw states" and as 
one of the world's few "outposts of tyranny" in company with Cuba, Bmma, and Belarus.2llz 
Zimbabwe is a well-known disaster with half the population facing the threat of famine, inflation 
up 150,000%203, hundreds of thousands of people displaced, 80% unemployment, and rule of 
law replaced by the arbitrary and brutal rule of self-appointed eltte. By denying security and other 
government-to-government assistance to Zimbabwe, the USG has made poltcy decisions based 
upon moral grounds. As the government of Zimbabwe continues to tert"Orise the majority of its 
population, the USG has refused to continue to train or arm the miLitary and other security 
forces, in order to avoid indirect complicity in the brutalisation of the Zimbabwean population. 
In this case, the USG is holding the Zimbabwean government accountable for its actions, and 
can hardly be accused of amoral Realism. 
Additionally, a reV1ew of my post-9/11 rankings shows that the highest regional security 
priorities for the uSG are neighbours of Zimbabwe- Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, and 
201 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle/or Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, (New York: 
Alfred Knopf), 1978 
202 "Condolezza Rice Says Zimbabwe an Outpost of Tyranny," www.newzimbabwe.com. 03 November 2006. 











Mozambique, with South Africa not far behind (see Table 64). It might even be argued that 
those nations rise in security assistance rankings could be linked to the problems in Zimbabwe, 
as an insurgency or humanitarian crisis would affect them most directly. 
If, as Hans Morgenthau said, "We are able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, 
having judged them in this fashion, we are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the 
interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own,,204 then the LJSG 
has demonstrated in Southern Africa that it is basing its security policies with some level of 
moral consideration. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY STUDIES-SCHOLARS 
Security Studies scholars, particularly those concerned 'with Southern Africa on the regional or 
country-to-country level should use this data to expand understanding of CSG operations and 
influence on the continent and the region. This thesis opens up information on the scope and 
types of security programmes the USG operates in Southern Africa and even around the globe. 
Many of the programmes on which data has been collected are not in mainstream focus, 
particularly in non-military sectors. Hopefully scholars also see an opportunity for further 
research on CSG criminal justice efforts in the region, particularly in relation to the Global War 
on Terror. 
The data presented should also help scholars compare a changing A C and SADC security 
architecture to fluctuating CSG influence and support, which undoubtedly will be influenced by 
l~SG policy. This thesis should also serve as a model for security assessment in other regions of 
the globe, which may also have been overlooked since the beginning of the Global War on 
Terror. African security scholars should also take close note on shifting CSG assistance levels as 
Chinese influence grows on the continent and as the Zimbabwean situation changes or worsens. 
204 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle/or Power 












To combat the assistance overlap, competition between agencies, and overall monetary waste, 
my main recommendation is to the LJSG and involves coordinating all security assistance from 
every federal agency operating in Southern Africa under the new u.S. African Command 
(AFRICOM). I propose that AFRICOM designates one of its primary command branches as 
SECURITY ASSISTANCE. 
A senior military officer will command the SECURI1Y ASSISTANCE branch with a deputy 
from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). SEClJRJTY 
ASSIST ANCE will be broken into geographical regions, one being SOlJTHERN AFRICA. This 
regional branch will be run by a senior military officer with permanently assigned representatives 
from the following U.S. federal agencies: Department of Defense, Bmeau of INL, Diplomatic 
Security, Department of Justice, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, and 
USAID. These federal department representatives will coordinate international training from all 
agencies within their department. For example, the DoJ representatJIve will coordinate with 
OPDAT, ICITAP, ATF, DEA, and FBI international training programme managers. They will 
work with local embassy representatives, host nation security officials, and offices in Washington 
D.C. to determine training needs, develop budgets, and most importantly coordinate 
departmental and interdepartmental training with the other representatives. 
Doing this will centralise training and keep all agencies informed of what their USG partners are 
involved in. Working together rather than blindly and separately will vastly improve efficiency, 
resomce allocation, and quality of relations between the USG and Southern Africa. In addition, a 
liaison from the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation should be 
permanently attached to the SOUTHERN AFRICA branch. This liaison would act as a go-
between between the SADC, AFRICOM, and individual nations on matters of security co-
operation. 
As far as future security cooperation is concerned, based on the pre vs. post-9/11 rankings in 
Chapter Four, the countries at the top of the post-9/11 rankings should not be tembly 











less assistance because South Africa has a strong defence infrastructure in place and in theory 
needs less help. That being said, the significant decreases in international training and exchange 
are worrisome. Of perhaps any country in the region, the USG should be ever expanding its 
relationship with South Africa. It is the regional hegemony and therefore needs requisite 
attention. That Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique bettered their positions is good news, and 
that Zimbabwe remains at the bottom is no small surprise. However, here is no question that 
Angola must be brought towards the top of the ranking list. Angola did not receive nearly the 
attention it now warrants given its rising power in Africa and the size of its military. The USG 
should not discount Angola and efforts need to be significantly increased. 
In summation, the united States has a unique opportunity to assist a region in need, and forge 
bonds in a part of the world largely ignored and underdeveloped. Given its status as the world's 
lone superpower, the United States has a responsibility to protect itself and like it or not, other 
parts of the globe. Southern Africa is a region which in future years will be of great importance 
to the United States, not only due to the power of the rising South, but also because of energy 
security, a potential implosion in Zimbabwe, the HIV / AIDS epidemic, and rising anti-American 
sentiment throughout the globe. In Southern Africa, the United States has eager partners willing 
and wanting to learn and enjoy the fruits of a strong partnership. It is up to the United States to 
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APPENDICES: SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS 
APPENDIX A 
AVIATION LEADERSHIP PROGRAM (ALP) 
The ALP is an U.S. Air Force-funded undergraduate pilot training programme for students from 
less-developed nations, deemed to be friendly to the U.S. Training generally includes pilot 
instruction, English language training, and as well as programmes focusing on the democratic 
institutions and social framework of the U.S. Included in the costs of the programme are 












INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDGCATION AND TRAINING (IMET) 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) pays for the training or education of 
foreign military personnel and a limited number of civilians. IMET grants are given to foreign 
governments, which choose the courses their personnel will attend. The goal is to improve the 
ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defence articles and 
defence services obtained by them from the ES., with maximum effectiveness, thereby 
contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries. 
Once a country detennines its training needs and a funding source is designated, the Service 
International Training Agencies process the training requests. Course options include amongst 
other things: English Language Training, professional military education, management training, 
postgraduate education, and operational and technical training. These programs cover hundreds 
of topics and skill areas required by both international military officers and enlisted personnel 
and civilians. Courses also cover special emphasis areas as defence resources management, "rule 
of law" and other training that exposes international students to the ES. professional military 













JOINT COMBINED EXCHANGE AND TRAINING OCE1) 
The JCET programme involves sending small u.s. Special Forces teams overseas to work with, 
or to train with, foreign militaries. The average JCET group is comprised of 10 to 40 troops, 
though groups can include as many as 100. Missions range from training, advising, and 
organisation of foreign groups for unconventional warfare to training coalition forces for 












REGIONAL CENTERS FOR SECuRITY STuDIES (RCSS) 
The Regional Centers' mission is to enhance regional security by building sustained and mutually 
beneficial relationships; fostering regional cooperation on security issues; and promoting 
effective communications and strategic capacity through free and candid interaction in an 
academic environment. Programmes take place both in Washington, DC and within Southern 
Africa. Southern African military and MoD leadership attending RCSS programmes have gone 
to the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany (GCMECSS) and 
more recently, at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) in Washington, D.C. 
AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STL~DIES (ACSS) 
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports the development of u.S. strategic policy 
towards Africa by providing high quality, relevant academic programs, fostering awareness of 
and dialogue on FS. strategic priorities and African security issues, building networks of 
African, American, European and international military and civilian leaders, assisting FS. 














REGIONAL COMBATING TERRORISM FEU~OWSHIP PROGRAM (RCTFP) 
The Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) is a u.S. DoD 
security cooperation tool that provides education and training to international security personnel 
as part of the U.S. global effort to combat terrorism. Section 2249c of Title 10, U.S. Code 
authorises the Defense Department to use up to $20 million per year "to pay any costs 
associated with the attendance of foreign military officers, ministry of defence officials, or 
security officials at United States military educational institutions, regional centers, conferences, 
seminars, or other training programs conducted under the Regional Defense Combating 
Terrorism Fellowship Program." The RCTFP is focused on strategic and operational level 
combating terrorism education and training for mid-level to senior-level foreign military officers, 
MoD officials, and security officials with counter-terrorism responsibilities. 1be goals of the 
programme are to build and reinforce the combating terrorism capabilIties of partner nations; to 
build and strengthen a global network of combating terrorism experts and practitioners 
committed to participation in support of U.S. efforts against terrorists and terrorist 












MILITARY TO MILITARY CONTACTS PROGRAM (MCP) 
The MCP programme maintains a team of lJ.S. military personnel within the Ministry of 
Defence for selected countries, to facilitate dialogue of requirements for defence management 
appropriate to democratic societies. These military liaison teams help in the creation of 
Travelling Contact Teams with expertise in specific functional areas. The information provided 
by the team is tailored to the host nation's particular needs. In addition to use of the contact 
teams, the objectives of the MCP may be accomplished through the use of familiarisation tours, 












NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM 
This programme links U.S. states with partner countries for the purpose of supporting the 
security cooperation objectives of the Combatant Commander, in Southern Africa's case this 
would be the u.S. African Commander (AFRICOM). The programme's goals reflect an 
international affairs mission for the National Guard (NG) using the unique civil-military nature 
of the Guard to interact with both active and reserve forces of fon:ign countries. The State 
Partners actively participate in a host of engagement activities from bilateral familiarisation to 
training exercises opportunities, fellowship-style internships, civic leader visits, and medical 
events. All activities are coordinated through the Combatant Commander and the U.S. 
Ambassador's country team, and other agencies as appropriate, to ensure that National Guard 
support is tailored to meet both U.S. and country objectives. 
The value of the SPP is its ability to focus the attention of a small part of DoD-a State 
National Guard-with a single country or region in support of USG policies. This concentrated 
focus allows for the development of long-term personal relationships and a mechanism to 
catalyse support from outside the DoD, which otherwise would not occur but nevertheless 












MINE ASSISTANCE (MA) 
'lbe I\1ine Assistance .(I\1A) programme assists countries that are experiencing the adverse affects 
of uncleared landmines and other explosive remnants of war. Activities include FS. military 
training of host nation defence and law enforcement forces on de-mining operations as well as 
equipment donation. Occasionally funds are used to contract civilian de-mining companies to 












DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HIV / AIDS PREVENTION PROGRAM (DHAPP) 
The DoD HIV / AIDS prevention programme was established in FYOl as a way to fund, treat, 
and educate African militaries in HIV / AIDS prevention and treatment. HIV / AIDS is deemed 
by the uSG to be affecting the readiness and national security of allied African nations due to 
the high rates of infection in military personnel. Many militaries are experiencing readiness 
problems due to high rates of morbidity and mortality among their personnel. The u.S. Navy 












FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) / FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING (FMF) 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme is the government-to-government method for selling 
l~ .S. defence equipment, services, and training. A military buying weapons through the FMS 
programme does not deal directly with the company that makes them. The U.S. DoD serves as 
an intermediary, usually handling procurement, logistics and delivery and often providing 
product support and training. 
Foreign lvIilitary Financing (FMF) refers to congressionally appropriated grants given to foreign 
governments to ftnance the purchase of American-made weapons, services and training, 
Congress appropriates FMF funds in the International Affairs Budget, the U.S. DoS allocates the 
funds for eligible friends and allies; and the U.S. DoD executes the programme. According to 
the Defence Security Cooperation Agency, "FMF helps countries meet their legitimate defense 
needs, promotes U.S. national security interests by strengthening coalitions with friends and 
allies, cements cooperative bilateral military relationships, and enhances interoperability with 
C .S. forces.,,2I1s FMF grants are often used to fund FMS arms sales. 
205 United States Department of Defence. Office of the Secretary of Defence. Defence Security Cooperation 












DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES (DCS) 
The U.S. Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programme regulates private U.S. companies' overseas 
sales of weapons and other defence articles, defence services, and military training. unlike f'MS 
sales, direct commercial sales are negotiated directly between the foreign government and the 
u.S. arms manufacturer without the Pentagon serving as an intermediary. DeS purchases avoid 
the surcharges for U.S. government administrative costs that are levied on FMS sales. DeS sales 
are usually quicker than FMS, as they avoid much "red tape" associated with the government-to-
government programme. DCS are also less transparent than FMS; some buyers are attracted to 
the programme's relative lack of reporting requirements. Governments that have more 
experience in military procurement, and do not feel a need to have the USG negotiate sales on 
their behalf, tend to choose DCS. DCS sales may also come in the fonn of Technical Assistance 
agreements (DCS-TA) rather than simply manufactured defence articles, which provides 












ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITY PROGRAM (EIPC) 
EIPC was an initiative aimed at increasing the number of foreign military personnel qualified to 
participate in international peacekeeping missions. EIPC provided: peacekeeping related to 
training and education (mostly through the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) located 
in Monterey, California), English language training, workshops, visits to peacekeeping training 
centres, non-lethal training equipment, library resources, and training simulation software. The 
goal was that upon completion, participants would have a good grasp of peace support 
operations policy, doctrine, logistics, and interoperability issues. Once the ACOTA programme 












AFRICA CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE (ACRI) 
The ACRI's objective was to enhance the capacity of African nations to better perform 
peacekeeping and relief tasks and thus encourage regional self-reliance. It sought to promote 
common doctrine, interoperability and standard communications technology among African 
forces. U.S. trainers conducted training in peacekeeping operations, communications, mine 
removal, and logistics. The U.S. also contributed non-lethal equipmt:nt to ACRI participants. 
While ACRI encouraged joint training exercises between African forces to hone their capacity to 












AFRICAN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
(ACOTA) 
This is the programme created by the Bush Administration in the spring of 2002 to take the 
place of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). It was designed to provide training in 
peacekeeping operations and regular military tactics to military units from selected countries. 
'lbe most significant difference between the two programmes is that ACOTA includes training 
for offensive military operations, including light infantry tactics and small unit tactics. This is 
designed to enhance the ability of African troops to conduct peacekeeping operations in hostile 
environments. The programme's goal is to increase the capabilities of these militaries in areas 
such as human rights, interaction with civil society, international law, military staff skills, and 












PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION PROGRAM (PM E) 
The Professional Military Education (PME) programme is comprised of progressive levels of 
military education designed to prepare military officers for leadership. It includes various basic 
level courses for the new and junior officers, command and staff colleges for the mid-level 
officers, and war colleges for the senior officers. International students may attend most of 
these courses through the normal Security Assistance Training quota process; however, the 
command colleges as well as the war colleges are by-invitation-only, with each U.S. Military 
Service deciding the invitation list. The sponsoring country is asked to provide only career 
personnel for these types of courses, and to meet the required rank/grade and educational level 












DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
ACTIVITIES TRAINING PROGRAM (OIlA) 
This programme brings foreign participants to the U.S. based on individual technical expertise 
and then marries their knowledge to intelligence operations. The participants work together to 













DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAM (DP) 
This programme deals with the military application of nuclear energy. The goal of the 
programme is to reduce global nuclear danger by maintaining a secure supply of U.S. nuclear 
weapons, and maintaining the ability to design, produce and test nuclear weapons in order to 
meet u.S. national security requirements, and ensure that associated materials, capabilities, and 
reliable technologies are in a safe, environmentally sound, and cost effective manner. The 













DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF GLOBAL THREAT REDlJCTION 
TRAINING PROGRAM (OGTR) 
This office identifies, secures, removes, and/or facilitates removal of vulnerable nuclear and 
other radioactive materials around the world that pose a threat to the lJ .S. and the international 












DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY REGIME BUILDING/PREVENT£NG PROLIFERAT£ON 
PROGRAM (RBPP) 
This programme works to support international efforts to reduce worldwide tensions through 
non-proliferation treaties, cooperative monitoring and verification regimes, export control~ and 
sensitive materials and technology, and international nuclear safeguards. It provides policy and 
technical expertise to foreign governments in regards to U.S. efforts to implement non-












DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECCRITY NON-PROLIFERATION 
PROGRAM (NSNP) 
This programme provided training ill the following areas: prevention of nuclear weapons 
technology proliferation; protection of nuclear materials and facilities; research and development 
activities, which supported advanced technologies that aid in detecting and countering emerging 












DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR ENERGY, SCIENCE" AND TECHNOLOGY 
TRAINING PROGRAM (NEST) 
This programme addressed issues with existing nuclear power plants; supported nuclear energy 
research and nuclear energy education; worked on provision of power systems for defence and 
deep space exploratory needs; worked to develop technologies for production and application of 












DEPARTNIENT OF ENERGY NON-PROLIFERATION RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (NPRD) 
The objectives of this training programme are to use technology to promote the reduction of 
threats to national security posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation and 
assist in commitments to treaty monitoring. Programme participants develop applicable 
technologies, demonstrate and validate field able prototypes, and provide operational hardware 
and software to end-users. The four main programmes are the: Chemical and Biological National 













OFFICE OF OVERSEAS PROSECUTORIAL, DEVELOPMENT, ASSISTANCE AND 
TRAINING PROGRAM (OPDAT-ITP, OPDAT-JVP) 
OPDAT uses DoJ resources to assist prosecutors and criminal justice personnel worldwide in 
developing and sustaining effective criminal justice institutions. On occasion, OPDA T partners 
with the U.S. Federal judiciary, providing an opportunity for judges to share their experience and 
expertise with their foreign counterparts. Working with the DoS and USAJD, OPDAT proyides 
technical assistance tailored to meet the specific justice sector needs of a particular country or 
region. Once a justice sector assessment has been conducted, OPDAT applies a best practices 
methodology to develop effective criminal codes and procedures; improve institutional 
structures, policies and relationships; and/or enhance the professional capabilities and skills of 
prosecutors and select law enforcement officers to help create more responsive and responsible 
criminal justice systems abroad. OPDA T also stations long term Resident Legal Advisors in 












INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM (ICITAP) 
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I'FDFR\L Bl~RL \l' OJ' IN\ I',~T[(;\T[()N J"TLRi\ \Tlc):\\LTR \I'\[N(; PROCH \\1 
(H)I) 
The FBI is made up of International Training and Assistance Units that identify and follow 
through with training needs of foreign law enforcement agencies. Most training is on basic and 
advanced investigative techniques, counter-terrorism, organized crime, and intelligence 
gathering. The programme also supports law enforcement infrastmcture development with 












lWlC; ]'.]OR(]\II'.[ \(;].,\CY 1'.[11\:\ \TI()"'. \L 11\ \1"-.\"-.(; PR()(;R\\I (UJ.\) 
The DEA's role is that of international consultant to law enforcement agencles, as well as 
foreign governments seeking to develop quality narcotics law enforcement programs, 
organisational infrastructures, and judicial reforms. 
The specific courses offered are continually changing as new curricula are developed and 
instituted in response to experiences, changes in law enforcement emphasis, current 
international narcotics trafficking situations, new technologies, and specific requests of the host 
governments. However, the curricula generally include core narcotics enforcement principles 
and techniques. Topics of instruction include: initiation and development of narcotics 
investigations, surveillance techniques, pharmacology, intelligence collection and analytical 
methods, tactical safety, interviewing, drug identification, asset forfeiture and financial 
investigations, undercover operations, operational planning and an overview of current 
international trafficking trends and situations. All DEA international training programmes have 
as a major objective the building of regional working relationships between countries. 
DEA offers both in-country and regional training programmes conducted by mobile training 
teams. In-country programmes are seminars conducted in a host country and only include 
participants from that country. Regional training is designed to bring together a combination of 
participants from a number of countries sharing common drug trafficking issues or routes. 
Regional schools have been found to be beneficial in fostering an improvement in professional 
relationships among the participants, in addition to covering the topical materials. A tralnlng 
team member to design each school to the specific requirements of the receiving country 
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The A TF programme provides trained explosives detection camne teams to selected foreign 
countries to assist them in their efforts to combat terrorism, To support the mission, the A TF 
developed a scientifically based explosives detection canine programme that trains dogs capable 
of detecting a myriad of different explosives compounds. ATF's programme uses a food and 
praise reward training methodology that exposes canines to five basic explosives groups, 
including chemical compounds used in estimated 19,000 explosives formulas. This training 
methodology allows for a canine to be repeatedly exposed to various explosives' odours daily, 













UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE INTERNATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM 
(lJSSS) 
The USSS sponsors two security cooperation initiatives m Southern African states: the 
Counterfeit Detection Program and the International Training Program. The Counterfeit 
Detection Program provides classroom and lab-based training for foreign counterparts in 
counterfeit U.S. currency. The ITP introduces participants to investigative procedures and 












FEDERAL L\ W ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER INTERNATIONAL 
TRAINING PROGRAM (FLETC) 
FLETC offers three types of training in Southern African countries: International Banking and 
Money Laundering Program (IBMLP), Interview Training, and an International Students 
Program (ISP). The IBMLP program is at basic and advanced levels and is designed for criminal 
investigators and law enforcement intelligence analysts studying financial crimes and terrorist 
financing. The Interview Training program trains law enforcement officials in proper interview 
and questioning techniques. The ISP program brings foreign law enforcement counterparts to 
the FLETC to train in every training division at the centre in order to foster collaborative 












ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (ATA) 
The A TA program trains civilian security and law enforcement personnel from friendly 
governments in police procedures that deal with terrorism. Diplomatic Security (DS) officers 
work with the host country's government and a team from that country's U.S. mission to 
develop the most effective means of training for bomb detection, crime scene investigation, 
airport and building security, maritime protections, and VIP protection. The Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance program builds the capacity of key countries to fight terrorism; establishes security 
relationships between U.S. and foreign officials to strengthen cooperative anti-terrorism efforts; 
and shares effective anti-terrorism techniques. 
DS assesses the training needs, develops the curriculum, and provides the resources to conduct 
the training. The bureau uses its own training experts as well as those from other LJ.S. federal, 
state, and local law enforcement agencies, police associations, and private security firms and 
consultants. 
Most ATA program recipients are developing nations lacking human and other resources needed 
to maintain an effective antiterrorism programme and infrastructure:. A TA training seeks to 
address deficiencies noted in the ability to perform the following areas: protecting national 
borders; protecting critical infrastructure; protecting national leadership; responding to and 













INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY-GABORONE, BOTSWANA 
(ILEi\-G) 
The United States and the Government of Botswana signed a bilateral agreement in July 2000 to 
establish an ILEA in Gaborone to promote international cooperation against crime. The main 
feature of the ILEA is a sLx-week intensive personal and professional development program, 
called the Law Enforcement Executive Development Program (LEEDP), for law enforcement 
mid-level managers. The LEEDP brings together approximately 45 participants from several 
nations for training on topics such as combating trans-national criminal activity, supporting 
democracy by stressing the rule of law in international and domestic police operations, and by 
raising the professionalism of officers involved in the fight against crime. 
The ILEA also offers specialized courses for police and other criminal justice officials to 
enhance their capacity to work with U.S. and regional officials to combat international criminal 
activities. These courses concentrate on specific methods and techniques on a variety of 
subjects, such as counter-terrorism, anti-corruption, financial crimes, border security, drug 
enforcement, firearms and many others. 
The training faculty for ILEA is drawn from a cross-section of U.S. Federal law enforcement 
agencies, U.S. state and local law enforcement agencies, non-governmental organizations, and 
the international law enforcement community. ILEA training programmes includes a six-week 
core curriculum, offered approximately four times per year; special courses, approximately two 
weeks in length; and senior management conferences designed to disseminate vital crime control 
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The USCG provides trammg and consulting servlces ill maritime law enforcement, marme 
safety / environmental protection, small boat operation and maintenance, search and rescue, and 
infrastructure development for countries with waterway law enforcement programmes. 'lbe 
USCG works with individual nations, other u.s. federal agencies, and U.S. Embassies to 
determine the needs and coordinate specific training that can be held for small unit, multi 












AFRICAN COASTAL/BORDER SECLJRITY PROGRAM 
In Africa, the C.S. has initiated the African Coastal and Border Security programme to provide 
new and follow-on assistance to African partners to help them control sensitive border areas and 
to defend coastal waters from terrorist and criminal activities, as well as to better protect 
fisheries, oil, and environmental resources. The u.S. wants to prevent unlawful or hostile 
exploitation of the African maritime sector while collectively improving African capability to 
monitor activity throughout the domain; establish responsive decision-making architectures; 













UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL AGENCY INTERNATIONj~L 
TRAINING PROGRAM (fSA) 
The CBP is focused on border and port security in the U.S. with a pnonty on preventing 
terrorist entry into U.S. borders. The CBP has three security cooperation initiatives: the 
International Visitor Program (IVP), the general International Training and Assistance Program 
(111)), and the Export Control/Border Security Program (EXBS). The goal of the IVP program 
is to facilitate foreign official visits with senior managers and program officers relating border 
security. The ITAP program provides border security training with a focus on all aspects of 
security and law enforcement to help foreign nations develop and maintain their own working 
border security programs. 'Tbe EXBS program specifically trains border security officials and 












SAFE SKIES FOR AFRICA INITIATIVE 
The purpose of the Safe Skies for Africa Initiative is to promote sustainable improvements in 
aviation security and safety in Africa and to create the environment necessary to foster the 
growth of aviation services between Africa and the U.S. Nine African countries were selected to 
participate in this programme. Thcy are: Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, 
Mali, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. 
Inter-agency teams comprised of Federal Aviation Administration, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), u.S. Customs Service, DEA, and U.S. DoD specialists have 
conducted aviation security and safety observations (or assessments) of all the countries listed 
above with the exception of Zimbabwe. The FAA has hosted civil aviation authority (CAA) 
executives from these countries (except Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire) to assist them in 












UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
INTERNATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM (l'SA) 
The TSA programme assists foreign aviation and security counterparts with management of 
aviation security operations, improvement and maintenance of aviation security and safety, and 












GNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CGSTOMS ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 
INTERNATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM (ICE) 
The ICE is the G.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) investigative bureau and it has 
two programmes in Southern Africa: the International Visitors Program and International 
Training Program. The IVP brings counterparts to the G.S. for specially designed training and 
senior level meetings with a large focus on border-related legal issues. The 111) provides 
country-specific training for foreign law enforcement officials in areas such as WMD, cybcr-












uNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICE INTERNATION1\L 
TRAINING PROGRAM (USCIS) 
The uSCIS international training programme offers training to foreign counterparts in an 
Asylum Officer course. This course provides training in international human rights law, asylum 
and refugee law, interviewing techniques, decision making and decllsion writing skills, and 
effective background research investigative skills relative to the country of origin. All training is 
conducted in the l).S. 
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